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This thesis is a primer for students in the Introduction to Command, Control, 
and Communication Courses at the Naval Postgraduate School. This document 
provides students a consolidated reference that emphasizes key concepts and ideas 
presented by the course instructor and required readings. Its organization closely 
parallels the course outline used for in-class instruction. 
It supports course objectives by providing an executive overview of a wide 
variety of C2 topics. These topics include: C2 related definitions; roles, missions, 
capabilities, and warfighting philosophies of the military services; C2 functions and 
C41 systems used by the military services; and C41 modernization initiatives. 
This primer serves as a daily reading source that explains fundamental concepts, 
highhghts key points in external readings, and cites examples of modern applications 
of C4I systems. The thesis is not intended to eliminate the requirements for outside 
research from the courses, but only to reinforce the main ideas. The concise 
organization of material presented in this thesis will promote retention of course 
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Over the past few years, shrinking defense budgets and the fall of the Soviet 
Union have lead to significant reductions of the United States Armed Forces. 
These force reductions have caused military leaders to seek new ways to maximize 
the use and capabilities offered by joint military forces. History has shown that 
joint interoperability among the services' C41 systems affects the success of joint 
military operations. Consequently, this has developed a need for all military 
services to formally educate some of their officers in joint Command, Contral, 
Communications, and Intelligence (C4I). Military officers may receive this formal 
education by participating in programs like the Joint C41 Systems curriculum 
offered at the Naval Postgraduate School. The key objective of this education is to 
provide the officers with the knowledge they need to anticipate and support their 
commander's C41 joint interoperability requirements. 
Military officers attending the Joint C41 Systems curriculum at the Naval 
Postgraduate School complete a seven quarter education program where they 
receive courses in a wide range of technical areas that focus on Command and 
Control (C2), Command, Control, and Communications (C3), and C41 related 
subjects. The curriculum is designed to continually build on the knowledge 
acquired from previous courses. 
A Joint C41 Systems class typically contains students from all four services. 
Since they arrive with diverse background experiences, they begin their education 
by taking an introductory level course in C3. The goal of this course is to provide 
first quarter C41 Systems students a basic foundation for use in other courses in the 
course matrix will be taught or later addressed. The introductory C3 course is a 
survey course that includes a wide variety of C3 related topics and issues. Due to 
the large number of C3 topics presented, most are only briefly discussed. 
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Additional reading assignments or courses taken later in the curriculum will 
provide additional depth in many of these areas. However, many topics are not 
covered with the focus or level of detail desired. 
This thesis serves a dual purpose. The first is to provide students with a course 
primer that captures and emphasizes key concepts or main ideas presented by both 
the course instructors and from required readings. It serves as a single source 
document that minimizes confusion by avoiding unnecessary and extraneous 
detail. By integrating this primer into the course, it will provide both the students 
and the instructors a common reference plan that clearly maps the direction for the 
introductory courses. This thesis will, by no means, totally eliminate outside 
reading assignments, but it will allow them to become more focused. 
The second purpose of the thesis is to supplement course reference material by 
providing in depth discussions for topics that will not be addressed by other 
courses in the course matrix. These topics are fundamental to understanding 
potential application of ideas, concepts, and theories presented later in the 
curriculum. This thesis will also build a basic knowledge for understanding C3 
related subjects presented by visiting guest lectures and routine video 
teleconferencing presentations. To accomplish this task, this thesis covers many 
broad areas in C3 to include: C2 related defitions; the military services's roles, 
C2 organizations, and warfighting philosophies, and the military services' C41 
systems and communications support systems. 
Chapter I defines and discusses the meaning of the basic C2 terminology 
including command, control, C2, C3, and C41. Also presented is a description of 
the Lawson decision making model and its importance to C2. 
Chapter 11 provides an executive overview of Department of Defense's 
organization, purpose, primary C41 system, and communication support systems. 
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This chapter provides an educational framework for understanding how the 
services contribute to the DoDs overall objectives. 
Chapters I11 to VI describe the roles and missions, current C2 organizations, 
capabilities, limitations, and warfighting philosophies for each of the four military 
services. These chapters present how each service operates, deploys, and 
contributes to tactical, theater, and joint operations. The overall goal is to 
introduce students to the operational considerations required for employing C41 
systems that will support the C2 needs of theater and tactical commanders. 
Chapters VII to X identi& basic C2 functions shared by all of the services and 
present the current C41 systems used to support them. Although strategic and 
national C41 systems are frequently referenced, the thesis focuses on theater and 
tactical level C41 systems. Even though advancing technology may soon lead to 
the replacement of the C41 systems presented in this thesis, having a basic 
knowledge of their current application, will continue to serve as a reference point 
for evaluating future replacement systems. 
Chapter XI discusses ongoing C41 modernization initiatives. It presents an 
overview of the C4IFTW concept and the evolution of Global Command and 
Control System (GCCS). 
Chapter XII concludes the thesis with recommendations for further research in 
areas that exceed its scope. Some of these areas include: C2 processes for 
organizational and operational decision making; special operation forces' 
organization; and joint level planning, organization, and deployment. Further 
research in these areas would further contribute to the introductory course 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Today's military force has become much smaller over the past few years, 
due to the ending of the cold war and dwindling defense budgets. This has 
encouraged our military leaders to turn their attention toward the potential 
capabilities achievable through the effective application of joint military forces. 
History has often revealed that the success of joint operations depends heavily on 
the interoperability of among the military service's C41 communication systems. 
As a result, all of the services have now identified a need to formally educate their 
officers in joint command, control, and communications (C3). 
Education programs such as the Joint Command, Control, Communications, 
and Intelligence (Joint C4I) curriculum taught at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
provides a means to satisfy this requirement. Each of the services are now sending 
selected officers to Naval Postgraduate School to receive this education. Officers 
participating in the Joint C41 curriculum are expected to eventually return to their 
organizations with the knowledge necessary to satisfL their commanders 
Command and Control (C2) needs in a joint environment. 
Since these officers typically arrive to the Joint C41 curriculum having 
diverse backgrounds and experiences, they are required to take an introductory 
course in Command, Control, and Communications (C3) during their first quarter. 
This course introduces a wide range of C3 related topics from which other courses 
in the curriculum will be based. Since the introductory C3 is taught in only one 
quarter, class time is a major constraint that prevents the course instructors fi-om 
presenting any one topic in-depth. To over come this constraint, students are 
assigned numerous external reading assignments to develop a deeper 
understanding of C3 related topics and issues. Since these assignments are taken 
from a number of different references, they often overwhelm students with 
extraneous detail leading to possible confusion or distract their attention from the 
true learning objectives of the course. Improved correlation between the outside 
reading assignments and classroom presentations, calls for a course primer that 
clearly establishes a harmonic relation between them. 
B. PURPOSE 
The overall goal of this thesis is to improve the quality of education in the 
introductory C3 course by serving two purposes. The first purpose is to capture 
key points and ideas from external reading assignments and inclass instruction, by 
providing students with a course primer. The primer will serve as a single source 
document that emphasizes the course's main topics by avoiding extraneous detail 
in the external readings, as well as, provide course instructors and students a clear 
map for the course's direction. The second purpose of this thesis is to supplement 
the course reference material. It will provide students with more in-depth 
discussions on other important C3 related topics, not covered by existing reference 
materials or addressed in follow-on courses. These topics include: C2 related 
definitions; the military services's roles, C2 organizations, and warfighting 
philosophies; and the military services' C41 systems and communications support 
systems. By providing detailed discussions on these topics, students can develop 
the basic knowledge necessary for understanding C3 related subjects presented by 
visiting guest lectures and routine video teleconferencing presentations. 
C. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is oriented toward each of the military services' 
roles, organizations, warfighting philosophies, C41 systems, and communication 
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support systems used at operational and tactical levels. The scope of this thesis is 
driven primarily by the notion that a majority of officers attending the Joint C41 . 
Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School are normally mid-grade officers, who 
typically return to organizations at operational and tactical levels. This thesis 
focuses on regional CINCs roles, organization, and C41 systems vice those of the 
functional CINCs. Although an overview of DoD's functions and organization are 
briefly discussed in Chapter 11, more detailed presentations at this level fall beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Other important areas that support national, strategic, and 










Strategic nuclear C2, organizations, and C41 systems (NORAD) 
Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) 
Joint Deployment System (JDS) 
Unique joint contingency C41 and communication support systems 
Administrative requirements, organizations, and functions at the 
national and operational levels 
Defense level planning systems (JOPES, JSPS, PPBS, ACQ) 
Functional CINCs' roles, organizations, and C41 systems 
Special Operations Forces missions, organizations, C41 systems and 
communications support systems. 
National and strategic level sensors and intelligence processing 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remaining part of this chapter defines and discusses the meaning of the 
basic C2 terminology including command, control, C2, C3, and C4I. Also 
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presented is a description of the Lawson decision making model and its importance 
to c2.  
Chapter 11 provides an executive overview of Department of Defense's 
organization, purpose, primary C41 system, and communication support systems. 
This chapter provides an educational framework for understanding how the 
services contribute to the DoD's overall objectives. 
Chapters I11 to VI describe the roles and missions, current C2 organizations, 
capabilities, limitations, and warfighting philosophies for each of the four military 
services. These chapters present how each service operates, deploys, and 
contributes to tactical, theater, and joint operations. The overall goal is to 
introduce students to the operational considerations required for employing C41 
systems that will support the C2 needs of theater and tactical commanders. 
Chapters VII to X i d e n w  basic C2 functions shared by all of the services 
and present the current C41 systems used to support them. Although strategic and 
national C41 systems are frequently referenced, the thesis focuses on theater and 
tactical level C41 systems. Even though advancing technology may soon lead to 
the replacement of the C41 systems presented in this thesis, having a basic 
knowledge of their current application, will continue to serve as a reference point 
for evaluating future replacement systems. 
Chapter XI concludes the thesis with a discussion of ongoing C41 
modembation initiatives. It presents an overview of the C4IFTW concept and the 
evolution of Global Command and Control System (GCCS). 
Chapter XII concludes the thesis with recommendations for further research 
in areas that exceed its scope. Some of these areas include: C2 processes for 
organizational and operational decision making; special operation forces' 
organization; and joint level planning, organization, and deployment. Further 
research in these areas would further contribute to the teaching objectives in the 
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i introductory course and better prepare students for follow-on courses in the Joint I C41 Systems curriculum. 
E. C2" DEFINED I I 
I The terms command, control, command and control (C2), and command, 
control, and communications (C3) have become a common part of today's military 
vocabulary. Although initially their definitions may seem apparent, these terms 
actually possess a variety of meanings depending on the user's interest in command 
and control. For example, engineers might view these definitions in terms of the 
communications facilities, power requirements, network configurations, and 
bandwidth availability. To military personnel managers, they may interpret the 
meanings of command and control terms as it pertains to the human aspect of the 
C2 process. Still others, who plan military operations, may interpret the 
definitions in terms of their contributions to operational goals. Ultimately, the 
different meanings are associated with one's specific interest in the area of C2. A 
common awareness of the dichotomies that exist in C2 related terminology is 
useful for productive and cohesive military planning of tomorrow's armed forces. 
[Ref. 1: pp. 5-12] 
The main point of this chapter is to present how commonly used C2 terms 
defined by the Joint Pub 1-02 (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) 
are interpreted by two prominent figures in the study of C2; Frank Snyder and 
Thomas Coakley. Familiarization with their interpretation of C2 helps 




To form the basis for comparison, Joint Pub 1-02 provides a standard 
definition for command as follows: 
The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the 
direction, coordination, and control of military forces. [Ref. 2: p. 771. 
This definition implies that command is a designated authority granted to 
commanders, so that they can lawfully direct and manage their resources to 
accomplish the orders assigned by higher echelons. This authority includes the 
responsibility for the success or failure of their organizations. Although the 
authority can be delegated down to the lowest practical level, the responsibility is 
nontransferable and resides with the original appointee. 
In his book ''Command and Control: the Literature and Commentaries," 
Frank Snyder adopts the first sentence of C2, defined in the Joint Pub 1-02, as his 
definition for command. He defines command as: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over his assigned forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission. [Ref. 2: p. 771 
Snyder emphasizes that command is a function to be performed through some 
form of human activity, rather than just an authority as defined in Joint Pub 1-02. 
This human activity, which integrates the human dimension into the C2 process, is 
based on an individual's attributes such as leadership, courage, judgement, and 
forejight. Commanders must effectively apply these attributes to successfully 
motivate subordinates to carry out their orders. [Ref. 3: pp. 11-14] 
Thomas Coakley views the definition of command as a synonym for the 
phrase command and control. By using historic examples in his book, "Command 
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and Control for War and Peace," Coakley illustrates the phrase command and 
controZ originated from the single term command. In the early days when the 
force structure was simple, Alexandria the Great performed the functions of 
command by directing and leading his forces by himself. By relying on his own 
abilities, Alexandria assessed the enemy situation, developed a battle plan, and 
observed the results of his decisions. Coakley postulates that the phrase command 
and control replaced the term command following World War 11. During this 
period, the force structure evolved into a complex organization. As a result, 
commanders could no longer rely solely on their own abilities, but instead required 
staff assistance to command their forces. Coakley suggests that command 
functions have evolved from a tactical to a strategic orientation, concerned with 
associating only the "big picture" of the battle with command. [Ref. 1: pp. 34-36] 
2. Control 
Department of Defense (DoD) and Snyder both agree that control is defmed 
as : 
The authority which may be less than full command exercised by a 
commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other 
organizations. [Ref. 2: p. 881 
This definition describes situations where commanders only have temporary 
authority over assigned forces to perform specific command functions such as 
administrative, operational, or tactical control. For example, an army aviation 
support company maybe operationally attached to an infantry brigade to provide 
lift support for a specific mission. In this case, the brigade commander would 
have temporary control over the aviation assets only for the duration of the 
mission. Upon completion of the mission, the control of the aviation support 
company would return to its parent unit. 
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Coakley views the meaning of control as having tactical or operational 
connotations concerned with the immediate management of forces. He further 
presents the ideas that the word control has different meanings depending on the 
users' point of view. For example, an army commander of force A may view 
control from an organizational perspective as it relates to managing the operational 
and administrative activities of another force B. From an air force commander's 
perspective he or she might view control in terms of specific systems or aircraft 
such as directing an aircraft to attack a designated target. The Navy, on the other 
hand, may view the term control as a means of constraint, such as restricting or 
limiting a specific ship from attacking an enemy vessel. Coakley also presents the 
push-pull dichotomy that exists between meaning of terms command and control. 
He defmes command as pushing forces into combat and control as holding the 
forces back. Although Coakley shares the common idea with DoD and Snyder that 
control relates to tactical or operational control, he differs by defining control as 
leash that commanders use to limit or constrain activities of their force. In 
contrast, DoD and Snyder imply that constraint is only part of control. They view 
control in a broader sense by suggesting that someone other than the commander 
may exercise control over deployed forces or assets. Take for instance, an air 
traffic controller may direct pilots to fly specific directions, even though they are 
not the Commander. DoD and Snyder further suggest that control is a subset of 
command, meaning that i fa  commander has command, he will also have control. 
Conversely, control can occur independently, without the presence of command. 
[Ref. 1: pp. 37-38] 
3. Command and Control 
DoD defines the phrase command and control as follows: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 
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Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement 
of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures 
employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 
[Ref. 2: p. 771 
This definition implies that command and control is a process by which the 
commander plans, directs, coordinates, and controls his assigned resources to 
achieve some common objective or goal. 
Similarly, Snyder adopts the following subset of DoD's definition to define 
command and control as a process: 
Procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 
accomplishment of the mission. [Ref. 2: p. 771 
Snyder expounds on this definition, by explaining that the C2 process is initiated 
when a commander receives information about the situation. The commander then 
decides the best possible course of action, before directing his subordinates to 
execute his decision. The process concludes when the commander receives 
feedback on the effectiveness of his decision and further directs adjustments, as 
needed, to satis@ mission requirements. [Ref. 3: p. 11-12] 
a. Types of Decisions 
Commanders generally make three types of decisions: 
organizational, informational, and operational decisions. Organizational decisions 
are decisions usually made before the start of the mission. They establish the 
structure of the chain of command, dictate levels of authority, and provide a path 
for reporting information within the organization. Informational decisions are the 
decisions that commanders make to identify the type of information, format, and 
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frequency they need to accurately access the situation and make operational 
decisions. Operational decisions are the decisions that tell subordinate activities 
what course of actions to execute to accomplish their assigned mission. [Ref. 3: p. 
131 
Coakley, like DoD and Snyder, also defmes C2 as a process: 
C2 is eve-g an executive uses in making decisions and seeing 
they're carried out; it includes the authority accruing from his or her 
appointment to a position and involves people, information, procedures, 
equipment, and the executive's own mind. A C2 process is a series of 
functions which include gathering information, making decisions, and 
monitoring results. [Ref. 1: p. 531 
Coakley's definition differs from DoDs and Snyder's definitions because Coakley 
uses more general terminology that applies beyond a military context. In his 
definition, Coakley uses the term executive instead of commander to identi@ those 
individuals assigned to leadership positions. These positions inherit a certain 
amount of authority to direct others to perform some action. The degree of 
authority depends primarily on the level of that position within an organizational 
hierarchy. Coakley defines the C2 process, similar to DoD and Snyder, as a 
relation between executives (commanders) and their responsibility of managing 
their assigned resources to achieve a particular objective. The second part of 
Coakley's definition for C2 focuses on the input, processing, and output of 
information by the decision maker. 
b. C2Analogy 
To illustrate the C2 process, Coakley uses the analogy of a head 
coach of a football team and compares it to that of a commander. The head coach, 
similar to the commander, is the primary decision maker for the organization. 
Before an important game, the head coach must obtain information about the 
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opposing team that includes their capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Prior to 
a mission, a commander must perform a similar function of obtaining information 
about the enemy. Both the coach and the commander must rely on scouts and 
subordinates to provide this information in a useful format, so they can make 
future decisions. Once the coach receives this information, he, like the 
commander, must rely on his own experience to formulate and choose a strategy 
that offers his organization the best advantage. After the game or mission begins, 
the coach (commander) must receive feedback, so they can constantly evaluate 
their progress and direct adjustments, as necessary to achieve their final goal. This 
analogy provides a useful tool for understanding the basic concept of any C2 
process. [Ref. 1: pp. 18-23] 
C. Lawson Model 
The success or failure of military forces in combat often depends 
greatly on the speed and efficiency of their C2 process. Commanders must acquire 
real-time information, make tactical decisions, and distribute information to 
subordinates faster than the enemy, in order to, maximize their chances for 
victory. Joel S .  Lawson developed an excellent model, commonly called the 
"Lawson Model," that replicates the C2 process [Ref. 1: p. 321. Figure 1 shows 
the five functions that compose of the Lawson model are sense, process, compare, 
decide and act functions. 
The sense function is the collection of data and information about 
the situation or environment, such as the positions of friendly and enemy forces, 
terrain, obstacles, and types of weapons. Once information is collected from both 
internal and external sources, a commander and staff must perform the process 
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Figure 1 .  The Lawson Model. [After Ref 1:  p. 321 
function. The process function is the correlation of collected information to 
develop possible courses of actions. These courses of action are analyzed and 
compared to one another to determine the tradeoffs and benefits relative to the 
desired goal or state. This is called the compare function. The commander must 
then perform the decide h c t i o n  by using available decision aids and input from 
higher authority to decide which coarse of action will best satis@ the mission. 
Upon making his decision, the commander directs his forces to execute his orders, 
called the act function. The result of this act may cause commanders to issue new 
orders to his forces. As these forces interact with the enemy, they perturb the 
environment. The C2 model senses these perturbations causing it to start another 
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C2 cycle. The Lawson model represents a methodical decision making loop that 
has often modeled how commanders made decisions in the past. Commanders, 
who access the situation, make decisions, and provide direction to their forces at a 
faster rate than that of their adversaries, are more likely to lead their forces to 
decisive victories. This is commonly termed "Getting inside of the enemy's C2 
cycle". [Ref. 1: pp. 32-33] 
4. Command and Control Systems 
Systems that support the C2 process may be called command and control 
(C2) systems, command, control, and communications (C3) systems and 
command, control, communications, computers (C4) systems and so forth. DOD 
defmes command and control system as: 
The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and 
personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and 
controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the mission 
assigned. [Ref. 2: p. 771 
This defintion encompasses all of the different variations of a C2 system by 
implying that it is a composite of all resources and tools a commander needs to 
manage his force and achieve his objectives. 
Snyder favors the phrase C4 systems and defmes it using the middle part of 
DOD's definition: 
An arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, 
and procedures employed by a commander. [Ref. 3: p. 113 
This definition may seem straight forward, however, the types of components that 
make up C2 systems have occasionally been a source of debate among politicians 
and military leaders. For example, some believe that C2 systems should include 
intelligence (C3I), since commanders require it for making decisions. Others 
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believe that computers should be added to the list of C2 systems and intelligence 
should be kept separate. These differences in interpretation of DoD's definition 
for C2 systems have increased the difficulty for military leaders in the planning of 
future C2 systems. [Ref. 1: pp. 9-10] 
Snyder, like Coakley, supports the same general idea that the function of any 
C2 system is to support the C2 process. Snyder further points out that regardless 
of different phrases one chooses to refer to C2 systems, all are acceptable, as long 
as they refer to system(s) that support the C2 process. [Ref. 3: p. 121 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced several different interpretations of the terms 
command, control, command and control, and command and control systems. 
Command is defined as some level of authority and responsibility given to 
commanders to perform a mission. Control is less than full command in which 
commanders have limited and temporary authority over assigned forces to conduct 
some specific function of control. Command and control is described as a process 
that produces one of the three types of decisions; organizational, informational, 
and operational. The Lawson model illustrates the five functions associated with 
the C2 process that includes sense, process, compare, decide, and act. Although 
many variations of the term C2 systems exist, all share a common purpose of 
supporting the C2 process. In addition, the components of C2 systems may 
simultaneously support one or multiple C2 processes, at different levels of 
command. 
The next four chapters will describe the roles and missions, current C2 
organizations, capabilities, limitations, and wdighting philosophies for each of 
the military services. These chapters will also present how each service operates, 
deploys, and contributes their capabilities to tactical, theater, and joint operations. 
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This information will develop an appreciation and understanding for the 




11. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OVERVIEW 
In the previous chapter the basic C2 related def*mitions were defined to 
facilitate a better understanding of the scope, ideas, and concepts presented 
throughout this thesis. Before presenting each of the roles, missions, and 
warfighting philosophies for each of the military services, the reader should 
become familiar with the Department of Defense's (DoD) organization and 
purpose. To achieve this goal, this chapter briefly describes the DoD's 
organizational structure, primary functions, C41 systems, and key communication 
support systems. This will build an educational framework necessary for 
understanding information discussed in subsequent chapters. 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
The DoD was originally created as the National Military Establishment 
(NME) by the National Security Act of 1947. It was renamed two years later as 
the Department of Defense (DoD) by the National Security Act of 1949. Today's 
DoD receives its direction, control, and authority from the National Command 
Authority (NCA) that is comprised of the President and the Secretary of Defense. 
They are granted by law the full or limited authority to direct the Armed Forces of 
the United States into military action as they deem necessary to enforce national 
and foreign policy, protect our national interests, and promote global stability. 
The NCA decisions are normally based on advice from the National Security 
Council (NSC). The NSC is composed of the President, Vice President, Secretary 
of State, and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman for Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Director of Central Intelligence Agency serve as advisors to the NSC. [Ref. 4: pp. 
2-2 to 2-71 
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The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), under the authority of the President 
(Commander in Chief), provides direction and control over the DoD and its 
component agencies. He also advises the President on all matters relating to DoD 
activities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), under the authority of the Chairman of 
the JCS, represent their respective military departments in advising the President, 
the SECDEF, and the NSC on service related issues. In a similar fashion, the 
Chairman himself serves as the principle military advisor to the NCA and NSC. 
Each of the Service Departments have their own Service Secretary who receives 
guidance, direction, and specific military objectives from the SECDEF. [Ref. 4: p. 
2-41 
1. DoD Organization 
There are a number of components that make up the DoD organization. 
These components include Secretary of Defense, Chairman of JCS, JCS, DoD 
staff, military departments, DoD agencies, Combatant Commands, and DoD field 
activities, as shown in Figure 2. [Ref. 4: p. 2-41 
2. DoD Functions and Responsibilities 
The above components collectively contribute to the DoD's overall 
objectives that as prescribed by the National Security act of 1947. These 
objectives are: [Ref. 4: p. 2-51 
0 Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all 
enemies, foreign and domestic 
0 Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the 
United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest 
0 Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United 
States 
18 
. DOD ORGANIZATION 
DOD STAFF 
1 Dep. Secretary of Defense 
2 Under Secretaries 
11 Assistant Secretaries 
5 Deputy Under Secretaries 
10 Directors 
10 Other officials 
L Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs 
I of Staff 
Joint Chiefs 
of Staff 
I DOD AGENCIES (16) 
I 
MILITARY ' 
Defense Investigative Service (DIS) 
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) 
Advanced Research Projeas Agency (ARPA) 
National Security Agency (NSA) 
Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA) 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) 
Central Imagery Office (CIO) 
Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) 
Combatant 
Commands (10) 
DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES (7) 
Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program 
of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS) 
Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) 
Defense Medical Program Activity (DMPA) 
Off ice of Economic Adjustment (OEA) 
Dept. of Defense Dependent Schools (DODDS) 
American Forces Information Service (AFIS) 
Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) 
Figure 2. DoD Organization. [After Ref. 41 
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The DoD Directive 5 100.1 outlines specific support and operational 
responsibilities for DoD that are performed by the Administrativehpport and 
operational chains of command respectively. The administrative/support chain of 
command exists and runs from the President to the SECDEF to the service 
secretaries of the military departments to service chiefs and then to the Component 
Commanders in Chiefs (CINCS) of military forces. Some examples of the 
responsibilities or functions of thts chain of command include; recruiting, 
organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, administering, 
and maintaining the military forces. The operational chain of command runs from 
the President to the SECDEF and then to the Unified Combatant Commanders 
(CINCS). It is important to note that the Chairman of the JCS plays a key role in 
operational chain of command by acting as the primary military advisor to 
the NCA and by facilitating communications between the NCA and the CINCS as 
they perform their assigned military missions. Some examples of operational 
responsibilities (functions) are military advice, strategic direction, operational 
planning, and C2 over Combatant Commands. Even though each of the military 
services perform both support and operational functions, this thesis focuses 
primarily on their operational responsibilities and their related C2 organizational 
structures. These will be addressed in Chapters 111 through VI. [Ref. 5 :  p. 21 
DoD's operational C2 functions differ from the basic C2 functions 
commonly performed at the theater and tactical levels. The five C2 functions 
common to the theater and tactical levels will be presented in Chapters VII through 
X. These C2 functions are common to each of the military services and include 
intelligence, air operations (or air defense), frre support, maneuver, and logistics. 
These C2 functions will serve as a baseline for presenting the contributing utilities 
and values of each of the services' C41 systems, as they support the operational 
chain of command. 
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The fundamental difference between Unified and a Specified Combatant 
Command (when activated) is that an Unified Combatant Command is composed 
of forces from two or more military departments, where as a Specified Combatant 
Command is composed of forces from only a single military department. The 
commanders for Unified and Specified Combatant Commands are called 
Commanders in Chief (CINCS). These organizations are generally assigned 
broad, continuing missions in their designated regions. [Ref. 4: p. 2-19] 
B. DoD C41 SYSTEM (WWMCCS) 
The DoD accomplishes the functions and responsibilites discussed in the 
previous section, by using their primary C4I system called the World-Wide 
Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). This system supports DoD 
by extending C2 from the NCA to the component CINCS. WWMCCS automates 
the information exchange through a globally dispersed WWMCCS Intercomputer 
Network (WIN) that gives users the capability to review, update, and exchange 
information with computer databases at various locations. The system also is 
capable of interfacing with other C2 systems such as: [Ref. 4: pp. 2-25 to 2-28] 
0 Presidential Command and Control System 
0 Non-DoD Command and Control Systems (State Department, 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), United Nations (UN), Coast 
Guard) 
0 Tactical C41 Systems 
WWMCCS is composed of five elements including: communications, 
warning, executive aids, command facilities, and data collectiodprocessing. 
These elements are used on a daily basis by DoD and form the JCS to the 
Component Commanders to support their operational requirements and to keep 
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abreast of the readiness state of their forces. [Ref. 4: pp. 2-26 to 2-27] 
A key subcomponent of WWMCCS is called the National Military 
Command System (NMCS). This component serves as the main C41 system that 
supports primary and alternate command posts such as the National Military 
Command Center (NMCC), NMCC Site R, the National Emergency Airborne 
Command Post (NEACP), and other command posts designated by the SECDEF. 
The NMCS allows the effective coordination of military plans and operations with 
other outside activities such as: [Ref. 4: pp. 2-29 to 2-30] 
0 White House Situation Room 
CIA Operations Center 
0 Department of State Operations Center 
National Coordination Center for Telecommunications 
0 United Nations Military Missions 
U.S. Coast Guard Operations Center 
Federal Aviation Administration Executive Communications Control 
Center 
One of the principle features of WWMCCS is the automated support that it 
provides to the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The 
JOPES is an integrated senior-level, decision-malung system used by the NCA and 
throughout the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). It assists users 
in determining the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and directs the 
necessary actions accordingly. It is composed of policies, procedures, personnel, 
and facilities that interface with automated data processing systems, such as those 
provided by WWMCCS, to support operational requirements during deliberate and 
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crises action planning. JOPES interfaces with a number of other planning and 
support systems used at the DoD level such as: [Ref. 4: pp. 2-30 to 2-3 13 
0 Logistics Sustainment Analysis and Feasibility Estimator 
(LOGSAFE) 
0 Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool (DART) 
Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) 
0 Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System (FAPES) 
Despite the many capabilities offered by WWMCCS, further improvements 
to this system were halted in October 1992. This was not caused by the lack of 
use, but rather by technical limitations imposed by the growing crisis planning 
needs of the JPEC. On December 15, 1995, WWMCCS will be replaced by a 
new, more capable, system called Global Command and Control System (GCCS). 
It will contribute to the approved C41 For The Warrior (C4IFTW) concept that will 
eventually create a seamless C41 architecture. Both GCCS and C4IFTW will be 
discussed later in Chapter XI. [Ref. 4: p. 2-39] 
C. DOD COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
The DoD key communications support system that provides connectivity 
for DoD's C41 and contingency planning systems is called the Defense 
Communications System (DCS). The DCS extends connectivity from the NCA to 
theater tactical networks (area common user systems). The primary purpose of the 
DCS is to provide users long-haul communications services and strategic access to 
a wide variety of defense communications networks or systems. These networks 
or systems include the Defense Data Network (DDN), the Defense Switched 
Network (DSN), and the Defense Message System (DMS). Long-haul 
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connectivity between theater DCS entry stations and defense networks is typically 
provided by Defense Satellite Communication Systems (DSCS), commercial 
satellites, leased satellites, or fiber-optic cable. The Defense Information System 
Agency is the lead agency responsible for managing and controlling the DCS 
assets to ensure users are provided continuous, reliable, and responsive 
communication services. [Ref. 6: pp. 7-14 to 7-36] 
1. Defense Data Network (DDN) 
The DDN is a common-user communications network that provides the 
global transfer or exchange of information among diverse types of computers, 
terminals, and workstations. The network is composed of more than 350 Packet 
Switched Nodes (PSN), 650 trunks, 250 Terminal Access Controllers, 1900 hosts, 
and 4800 terminals. There are four types of DDNs used to pass unclassified and 
classified data. These types include; the Military Net (MILNET) for passing 
unclassified data, the Defense Secure Net 1 (DSNET 1) for passing Secret level 
data, the Defense Secure Net 2 (DSNET 2) for passing Top Secret data, and the 
Defense Secure Net 3 (DSNET 3) for passing SCI compartmental information. 
The DDN is currently transitioning to the Defense Information System Network 
(DISN). The DISN is a composite of Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (MCS) ,  Nonsecure Internet Protocal Router Network 
(NIPRNET), and Secure Internet Protocal Router Network (SIPRNET). [Ref. 6: p. 
7-22] 
2. Defense Switched Network (DSN) 
The DSN serves both common users and dedicated subscribers with a 
general purpose voice network. It provide its users with secure or nonsecure voice 
and teleconferencing long distance services. This switched network interfaces 
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with the services' AN/TTC-39 Tactical Circuit Switches and the Defense 
Commercial Telecommunications Network (DCTN). [Ref. 6: p. 7-32] 
3. Defense Message System (DMS) 
The DMS is a global message communications network that processes 
record traffic between strategically positioned DCS message centers (referred to in 
the past as AUTODIN Switching Centers). It is designed to support both general 
users and the intelligence community (at all security levels). The DMS will 
interface with the services, AN/TYC-39 Tactical Message Switches by using 
message store and forward techniques. [Ref. 6: p. 7-14] 
4. Satellite Communications 
There are a number of different types of satellites used by the services and 
DoD to provide long-haul connectivity for the DCS. Some of these satellites 
include DSCS satellites, Military Satellite Relay System (MILSTAR) satellites, 
Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), and Leased Satellites (LEASAT). Since the Navy is 
the primary users for the FLTSAT and LEASAT, they will be discussed later in 
Chapter VII, under the Navy's communication support systems. 
a. 
The DSCS are government owned multichannel Super High 
Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) Satellites 
Frequency (SHF) satellites positioned in geosynchronous orbit. These satellites 
provide earth, narrow, and area coverage fiom 75' North latitude to 75' South 
latitude to give users long-range connectivity into DCS networks. They are part of 
a Joint program to support long distance services necessary to pass intelligence 
data, emergency action messages, and critical C2 information. Currently, there are 
25 
two versions of the DSCS satellites in operation: DSCS I1 and DSCS 111. [Ref. 6: 
p. 7-28] 
6. Military Satellite System (MILSTAR) 
The MILSTAR is a new military satellite communications system 
currently being installed. This satellite system will support multi-service tactical 
mobile forces with real-time battle management functions such as air tasking 
orders and imagery dissemination. Since MILSTAR satellites will be Extremely 
High Frequency (EHF) systems, they will offer a large operating bandwidth that is 
capable of supporting very high data rates (T-U1.544 Mbps). To increase the 
system survivability and reliability, MILSTAR will be able to operate in adverse 
electronic warfare environments, due to its anti-attack, anti-jam characteristics. 
After their installation, MILSTAR satellites will also be fully compatible with the 
Navy's new EHF fleet satellites which it plans to install on selected ships, 
submarines, shore facilities, and aircraft. [Ref. 7: p. 291 
Presented above are strategic level communications support systems that 
support DoD's C41 and contingency planning systems. As stated earlier, these 
communications support systems provide connectivity from DoD to the theaters. 
Later in Chapters VII through X, discussions on each service's communications 
support systems will be oriented toward those used at the theater and tactical 
levels. In these discussions the services' communications support systems will be 
categorized as either a theater or a tactical systems. This approach allows a 
standard treatment and presentation for the various types of communications used 
across each of the military services. The determination for which category the 
systems are placed will be based on some or all of the following criterion: 
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Span of C2 supported by the system (local or theater level) 
0 Degree of interface with the strategic network (direct or indirect) 
Location of the system (communication zone or combat zone) 
Level of the subscriber (theater or unit level) 
The systems are categorized subjectively. This does not imply the 
categories have discrete boundaries. In fact, as communication support systems in 
all the services continue to evolve with advancing technology and a joint 
orientation, the boundaries between theater and tactical communications will 
become even less defined. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an executive overview of the DoD's organization, 
purpose, primary C41 systems, and communications support systems. It began by 
explaining the composition and role of the NCA, NSC, and the statutory advisers. 
This was followed by a list of the major elements that compose the DoD and a 
brief look at DoD's primary objectives. This chapter also addressed the 
adminstrative/support and operational chain of command that exist within the 
DoD. Their specific C2 functions (responsibilities) were outlined in DoD 
Directive 5 100.1. The WWMCCS C41 system was briefly described as DoD's 
primary C41 system used to perform these functions and coordinate required 
military actions among all of the DoD's agencies, activities, military departments, 
and CINCs. Long-had communications that support WWMCCS and extend C2 
from the NCA to the theater level was provided by various DCS communications 
networks. The next four chapters will describe the roles, organization, and 
warfighting philosophies of each of the military services as they contribute to the 
achievement of the DoD's overall objectives. 
27 
28 
111. U.S. NAVY MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND 
PHILOSOPHY 
The key to comprehending how the Navy exercises their command and 
control process requires some familiarization with its primary missions, 
organization, and warfghting philosophy. This chapter provides an overview of 
each of these areas. A basic knowledge of the Navy's operational requirements 
will facilitate a better understanding of their C2 requirements and the types of 
communications systems they use. These systems will be described later in 
Chapter VII. 
A. FUNCTIONAL ROLES OF THE NAVY 
The U.S. Navy has three primary functions. These functions are sea 
control, power projection, and sealift operations. 
1. Sea Control 
Total control of the seas gives the National Command Authority (NCA) the 
capability to project global military power in response to international crises. To 
sustain or reinforce the forward presence of military forces, the Navy must 
preserve its unencumbered access to Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC,) 
suitable for sealifting other military forces and hardware. The projection of this 
military presence is essential to the nation's ability to enforce United Nations (UN) 
sanctions, international law, and national foreign policy. [Ref. 8: p. 1-1-10] 
The U.S. has always relied heavily on the free access to the sea to import 
and export items such as technology, agriculture, raw materials, and f ~ s h e d  
products. This is essential to the country's economic stability and growth which 
ultimately has a profound impact on the size and capabilities of our military 
forces. The U.S. has other interests in the seas, such as the protection of our daily 
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transoceanic air flights, critical lines of communications, and coastal defense. 
Throughout U.S. history, the nation has been reminded of the strategic importance 
of being a "maritime" nation. These reminders range from the need to protect 
American merchant ships in the Mediterranean from barbaric pirates in the late 
1700's to providing multidimensional avenues of attack against Iraq during Desert 
Storm. Control of the seas provides the U.S. a strategic media, by which it uses as 
a natural barrier, to protect itself from hostile nations, or as an avenue to sealift 
heavy armed forces worldwide in response to international crises. [Ref. 9: pp. 3-61 
The Navy is responsible for maintaining sea control that involves protecting 
sea lines of communications, securing operational areas, and safeguarding its 
deployed forces. Sea control is a pro-active and offensive strategy that allows the 
Navy to quickly acquire sea superiority when changing to wartime scenarios. This 
type of strategy immediately pushes the enemy into a defensive posture, causing 
him to react to the Navy's military actions. Furthermore, this offensive strategy 
denies the enemy use of the sea (battlespace maneuver area) while allowing the 
Navy to seize and retain the offensive initiative. [Ref. 4: p. 1-1-10] 
There are two types of missions associated with sea control: strategic and 
tactical. Strategic missions involve the Navy's role in neutralizing the enemy's 
efforts to deny fiiendly use of the sea, by employing stand-off style tactics. 
Examples of these tactics may include performing naval blockades and barriers, 
long-range naval gunfire against land targets, or conducting offensive mining 
operations. Tactical missions are associated with safeguarding naval forces or 
supporting other units participating in operations nearby. Examples of these are 
the removal of enemy barriers and obstacles at sea, providing naval gunfire 
support for local amphibious forces, and performing countermine operations. [Ref. 
8: p. 1-1-10] 
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Over the past few years, the Navy has increasingly become a key player in 
accomplishing missions called "other than war". To accomplish these missions, 
the Navy has relied on control of the sea lanes to transport humanitarian aid to 
third world countries, protect U.S. borders against uncontrolled immigration, 
perform active roles in drug intercept operations. Free access and unhindered use 
of the seas are paramount for the U.S. Navy to accomplish its assigned missions 
and to project U.S. military power to distant regions. 
2. Power Projection 
The U.S. Naval Forces enforce and execute the political, diplomatic, 
economic, and military objectives, outlined by the NCA, by projecting their 
military power to regional areas of interest. The forward presence of combat 
ready Naval Forces, capable carrying out a wide range of military operations, 
fosters regional stability and security. This Naval Force confims the nation's 
commitment to preserving access to global resources, protecting our allied nations, 
and enforcing international laws and agreements. Additionally, forward 
positioning of combat ready and lethal naval forces serves as a deterrence to 
unruly and aggressive nations. These nations must consider the military 
consequences that could result fiom their use of weapons of mass destruction such 
as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. By projecting military forces into 
regions of interest, the Naval Forces possess the ability to quickly attack targets of 
opportunity in littoral areas with precise accuracy and substantial lethality. The 
prepositioning of port opening equipment and other military hardware provides the 
U.S. military additional resources to conduct more extensive operations ashore. 
Although the power projection of military forces is necessary to maintain regional 
stability, the NCA depends on the Navy to transport required military resources for 
the other services as discussed in the next section. [Ref. 8: p. 1-1-10 and Ref. 91 
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3. Sealift 
The third major function of the Navy is to provide sealift capabilities to 
deploy military resources through SLOCs to specific regions of interest. Examples 
of these resources may include maintenance facilities, communications equipment, 
ammunition, and heavy weapons. They are critical to sustaining existing naval 
forces, or for supporting the other military service in follow-on military 
operations. Implied in the mission of transporting these resources to forward 
areas, is the Navy's responsibility of securing entry ports that facilitate the 
reinforcement of Marine and Army units, as they conduct combat land operations. 
[Ref. 8: p. 1-1-10 and Ref. 9: p. 691 
To perform the three functions expected of today's Navy, it is equipped 
with highly trained sailors who operate some of the most advanced ships, 
submarines, and aircraft in the world. This provides the Navy with the mobility, 
flexibility, and firepower needed to safeguard the nation's interest at sea and 
around the globe. 
B. NAVY ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE 
The U.S. Navy's organization, like DoD, consists of two chain of 
commands to facilitate C2 fiom the NCA down to Naval operating forces. These 
are the administrative and the operational chain of commands, as shown in Figure 
3. The NCA exercises leadership over the Navy by providing the Secretary of the 
Navy and the Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) of Combatant Commands (Unified) 
with a National Security Strategy necessary to achieve political and military 
objectives. 
Although this thesis focuses on the operational chain of command, the 
Navy's administrative chain of command briefly discussed. This chain of 
command is unique to the Navy since it extends down to lower command levels 
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Figure 3.  Navy Organization. 
than compared to the other military services. The administrative chain of 
command, shown in Figure 4, is primarily concerned with the administrative and 
logistic activities that support Naval Forces. Some examples of this support 
I 33 
Administrative Chain of Command 
National Cmd j AJthorilY I 
Chief of Naval w 
I CINCIANTFLT CI NCPACFLT CINCUSNAVEUR 
Air Type Commander 
Submarine Type Commander 
Subsurface Type Commander 
Group Cdr 
I I I , 
I 






Sqdn Cdr aoumrs 
C b  (ship) 
I 
Frigate Unit Cd 
Figure 4. Administrative Chain of Command. [Ref'. 101 
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. . . .. . . . . . . - _ -- 
TYPE COMMANDERS 
Air Type Commander 
fleets assigned to their command. Type commanders (typically three stars), who are 
shore based, assist the Fleet CINCs by supervising all administrative and logistical 
support requirements of the operational forces within a particular fleet. There are 
usually three different Type commanders assigned to support each fleet's air 
(NAVAIR), surface (NAVSURF), and subsurface components (NAVSUB). For 
example, the three Type commanders for the Second Fleet units operating in the 
Atlantic Theater are the NAVAIRLANT, NAVSURFLANT, and NAVSUBLANT. 
Table 1 shows the assets each Type commander supports. Type commanders insure 
that Carrier Vessel Battle Groups (CVBGs) are fully mission capable when CVBGs 
deploy from their home ports. While at sea, the Type commanders continue to 
PRINCIPLE EQUIPMENT 
Air Wing Squadrons, Carriers 
I1 I 
Subsurface Type Commanders Submarines 
Surface Type Commander Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates, 
Oilers, Amphibious Ships, and other 
naval surface ships 
monitor the administrative needs of the CVBGs and provide support as required. 
The commanding officers of operating forces such as CVBG commanders, 
destroyer/fiigate squadron commanders, and air wing commanders, are responsible 
for their units achieving a high level of combat readiness before deploying. Since 
cruisers and carriers do not have their own administrative squadrons, the CVBG 
commanders must share direct responsibility with the Type commanders in the 
readiness preparation of these vessels. [Ref. 8: pp. 1-1-6 to 1-1-7 and Ref. 101 
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Figure 5 shows the operational chain of command that is used to manage 
the operational employment of naval units including force composition, location, 
movement, and deployment tasks. In addition, the operational chain of command 
Operational Chain of Command 
CINCuHTnT CINCNAVCENT 





W ~ O m E s r  
Figure 5 .  Operational Chain of Command. [After Ref. 4:p. 1-1-11 
controls and manages the daily missions, training exercises, and transitions to 
wartime scenarios for all deployed naval forces. Numbered fleet commanders 
(Commanders of the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Fleets, assist Fleet CINCS 
in maintaining operational C2 over deployed naval forces within each theater of 
operations. For example, i fa  CVBG was enroute from its home ports in the U.S. 
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to join the Sixth Fleet located in the Mediterranean Sea, the Second Fleet 
Commander would maintain operational control over the CVBG as it crossed the 
Atlantic Ocean. Once the CVBG reached the Straight of Gibraltar, the operational 
control of the CVBG would then be "chopped" or transferred to the Sixth Fleet 
Commander. [Ref. 111 
A CVBG forms the basic naval operational force organization at sea. It is 
composed of many different classes of ships, aircraft, and submarines, as shown in 
Tables 2 and 3. Their actual composition depends on their assigned mission and the 
TYPE OF VESSEL 
Ammunition and oiler support 
ship (AOE, AE or AO) 
Carrier (CV/CVN (nuclear)) 







Destroyer (DDG) or Frigates 
(FFG), with guided missiles 
1-3 3 -4 
Table 2. Notional Carrier Battle Group Configuration. [Ref. 8: p. 1-1-21 
tactical situation. Although amphibious forces closely support missions assigned to 
CVBGs, they typically maneuver separately fiom the CVBGs. Amphibious forces 
and their operations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. All CVBGs and 
other naval forces operating collectively in a predetermined area of operation are 
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AIRCRAFT TYPE QTY AIRCRAFT TYPE QTY 
F-14 Strike aircraft 20-22 EA-6 Early Warning 5 
F/A- 18 Strike aircraft 22 E-2 Early Warning 5 
A-6 Strike aircraft SH-3/H-60 ASW/Logistic Support 6 
KA-6 Airtanker S-3 ASW/Tanker 4 
Table 3. Notional Air Wing Composition. [After Ref. 8: p. 1-1-51 
assigned to a numbered fleet commander. Some CVBGs within a numbered fleet 
may be grouped with other CVBGs to accomplish specific missions. Two or more 
CVBGs organized for these specific missions typically form a task force. 
Generally, a task force serves as the naval component for a larger Joint Task Force 
(JTF). The commander of the Naval Task Force is typically a CVBG commander 
or the numbered fleet commander himself. If a specific mission calls for a smaller 
Naval Force, subsets of units from several CVBGs may be detached as part of a 
task group or smaller task element. A task group or task unit commander is 
typically designated CVBG commanders or commanding officers of individual 
ships. Task force or task group commanders normally assume duties as Officers in 
Tactical Command (OTC) and as Composite Warfare Commanders (CWC). [Ref. 
111 
The OTC plays an important role in maintaining the 'big picture" of the 
tactical operations to insure naval forces, under his command, accomplish their 
primary mission. Composite warfare commanders, designated under the CWC 
concept, assist the OTC by conducting specific combat operations such as anti-air 
warfare (AAW), antisurface (ASUW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), strike 
warfare (STW), and space and electronic warfare (SEW). Although the OTC and 
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the CWC may be different commanders, normally they are one in the same. [Ref. 
8: p. 1-1-13] 
I 
Figure 6 shows how the five warfare commanders are normally organized 
by functional areas that include: AAWC, ASUWC, ASWC, STWC, and SEWC. 
The warfare area commanders are chosen from the CVBG commander's staff or 
from commanders of ships assigned to his CVBG. They are chosen based on their 
personal qualifications and the capabilities of the ships they command. For 
example, the commanding officer of the most capable AAW platform in the task 
unit or task group is typically designated as the AAWC. Depending on the 
authority delegated to him by the CVBG commander, he may have full authority 
to direct and control air defense systems and ship-based weapons in the CVBG to 
attack an approaching enemy aircraft. It is important to note, that the CWC always 
retains the negation authority over his warfare area commanders. That is the 
Task Force Organization 
Figure 6.  Task Force Organization. [After Ref. 4: Figure 1-1-41 
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authority to override or cancel any directive initiated by warfare commanders. To 
assist the CWC and the warfare commanders, the CWC assigns warfare area 
coordinators to manage five key support roles. These roles are: submarine 
element coordinator (SEC), who manages the support for submarines; the air 
resource element coordinator (AREC), who manages the disposition of carrier 
aircraft; the battle group logistics coordinator (BGLC), who manages required 
logistical support; the force over-the-horizon tracking coordinator (FOTC), who 
manages over-the-horizon tracking and surveillance of the battlespace; and the 
helicopter resources element coordinator (HREC), who manages the disposition of 
helicopters within the force. [Ref. 8: p. 1-1-13] 
While performing its overall mission, a task group may need to detach one 
or more ships or submarines from the group to conduct another mission or task. 
These vessels typically form a task element that is sometimes called a Surface 
Action Group (SAG). Once the task element completes its mission, it returns to 
the task group. The use of task elements prevents distractions from a task group's 
primary mission. For example, a task group enroute to conduct a naval blockade 
suddenly detects a hostile submarine operating nearby. The task group 
commander, may elect to form a task element, composed of two frigates and ASW 
capable aircraft, to identify and destroy the submarine while the remaining vessels 
continue toward the main objective. To lead this task element, the task group 
commander may appoint one individual ship commander as the task element 
commander. Once the task element completes its mission, it would rejoin the task 
group. [Ref. 111 
There are several important reasons why the Navy uses such a flexible C2 
structure. The Navy has a variety of modem ships and submarines, with diverse 
and in many cases overlapping capabilities, that require coordination and 
synchronization to maximize their combat effectiveness. The CVBG can best 
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achieve this by structuring their C2 process based on specific functions, such as 
antiair, antisurface, antisubsurface, and strike warfare. The second reason for the 
Navy's seemingly complicated C2 structure, is to capitalize on the "power down" 
concept for decision-making and execution of orders. By using a C2 structure 
based on functionality, warfare commanders at the lower levels have the freedom 
to access the tactical situation, make real-time decisions, and quickly disseminate 
orders for execution. As discussed in Chapter I, history has shown repeatedly, that 
forces having the quickest decision-making C2 cycle, often achieved a decisive 
advantage over their opponent. 
C. FUNDAMENTAL AND SUPPORTING TASKS 
As mentioned earlier, the Navy must perform three basic roles that include 
sea control, power projection, and sealift operations. This requires the completion 
of many fundamental and supporting tasks. Tables 4 and 5 show a list of these 
fundamental and supporting tasks, their purposes, and the primary assets they 
require. The size of force and the tactical scenario both determine whether one or 
all of the tasks listed in the tables will be used to support the Navy's primary roles. 
D. BATTLE GROUP OPERATIONS 
The carrier battle group is the basic organization the Navy uses for its 
deployed forces. The aircraft carrier is the centerpiece of this organization. This 
vessel plays an important part in projecting the Navy's military power over great 
distances from the carrier battle group (CVBG). Its key functions are to provide a 
mobile airfield from which to launch strike or reconnaissance aircraft and to 
provide the C2 facilities for the CVBG commander. The C2 facilities give the 
CVBG commander the ability to control other ships, submarines, and aircraft 
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within the group and coordinate with higher authorities, as well as, other naval, 




USED TASKS PURPOSE 
Anti-air Warfare 
(Uw) 
Destroy and neutralize 
airborne threats to gain 
air superiority 
Aegis Cruisers, Arleigh-Burke 











desel, attack, littoral) 
attack submarines, fixed wing 
aircraft (P-3, S-3), specially 
equipped helicopters (SH-60, SH- 
2), destroyers, and frigates 
Antisurface 
Warfare 
( A S W  
merchant ships, 
combat vessels, and 
patrol craft 
destroyers, fhgates, cruisers, strike 
aircraft (A-6, F- 16, F- 18), SH-60, 
attack submarines, P-3 and E-2C 
aircraft 
Destroy or neutralize 
enemy's surface naval 
threat to gain sea 
superiority 
conducting attacks, raids, 
or assaults on land targets 
C2 centers, support 
facilities, ammo 
storage areas, surfields 
stnke aircraft (A-6, F- 14, F- 18), 
E-2C naval gunfire and guided 
munitions fiom cruisers, destroyers, 
fhgates, and submarines. 
Amplubious 
Warfare 
delivery and fire support 
for amphbious land 
operations. 
shore bombardment, 
naval gunfire support, 
close air support 
stnke aircraft, gunfire support 
(cruisers, destroyers, and fngates), 
landing &ups (LPD, LSD, LST, 
LCAC), helicopter carriers (LPH, 
LHD, LHA) 
Mine Warfare offensive and defensive 
operations associated 
with employing or 
removing mines to allow 
fieedom of movement 
within the battlespace. 
offensive: mine laying, 
defensive: breaching 




operations to protect 
friendly use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum 
while denying its use to 
the enemy. 
all electronic warfare systems 






and destruction of 
enemy signal emitters, 
jamming, interception, 
deception, 






install, operate, and 
maintain C2 systems 
required to plan, direct, 
and control assigned 
Command, control, 
and communications 
communication centers and 








surveillance of named 
areas of interest to idenw 
and locate surface, 
subsurface, and airborne 
enemy targets 
intelligence gathering on 
enemy activities in littoral 
regions, sabotage of C2 centers 
and support facilities 
detection and location of 
hostile submarines, aircraft, 
shipdcrafts operating near the 
tactical areas of interest 
provide supplies and fuel, ammunitiodordinance, 
deployed forces (all 














command shp  
(LCC), and other 
command ships 
3 aircraft 
(AGF), E-2C and P- 
underway 
replenishment ships, 
oilers, (AOE, AOR, 




Table 5.  Supporting Tasks. [After Ref. 8: pp. 1-1-12 to 1-1-24] 
Figure 7, centered on the carrier, shows a generic representation of the 
displacement and areas of responsibility for other ships that make up a CVBG. 
Since aircraft carriers have limited self-defense capabilities, they must rely on 
other units in the CVBG for protection. Figure 7 also shows that cruisers operate 
within approximately 10 miles of the carrier and provide an inner barrier of 
defense against air, surface, and subsurface attacks directed at the carrier. These 
ships are equipped with state-of-the-art weapon systems and target tracking 
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Carrier Battle Group Displacement 
0-10 miles 





\ I I 
\ DestroyerdFrigates I 
Submarines 
Fixed-wing Aircraft 
Figure 7. Battle Carrier Group Displacement. [Ref 4:p. 1-1-20 and Ref 61 
systems to facilitate this role. SH-60 Helicopters, armed with homing torpedoes, 
work with other fixed wing aircraft to strike surface and subsurface targets. The 
helicopters normally operate within visual range of the CVBG. The destroyers 
and fr-igates typically operate in regions from 10-150 miles from the carrier to 
screen the CVBG against surface, air, and subsurface threats. It may perform 
other missions, as well, such as providing naval gunfiie support to amphibious 
landing forces or other joint operations ashore. Submarines assigned to CVBGs 
are responsible for the regions 150 miles or more from the carrier. The CVBG 
commander or the antisubmarine warfare commander may designate submarines to 
perform a variety of missions such as reconnaissance, antisubsurface, and 
antisurface operations. Fixed wing aircraft, launched from either shore bases or 
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the aircraft carrier, extend the eyes of the CVBG commander 75-200 miles or 
more on the flanks or ahead of the CVBG. These aircraft search for hostile 
submarines, aircraft, and surface vessels by using visual sightings, in conjunction 
with, radar and sonar systems. [Ref. 8: pp. 1-1-20 to 1-1-21 and Ref. 111 
Specific missions, areas of responsibility, and tactical displacements of 
each vessel within a CVBG, depend greatly on the composition of the CVBG and 
the tactical scenario. For instance, if the CVBG is operating in a confined area, 
like the Persian Gulf, it may have ship displacements far less than the distances 
shown in Figure 7. Conversely, if the CVBG is crossing the Atlantic Ocean, ship 
displacements may be much greater. 
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E. NAVY LIMITATIONS 
The Navy inherently has several limitations, such as sustainment 
capabilities and carrier mobility during flight operations. In order for the Navy to 
maintain a ship (of a specific type) continously on station for an extended period 
of time, they often must consider a ratio of three ships to one. This means that for 
every ship (of a specific type) required to remain on station, three ships must be 
designated for the mission. This is generally the result of one ship being in port 
(maintenance), while another is in transit to the region, and the third is the ship 
actually performing the assigned mission. The Navy's ongoing modernization 
iniatives to procure multi-functional ships will assist the Navy to overcome this 
limitation. 
The aircraft carrier may provide significant contributions to the CVBG with 
its typical 78 aircraft, however, it must overcome several that are unique to its role. 
Some of these limitations are the mobility of the carrier when launching or 
recovering aircraft, required crew rest that reduce available flight hours, equipment 
maintenance, and logistics (fuel, ordinance). When aircraft are being launched or 
recovered, the aircraft carrier must turn into the wind, forcing it to slow down or 
change direction. Furthermore, scheduled maintenance requirements and a f ~ t e  
amount of fuel and ordinance onboard limit its ability to sustain high intensity 
flight operations for long periods of time. The CVBG commanders must consider 
these limitations when planning and executing assigned missions, so they can 
preserve their equipment and personnel. [Ref. 8: pp. 1-1-21 to 1-1-22] 
F. NAVAL WARF'IGHTING PHILOSOPHY 
The understanding of naval warfighting philosophy provides insight, in a 
broad sense, on how the Navy plans and executes its assigned missions. The 
Navy's warfighting philosophy centers on two styles of wdighting: attrition and 
maneuver. Attrition warfighting philosophy is a direct approach that involves 
concentrating friendly resources to attack an enemy's primary offensive capability. 
Favorable outcomes using this type of philosophy, generally require force on force 
operations and many resources such as time, personnel, equipment, and 
ammunition. Alternately, maneuver wdighting philosophy is an indirect 
approach of using maneuver strategies and concepts to exploit known enemy 
weaknesses and vulnerabiliteis. [Ref. 9: pp. 3 1-32] 
The Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (Naval W a ~ a r e )  used the Battle of the 
Atlantic in World War 11 to illustrate an example of attrition warfare. During this 
battle, allied forces identified U-boats as Germany's principle and most effective 
capability at sea. After the allies experienced significant losses of their surface 
vessels, they redirected a substantial amount of supplies, equipment, and personnel 
toward subsurface warfare. Consequently, this approach lead to the attrition of the 
Nazi U-boat Fleet before the German's industrial base could build additional 
vessels. In this situation, attrition style warfare proved to be an effective tool that 
permitted allied forces to regain sea superiority. Although history has shown that 
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attrition warfare can produce the intended results, it only occurs at the expense of 
significant resources thus limiting other simultaneous operations. [Ref. 9: pp. 32- 
331 
Advancing technology and sophisticated weapons, like the long range 
cruise missile, have encouraged the Navy to favor the maneuver warfighting 
philosophy. Today's Navy commanders have better access to information about 
the enemy situation as a result of improved sensors and C2 information systems. 
This allows them to quickly iden* specific enemy capabilities and 
vulnerabilities. Examples of these capabilities include enemy troop displacement, 
key C2 facilities, and supply routes. The main idea of maneuver warfare is to 
attack critical, but vulnerable, enemy capabilities needed to conduct or sustain 
offensive operations. This allows the Navy to avoid the enemy's main strengths 
and simultaneously preserve its own resources. 
Naval commanders may elect to use either or both warfighting philosophies 
when developing operational plans. They integrate these philosophies into their 
plans by considering nine Principles of War that support the Navy's warfighting 
doctrine. 
G. PRINCIPLES OF WAR 
The principles of war provide a sound doctrinal framework for navy 
commanders to formulate their operational plans in a dynamic and fast-paced 
combat environment. Since the Navy's C2 architecture and organization promote 
decision-making at the lowest possible level, the principles of war add a thread of 
continuity to this process. The nine principles of war are based on proven 
concepts used throughout military history and include objective, mass, maneuver, 
offensive, economy of force, unity of command, simplicity, surprise, and security. 
[Ref. 9: pp. 43-50] 
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Objective is a clearly defined goal of the mission necessary to satisfy the 
commander's intent. Examples of stated objectives are: [Ref. 9: p. 441 
Secure specific seaport(s). 
Conduct a naval blockade around a designated area. 
Destroy the enemy's rear lines of communications. 
Unity of command is the common orientation of applied effort by the 
complete chain of command. This effort is achieved by clearly understanding the 
primary objectives that are outlined in the commander's intent [Ref. 9: p. 461. This 
gives commanders and their staffs at the lowest level the freedom to use their 
tactical expertise in developing their own concept of operations to accomplish 
their mission. For example, the commander of the Sixth Fleet might assign one of 
his task group commanders to secure a specific port critical to the success of a 
larger JTF operation. Although the task group commander is given a specific 
mission, he has the flexibility to develop his own concept of operations, in order 
to, accomplish the mission. By securing the port, the task group has contributed to 
the JTF's unified objective. 
Muss is concentrating the magnitude and direction of a force's combat 
power toward a selected objective or enemy force to exploit his vulnerabilities or 
weaknesses [Ref. 9: p. 441. Since the massing of combat power requires 
tremendous resources, it normally supports the direction of the main effort, such as 
the primary objective for a regional campaign. 
Maneuver is the moving or disposition of naval forces that allows maximum 
destruction of enemy capabilities while simultaneously offering protection to 
friendly forces [Ref. 9: p. 451. The maneuver principle facilitates the Navy's 
maneuver warfighting philosophy, by avoiding the enemy's strengths and attacking 
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his weaknesses. Furthermore, this principle is the means by which the Navy 
integrates other principles of war like mass, offensive, economy of force into their 
concept of operations. 
The offensive principle is the employment of tactics to seize and maintain 
the initiative of combat operations [Ref. 9: p. 451. This principle is a prerequisite 
for achieving decisive victory over hostile forces. In a JTF campaign for instance, 
the Navy may provide initial volleys of overwhelming firepower to soften the 
enemy land forces, prior to army or marine units conducting follow-on land 
operations. 
The economy of force principle is the displacement of friendly forces that 
reduces the number of forces required to protect friendly vulnerabilities and allows 
the majority of combat power to be used in support of the main effort [Ref. 9: p. 
461. The Navy may also use this principle to distract enemy forces away from the 
direction of their main objective, to avoid direct force on force confi-ontation 
against the enemy's strengths. 
The simpliciy principle means to define mission objectives and plans in 
concise terms so that commanders clearly understand their roles and expectations 
[Ref. 9: p. 461. By minimizing ambiguities or chances for misinterpretation, 
commanders at the lower levels enjoy the freedom to modifL their own plans to 
cope with the complex and rapidly changing nature of combat. 
The surprise principle is geared toward attacking enemy forces from 
directions where they are unprepared to defend or at times when they least expect 
[Ref. 9: p. 471. The main idea of this principle is to catch enemy forces "off- 
guard" in which they have little time to prepare counteroffensive operations. The 
Navy plays an important role in exercising this principle, especially in support of 
joint operations, due to their forward presence in the region. For example, a 
CVBG can strike enemy sea or shore targets from virtually anywhere and from any 
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direction in the region, by using their carrier based aircraft and precision guided 
missiles. This unique capability gives fi-iendly forces a superb advantage to 
conduct surprise raids or shore bombardments, in order to, exploit enemy 
weakness and gain the initiative. 
The securiy principle is the protection of friendly operational plans, 
objectives, and intentions to prevent the enemy from preparing counteroffensive or 
evasive actions [Ref. 9: p. 471. The security principle is essential to conducting 
surprise attacks on hostile forces and includes the security of communication 
systems, force displacement, and fi-iendly capabilities. 
These nine principles of war are embedded into today's navy doctrine. 
Commanders and staffs should carefully consider them before developing their 
concept of operations. These principles form a baseline to facilitate planning and 
execution of orders in a dynamic and unpredictable combat environment. 
H. SUMMARY 
The U.S. Navy provides the NCA and CINCs with a prepositioned, self- 
sustaining, combat-ready force, for which they can call upon to rapidly enforce 
foreign policy, protect our interests abroad, or respond to international crises. To 
support these national objectives, the Navy must perform three primary roles that 
include sea control, power projection, and sealift operations. The Navy's 
operational forces fiuther divide each of these roles into specific fundamental and 
supportive tasks. These tasks assist in planning and executing their assigned 
missions. To manage and support the fundamental and supportive tasks, the Navy 
has a C2 structure that consists of administrative and operational chain of 
commands. 
The CVBG forms the basic organization for deployed forces that 
commanders can fiuther divide into task groups or elements to perform specific 
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missions. The heart of the CVBG is the aircraft carrier. The composition of 
aircraft onboard the carrier gives the CVBG commander a wide range of military 
options. Since the carrier has only a limited number of defense systems onboard, 
it must rely on other vessels in the CVBG to protect it from air, surface, and 
subsurface threats. The displacement of these vessels, ranging fi-om a few miles to 
several hundred miles, introduces special considerations when planning naval C2 
support systems. 
As presented in this chapter, much of the Navy's C2 structure, under the 
CWC concept, is geared toward decentralized execution of tasks at the lowest 
possible level of command. This type of C2 structure give commanders a 
significant degree of freedom to integrate the nine principles of war into their 
operational plans and accomplish their mission. 
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IV. U.S. MARINE CORPS MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION AND 
PHILOSOPHY 
The previous chapter introduced the Navy's purpose, organization, and 
warfighting philosophies. Using the same approach, this chapter provides a 
similar overview for the U.S. Marine Corps. The specific goals of this chapter are 
to answer the following questions: What are the primary and secondary roles of 
the U.S. Marine Corps? How does the Marine Corps organize and deploy its 
forces? What is the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy? The answers to these 
questions continue to build the foundation for understanding the types of C41 
systems found in each branch of service, as well as, their operational uses. The 
Marine Corps' C41 systems will be presented later in Chapter VIU. 
A. MARINE CORPS MISSIONS 
The US. Marine Corps primary mission is to provide a forward-deployed 
Naval Task Force with highly trained and combat ready Fleet Marine Forces. 
These forces are capable of conducting combined-arms operations ashore to 
support the prosecution of naval, land, or joint campaigns. Fleet Marine Forces 
give the NCA the ability to demonstrate a show of force to aggressive nations, 
without the U.S. physically landing the military on foreign soil. In addition, Fleet 
Marine Forces demonstrate the nation's resolve to protect global interests and 
enforce international law. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-31 * 
At the lower levels of command, the Fleet Marine Forces give CINCs and 
naval fleet commanders immediate access to expeditionary forces that are capable 
of seizing or defending advanced naval bases, sea ports, and other facilities. Some 
examples of typical marine missions include; amphibious operations, advanced 
naval base defense, limited collateral land operations with army units, 
reconnaissance or intelligence operations, aerial refueling support, and land and 
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sea-based air c.; *arations. The type of assigned missions depend on the level of 
conflict as shown in Table 6.  The three levels that constitute the spectrum of 
conflict are Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Medium Intensity Conflict (MIC), and 
High Intensity Conflict (HIC). [Ref. 8: pp. 1-2-2 and 1-2-15] 
LICs generally require active marine forces to perform a broad range of 
economic, political, and military activities [Ref. 12: p. 41. These activities can be 
categorized as either limited objective operations or stability operations. Conflicts 
against well organized and larger threats are called MIC. At this level, active 
marine forces perform conventional combat operations or activities in preparation 
for a HIC. HICs require both the active and reserve marine force components to 
participate in large scale land and naval campaigns against one or more sizeable 
threats. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-15] 
In addition to their primary missions stated in the preceding paragraphs, 
Public Law 10 of the U.S. Code, mandates that the Marine Corps is responsible for 
performing other secondary roles. These secondary roles are as follows: 
0 Act as the lead service in developing tactics and doctrine related to 
amphibious operations 
Provide marine detachments onboard armed naval vessels to 
protect and secure advanced navy facilities 
Prepare and integrate marine reserve components into the active 
component force structure to facilitate transitions to war, or 
respond to national emergencies and international crises. [Ref. 8: p. 
1-20 151 
B. MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATION 
The basic building block of the Marine Corps organization is the Marine 
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). These forces provide combatant commanders 
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LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC) 
Stability 
Operations 
Show of Force 
Humanitarian 
Assistance Ops 
- Deliberate Ops 
- Disaster Relief 
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- Helicopter lift 
- Deep Recon. 
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- OTH Helicopter 









- Reserve land 
Actions 
force 
Table 6. Marine Corps Missions. [After Ref. 4, Figure 1-2-14: p. 1-2-11 
with a balanced, combat-ready, combined-arms force needed to support specific 
missions. A MAGTF is not a permanent organization and usually dissolves after 
completing its assigned role. The decision to organize and commit MAGTFs in 
response to a combatant commanders' or CINCs' operational tasking, rests with the 
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Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Atlantic or Europe. MAGTFs 
may work either independently or as a member of a joint or combined force, to 
support the prosecution of land or naval campaigns. They are organized normally 
structured to facilitate rapid sea or air mobility to their theater of operation. 
Additionally, MAGTFs are self-sustaining, thereby eliminating the need for host 
nation support. MAGTFs consist of three components: Command Element (CE), 
Ground Component Element (GCE), Air Component Element (ACE), and a 
Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). [Ref. 81 
The CE is the single headquarters for the MAGTF consisting of the 
commander, an executive staff, and a special staff. They are responsible for 
providing C2 and direction over the planning, coordination, and execution of all 
missions assigned to the MAGTF. The CE also contains all communications 
facilities that pennit the MAGTF commander to coordinate with higher, lower and 
adjacent commands. [Ref. 13: p. 2-21 
The GCE consists of infantry and armor units, varying in size fiom smaller 
than a battalion to multiple divisions. In addition, the GCE consists of other 
organic combat and combat service support units required to sustain ground 
operations. [Ref. 13: pp. 2-2 to 2-31 
The ACE consists of the air assets in the MAGTF, along with its associated 
air control agencies, organic combat support units, and combat service support 
units needed to support these aircraft. Some of the functions performed by the 
ACE are close air support (CAS), air reconnaissance, anitair warfare, and air 
traffic control. [Ref. 13: p. 2-31 
The CSSE supports the MAGTF with additional services beyond those 
which are provided by organic combat service support units within the GCE and 
ACE. Some of these services include supply, maintenance, engineer, 
medicddental, military police, food, and financial services. [Ref. 13: p. 2-31 
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Normally there is only one CE, GCE, ACE, and CSSE w i b  each 
MAGTF. The MAGTF and supporting units are organized to support specific 
objectives and will vary in size fiom one MAGTF to another depending on their 
assigned mission. [Ref. 13: p. 2-31 
Marine forces are typically under the operational command of a unified 
CINC. These commanders exercise their operational C2 over Marine forces as 
shown in Figure 8. When operating in ajoint environment, MAGTFs can be 
employed as: [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-23] 
0 A service component of the Naval component under a unified 
command 
0 An element of a joint task force under a unified command 
In the planning phases, the MAGTF is under the command of the CG, Fleet 
Marine Force Atlantic, Pacific or Europe [Ref. 13: p. 1-81. As the operation 
moves into the execution phase, operational control shifts over to the operational 
command structure depicted in Figure 8. The roles of the Commander of the 
Amphibious Task Force (CATF) were discussed in Chapter IV. 
The CATF is responsible for the over all operations concerned with the 
MAGTF's transition form ship to shore and their C2 facilities. Once the force 
establishes their C2 facilities on shore, the CATF hands over the C2 to the 
Commander of the Landing Force (CLF). The CLF then maintains the C2 over all 
ground and air assets operating in his area of responsibility. During redeployment 




CHAIN OF COMMAND 
UNIFIED COMMANDER I 
NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER I 
COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) 
I 
COMMANDER, AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (CATF) 
I 
COMMANDER LANDING FORCE (CLF) 
I 
MAGTF LANDING FORCES 
Figure 8. Amphibious Operational Chain of Command. [After Ref. 14: p. 1161 
C. TYPES OF MAGTFS 
There are four types of MAGTFs commonly used to fulfill the Fleet and 
CINC commander's goals and objectives. These are the Marine Expeditionary 
Force (MEF), the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), the Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and the Special Purpose forces (SPF). Table 7 shows 
the notional composition of each type of MAGTF. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-7 and Ref. 13: 
p. 1-31 
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I FORCEASSETS I MEF 
I Marines and Sailors I 30,000-60,000 
Aircraft Organizations 1-2 Air wings 
(Marines) 
Service Support Groups Force 
(Size) 
I Divisions or Battalions I 1-2 (Divisions) 
I Amphibious Ships 1 44-56 
I Tanks I 70-140 
I Helicopters I 250-300 
Medium and Heavy 
Artillery Pieces I 75-100 
I 125-175 Tactical Fixed Wing Aircrafl (USMC) 
I 1-2(Bn) Amphibious Assault BattalionsNehicles 
I Carrier ~ i r  wings (USN) I 2-4 
MEB I MEU 
4,000-18,000 1 1,000-4,000 
1-2 Alr Groups 1-2 Alr sqdns 
Brigade 1 unit 
2-5 InfBn I 1-2 M B n  
15-21 I 4-7 
17-34 I 5-10 
75-120 I 20-36 
24-42 I 6-12 
45-65 USNAJSMC 
(as available) 
20-30 (Veh.) I 10-15 (Veh) 
1-2 I 0 
I * Note: Composition for SPF was omitted, due to the large diversity between I each o rgda t ion .  
Table 7. Notional MAGTF Composition. [Ref. 8: pp. 1-2-7 to 1-2-91 
The MEF is the largest and most powerfid MAGTF. It's size ranges fiom 
slightly less than one division and a single air wing to several divisions and 
multiple air wings. The MEF is task organized to conduct a wide range of 
amphibious assault operations, operate in diverse environments, and sustain 
combat operations for about 60 days. Depending on its actual size, the MEF is 
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normally commanded by a major or lieutenant general. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-7 and Ref. 
13: p. 1-31 
A MEB is typically composed of a regimental size ground force and a 
aircraft group. In addition, it contains a brigade size combat service support 
element that is capable of sustaining combat operations for about 30 days. This 
organization is usually commanded by a brigadier general. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-1 1 and 
Ref. 13: p.1-31 
The MEU, normally commanded by a colonel, is composed of a reinforced 
battalion, a helicopter squadron, and service support units. Although fixed-wing 
aircraft support may be provided to the MEU when requested by the MEU 
commander or directed by higher authorities, these aircraft are usually not part of 
the organization. MEUs are designed primarily to support routine afloat 
operational requirements. Even though MEUs are limited in size and capability, 
they provide suitable quick reaction forces to fleet commanders. Generally they 
will not operate as a separate amphibious assault force, but as the leading element 
for a larger MEB or MEF. Seabases, positioned nearby, sustain the MEU for a 
period of about 15 days Without being reinforced or resupplied. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-9 
and Ref. 13: p. 1-31 
A special type of MEU called Marine Expeditionary Units with Special 
Operating Capability (MEU SOC) are forces augmented with special equipment 
and specialized training needed to perform unique marine operations associated 
with LICs. Although these forces have special operations capabilities, they are not 
considered special forces. Examples of MEU SOC missions are amphibious raids, 
security operations, show of force, mobile training teams, civic actions, and 
hostage rescue. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-91 
The SPF is a task organized force composed of highly trained marines and 
specialized equipment to accomplish particular missions. The members have 
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received extensive training in reconnaissance operations, intelligence collection, 
day/night operations, and small independent unit tactics. This type of training 
distinguishes them from the members of the MEU (SOC) units. SPF may deploy 
to their area of operations by amphibious ships, commercial ships, or military 
aircraft. Their primary purpose is to give the fleet and combatant commanders a 
unique and highly trained force capable of performing missions that the MEFs, 
MEBs, MEUs are not structured, trained, or equipped to accomplish. [Ref. 8: p. I- 
2-10] 
D. METHODS OF MAGTF DEPLOYMENT 
Since MAGTFs vary greatly in their size and capability, operational 
commanders consider four methods for deploying MAGTFs to an area of 
operations. These methods are forward basing, sealWsea-basing, pre-positioning, 
and airlift. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-13] 
Forward basing refers to the strategic placement of MAGTFs at land bases 
near their assigned geographical area of interests. This type of deployment 
minimizes the air assets, sealift assets, and deployment time necessary to insert 
MEF size forces into threat areas. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-13] 
Sewsea-basing is the forward placement or movement of a MAGTF to or 
within their projected area of operations using their organic amphibious ships. 
Typically MEBs and MEFs are forward deployed on these vessels. Their support 
is provided by other amphibious ships within the ATF or MEF. For example, A 
MEB may be formed and forward deployed in their amphibious vessels to selected 
areas, as political tension builds between the U.S. and some uncooperative nation. 
If political and economic sanctions fail to achieve their goal, the MEBs offer the 
combatant and fleet commanders the combined-arms force needed to support U.S. 
military intervention. Once the MEB arrives in their area of operations, they will 
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loiter in the region until required or directed to move ashore. During land 
operations requiring a MEF size force, a MEU may act as the lead element as 
shown in Figure 9. Once the MEU becomes established, it will then building a 
Amphibious Phased Assault 
Figure 9. Amphibious Phased Assault. 
MEB as additional forces transition ashore. The MEB, similiar to the MEU, will 
serve as the lead element and begin building the MEF as it moves ashore. The 
principal advantages of t h i s  type of deployment is to minimize U.S. presence in the 
country while simultaneously equipping fleet commanders or CINCs with quick 
reaction forces capable of initiating land operations. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-14] 
During an amphibious operation, the MEF may conduct an over-the- 
horizon assualt. This type of assault integrates the mobility provided by modern 
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helicopters into a landing forces' scheme of maneuver. Additionally, this allows 
the amplubious ships to remain at safe stand-off distances fiom hostile artillery, 
without hindering the speed of the landing force. 
Pre-positioning is the placement of equipment onboard marine pre- 
positioning shps (MPS) required to outfit a MEF and sustain combat operations 
for a period of 30 days. Generally, sailors and marines of the MEF are airlifted 
from the continental U.S. to secure staging areas where they will link up with their 
equipment and prepare for further employment into their area of operations. [Ref. 
8: p. 1-2-14] 
Airlift deployment is the rapid deployment of airmobile MEBs, commonly 
referred to as Air Contingency Forces (ACF), using strategic airlift assets. MEBs 
may be either airhfted directly to their area of operation or airlifted to staging 
areas where they will be supplemented with additional pre-positioned equipment. 
Airlift deployments provided a means to rapidly deploy a MEB, but unless these 
forces are matched with pre-positioned equipment, their capabilities may be 
limited. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-14] 
The fleet marine force commanders may elect to use one or a combination 
of the methods of MAGTF deployment to respond to global threats in their area of 
responsibility. In the event the fleet marine commander requires a large MEF, he 
will typically use a "building block concept" to insert the force. Figure 9 
illustrates this concept by showing a MEU acting as the lead element for a MEB 
moving ashore. As the MEB completes its transition to shore, it continues to build 
the size of the force by accommodating the remaining elements of the MEF. [Ref. 
8: p. 1-2-12] 
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E. WARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHY 
Warfighting phlosophy in the U.S. Marine Corps is based on three ideas 
that include command philosophy, shaping the battle, and maneuver warfare, The 
dynamics of land warfare require the marine corps to promote an aggressive 
command philosophy that gives commanders the authority to employ decisive 
maneuver tactics necessary to produce favorable outcomes. [Ref. 15: pp. 58, 60, 
and 661 
Marine Corps' command phdosophy, similar to the Navy, is based on the 
"power down" or decentralized decision making. Marine commanders are granted 
the freedom to make tactical decisions at the lower levels because they often have 
a better appreciation for immediate actions needed to respond to the tactical 
situation. Decentralized decision making is vital to controlling the dynamic nature 
of combat caused by the fast tempo, fog, and friction of battle. The term fog, used 
in this context, refers to uncertainty and confusion created as fiiendly and enemy 
forces try to impose their will on each other. The friction of battle is the resistance 
to friendly force initiatives created by hostile fire, disruption of C2 systems, and 
the struggle to maintain a coordinated effort using complex organizations. 
The success of any decentralized C2 structure depends highly on the 
competence of subordinate leaders to make timely decisions, effectively use of 
their decision support systems, and aggressively employ offensive and counter- 
offensive measures. Furthermore, Marine commanders must integrate their 
knowledge of tactics, doctrine, command philosophy, and the commander's intent 
into their operational plans and decisions. They must rely on their knowledge and 
other personal leadership traits such as courage, initiative, imagination, and 
acceptance of calculated risks, to make the timely and rational decisions. The 
Marine Corps cannot tolerate commanders who are timid, indecisive, and weak, 
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since its costs are often paid in the form of human lives. [Ref. 15: pp. 4-5, 6,61- 
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Commanders at the lower levels have a distinct advantage in detecting 
enemy soft spots, gaps, or vulnerabilities that must be exploited to achieve an 
offensive advantage and shape the forthcoming events of battle. Shaping the battle 
requires commanders to be adequately informed so they can modify their concept 
of operations, in order to, force the enemy to respond to fi-iendly initiatives. Some 
examples of how a marine commander may shape the battle are: [Ref. 15: p. 671 
The key to shaping battle events relies on the commanders' access to real- 
time intelligence of the operational scenario gained through their C2 support 
systems. Tactical reconnaissance operations and national sensors provide critical 
input to these systems. Commanders must use this information, in conjunction 
with their own expertise and vision, to anticipate how the enemy is likely to 
respond to friendly maneuver warfare. 
The main goal of maneuver warfhre is to strike the enemy hard and 
violently in areas where he least expects it and where it causes the most damage. 
Maneuver warfiue concepts form the foundation for today's warfighting 
philosophy by replacing the old attrition style approach. By avoiding the enemy's 
main strengths, commanders preserve their resources and fxepower needed 
1 
, 
0 Channeling enemy movement into selected areas 
0 Delaying enemy movement 
0 Isolating enemy forces from reinforcements and support. 
elsewhere to exploit decisive opportunities. The two key components of maneuver 
warfare include mobility and fxepower. [Ref. 15: pp. 58-61] 
Today's MAGTF's have a variety of organic transport assets such as tactical 
vehcles, helicopters, and amphbious ships available to mobilized MAGTF forces 
quickly across their area of operations. The rapid mobility of a powerfid, self- 
sustaining combat force furnishes JTF and Fleet commanders with the ability to 
insert or extract MAGTFs quickly at several locations. Ths  creates confusion 
and uncertainty within the enemy ranks, making it hard for them to detect the 
MAGTF's true axis of advance. For example a JTF or Fleet commander may 
initially direct an amphibious task force (ATF) to more ashore to secure a specific 
seaport. Once secured, the ATF may return to their amphibious ships and await 
further taskings. Since the enemy cannot predict the MAGTF's axis of advance, 
the MAGTF capitalizes on several principles of war such as surprise, mass, 
economy of force, maneuver, and offense. Surprise is often gained by the 
MAGTF attacking the enemy during hours of darkness and limited visibility. By 
mobilizing and maneuvering their forces, commanders are able to mass their 
combat power at the right time and place to exploit weak or "soft" spots in the 
enemy defenses. Only the minimum size force is used to protect other areas of the 
MAGTF against possible enemy counterattacks. [Ref. 8: p. 1-2-25 and Ref. 15: 
pp. 35-36] 
Combined-arms assets such as tanks, field artillery pieces, aircraft, or 
supporting naval aircraft and gunfire support constitute the bulk of the MAGTF's 
firepower. Typically the fire support fiom close air support and field artillery 
units are employed to soften enemy targets, prior to committing infantq forces on 
the objective. It is important to note, that the primary purpose of firepower may 
not necessarily be to completely annihilate the enemy, but instead, create doubt 
among his forces that eventually degrades unit cohesion. [Ref. 15: p. 591 
The effective use of maneuver warfare provides MAGTF commanders with 
tactical opportunities to set the operational tempo, gain the offensive initiative, and 
66 
prevent the enemy from conducting evasive actions. A fast operational tempo 
produces delays or hasty decision m h g  among enemy commanders. This in 
concert with a well-synchronized concept of operations that maximizes combat 
power at the right place and time, will ultimately destroy the enemy's will to fight. 
F. SUMMARY 
The type of missions assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps varies depending 
on the level of conflict. The uniqueness of the Marine Corps lies in its ability to 
conduct rapid amphibious operations from pre-positioned sea platforms. The 
MAGTF, with its combined arms capability, provides CNCs and fleet 
commanders with a combat ready force necessary to support the prosecution of 
naval or land campaigns. Regardless to its size, all MAGTFs have organizational 
structures tailored to accomplish specific mission requirements. MAGTFs can 
deploy to their areas of operation through forward basing, sealift operations, airlift 
operations, or pre-positioning of forces. The success of the MAGTF depends on 
the commander's ability synchronize his combat power at the right time and place 
to exploit known enemy weaknesses. This requires decentralized decision making 
and effective employment of sound maneuver warfare techniques, based on 
warfighting doctrine and philosophy. To achieve favorable outcomes, 
commanders must initiate actions that shape future battle events and force his 
enemy into a reactive posture. The result of these actions eventually leads to the 
degradation of enemy's force cohesion and their will to fight. 
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V. AIR FORCE MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND 
WARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the end of World War I, military leaders began to first recognize the 
value of air power in battle outcomes. The use of air power became even more 
predominate during World War 11, as the design of military aircraft improved in 
range, speed, and lethality. This trend continued to the more recent Gulf War in 
199 1. In Desert ShieldStorm air power was used extensively by Allied Forces to 
destroy Iraq's C2 centers, weapon storage facilities, and produce damaging 
psychological effects on their forces. Today's integration of air power into 
combined operations, provides military leaders the capability to rapidly project 
combat power deep within enemy territories. More importantly, proper 
application of air power, gives U.S. Armed Forces the opportunity to exploit the 
three dimensional battle space to achieve its national, strategic and tactical 
objectives. [Ref. 8: p. 14-51 
This chapter presents the modern U.S. Air Force's missions, organizations, 
capabilities, limitations, and warfighting philosophies support missions designated 
by the U.S. Code, Title 10. The objective, like the previous chapters, is to 
continue building an operational knowledge necessary to understanding the C41 
systems required to support the air component. These C41 systems will be 
presented later in Chapter IX. 
In order to understand the information presented throughout this chapter, 
the terms aerospace environment and aerospace forces needed to be clearly 
defined. The aerospace environment is all areas above the earth's surface to 
include space. Since the Air Force provides and controls the majority of the assets 
operating in this medium, they are commonly referred to as aerospace forces. 
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These forces capitalize on their use of air and space to provide them global access 
to any place on the earth's surface without limitations imposed by terrain or enemy 
obstacles. Conversely, the Air Force must contend with other obstacles, such as 
the enemy's aircraft and air defense weapons, to achieve air superiority. After the 
Air Force achieves air superiority, it can project combat power with great speed, 
range, versatility, and flexibility. These attributes are hallmarks of the Air Force 
and unparalled by the other services. [Ref. 16: p. 51 
B. PRIMARY ROLES AND MISSIONS 
There are four primary roles assigned to the Air Force that include 
aerospace control, force application, force enhancement, and force support. 
Associated with each of these roles are more specific missions the Air Force must 
accomplish to meet its operational objectives. [Ref. 16: pp. 6-71 
Aerospace control are measures taken to gain and maintain fiiendly use of 
the aerospace environment while also denying its use to enemy forces. These 
measures include offensive and defensive counter air and counter space 
operations. Counter air refers to measures taken to achieve air superiority 
necessary for fiiendly forces to conduct air operations with acceptable fiiendly 
losses and deny the use of this medium to enemy forces. Gaining air superiority is 
the Air Forces first and foremost important mission. Additionally, air superiority 
provides the operational commander the freedom to maneuver both his surface and 
Air Forces effectively to achieve his objectives. Counter space operations refers to 
measures taken to gain and maintain sole use of space while simultaneously 
denying its use to our adversaries. [Ref. 16: p. 61 
Force application is the delivery of aerial combat power at the right time and 
place against the enemy's surface targets. Some examples of force applications are 
strategic attack, air interdiction, and close air support. The Air Force generally 
70 
conducts strategic attacks through aerial bombardments against enemy resources 
they need to sustain their combat operations [Ref. 16: p. 61. These resources may 
included seaports, w o r t s ,  and sea lines of communications [Ref. 8: p. 1-4-81. 
The goal of air interdiction is to destroy, disrupt, or degrade the enemy's combat 
potential, by attacking enemy movements, supply routes, and ammunition holding 
areas. Ground units may receive close air support to enhance their efforts to 
concentrate their total combat power needed to achieve their tactical objectives. 
[Ref. 16: p. 111 
Force enhancements are missions that improve the combat effectiveness of 
both surface and Air Forces. Examples of force enhancements may include the 
following: 
Airlifting personnel and equipment into the combat zone 
0 Conducting in-flight refueling operations to increase range, payload, 
and duration of air assets 
0 Spacelifting critical navigation, communications, and intelligence 
satellites 
0 Performing aerial reconnaissance and surveillance operations 
0 Electronic warfare operations to maintain fiiendly use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum while denying its use to our adversaries 
0 Providing airborne command and control centers. 
Force support are missions associated with sustaining militaxy operations 
within the theater such as establishing and defending forward air bases, providing 
logistics support, and controlling space-based platforms. These missions not only 
support the Air Force, but the other services as well. [Ref. 16: p. 61 
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Most Air Force units perform more than one of the missions described 
above. Additionally, the Air Force has special operations forces who receive 
highly specialized training and use customized aircraft to perform a variety of 
missions introduced throughout the conflict spectrum. These forces are normally 
employed as a member of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). [Ref. 
8: p. 1-4-14] 
C. COLLATERAL MISSIONS 
Besides the Air Force's primary roles and missions, it has several collateral 
responsibilities to support Marine and Naval forces. Some examples of these 
missions include sea surveillance, aerial minelaying operations, and defense of 
SLOCs. The Air Force's ability to accomplish these missions gives the joint 
commander extreme flexibility to accomplish hisher operational objectives. [Ref. 
8: p. 1-44] 
D. ROLES IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY 
The Air Force plays a vital role in supporting the national strategy of the 
NCA, by establishing global presence. The Air Force publication, Global 
Presence 1995, presents three tenets that expand the traditional meaning of 
presence to reflect modern views on projecting militaty forces. The three tenets 
for establishing a global presence include: [Ref. 171 
0 All military forces can exert presence through the right combination 
of their capabilities 
0 Forces have unique attributes that exert presence when applied so 
they complement each other in an area of operation 
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0 Advancing technology enhances the contributions of military forces 
in performing presence missions by improving their situational 
awareness, strategic mobility, and force lethality 
The Air Force publication, Global Power-Global Reach, outlines five 
specific principles for using air and space power to project military power and 
support national strategy. These principles are sustain deterrence, provide 
versatile combat capability, supply rapid global mobility, control the high ground, 
and build U.S. influence. [Ref. 18: pp. 3-41 
Aerospace forces have the capability to deliver nuclear munitions anywhere 
on the globe. This capability acts as a deterrent to potential adversaries who must 
first consider the adverse consequences of launching nuclear or biological strikes 
against U.S. Forces or one of its allies. Today's long-range bomber and fighter 
aircraft give the NCA the capability of projecting versatile air combat power when 
and where needed to gain air superiority in any theater of operations. This 
capability along with other forward deployed forces, allows the nation to respond 
to a variety of crises throughout the conflict spectrum. [Ref. 18: pp. 5-61 
The Air Force's airlift and air tankers, improve the global mobility of not 
only the aerospace forces, but Army and Marine ground forces as well. During 
Desert StodShield, air tankers supported the successful bombardments of targets 
located deep into Iraq, by providing both U.S. and Coalition strike aircraft with in- 
flight refueling services. [Ref. 18: pp. 7-81 
Aerospace forces are charged with the primary responsibility to gain and 
maintain unprecedented control of the high ground. By accomplishing this role, 
the Air Force can provide the NCA and operational commanders with real-time 
information regarding battle damage assessment, disposition of enemy forces, 
location of bailistic missile launches, and navigation services. [Ref. 18: pp. 8-91 
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The Air Force's capability to rapidly project global combat power and U.S. 
mfluence to distant regions, demonstrates the country's resolve to protect its 
national interests. Ths  in turn, plays a vital part in strengthening U.S. relations 
with our allies. [Ref. 18: p. 91 
These five principles form the basic framework to aid decision makers on 
how and when to deploy aerospace forces to accomplish national and strategic 
objectives. Furthermore, they provide the pillars that support the Air Force's 
overall mission of defending the U.S., by exploiting the air and space medium. 
[Ref. 18: p. 31 
E. AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION 
The organization of the Air Force consists of major commands, numbered 
air forces, wings, and squadrons to fulfill both its peacetime and wartime missions. 
This organization is shown in Figure 10. Similar to the chain of commands in 
other services, the NCA communicates their strategic and military objectives 
through the Chairman of the JCS to combatant commanders. The combatant 
commander relies on input fiom their service component commanders within each 
theater to develop their campaign plan that integrates all available air assets. Air 
Force component commanders, such as the Commander of Central Air Forces 
(CINCUSAFCENT) and the Commander of Europe Air Forces (CINCUSAFE), 
provide operation& guidance to the major Air Force command under their 
authority [Ref. 4: pp. 2-3,2-28 to 2-29]. Major Air Force commands may 
consists of two or more numbered air forces. Numbered air forces are composed 
of either multiple-objective or composite wings. Multiple-objective wings 
normally contain similar aircraft such as bombers, fighters or airlift aircraft. The 
combination of two or more of these wings are referred to as multiple-wings. 
Composite wings are organizations consisting of a combination of different types 
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of aircraft within each wing. Both multiple-wings and composite wings are 
functionally organized within the theater to facilitate support and maintenance 
requirements. Regardless of the type of wing, each is composed of one or more 
Chairman of JCS 





I President I 
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Service component CDR 
(Major Command) 
Numbered Air Force CDR 
I 
Air Force Squadron CDR 
Figure 10. Air Force Operational Chain of Command. [Ref. 8: p. 1-4-31 
groups or squadrons made up of approximately 28 aircraft and a full maintenance 
crew of about 2,000 to 4,000 personnel. [Ref. 8: pp. 1-4-2 - 1-4-31 
During joint operations, the Air Force's air component commander is often 
designated as the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JTF 
commander normally designates the JFACC from one of the services participating 
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in the operation. The primary factor that drives this decision is which the service 
has the preponderance of aircraft operating in the area. 
Air component commanders and the JFACC use the Air Tasking Order 
(ATO) to document their operational objectives to their subordinate air 
commanders. The use of ATOs support the concept of centralized control and 
decentralized execution for using and employing air assets. Upon receipt of the 
ATO, subordinate commanders exercise a decentralized concept to develop and 
execute their own concept of operations to meet stated objectives. [Ref. 8: p. I-4- 
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A notional tactical communications architecture in a joint environment is 
shown in Figure 11. The joint air service component commander operates from an 
Air Operations Center (AOC) where he generates ATOs to his subordinate 
commanders. The AOC communicates directly with Forward Air Controller Posts 
(FACPs), Airborne Forward Air Controller (AFAC), Airborne Battlefield C2 
Center (ABCCC), Wing Operations Centers (WOCs), Air Support Operations 
Center (ASOC), and the other service component headquarters (army, navy, 
marines). The role of each of these operations centers are described below: [Ref. 
14: p. 151 
0 FACP - manages the tactical air space by controlling deployed 
aircraft and air surveillance operations 
0 AFAC - manages close air support operations, controls attacks, and 
performs battle damage assessments 
0 ABCCC - provides an airborne platform consisting of extensive 
communications facilities and display consoles to perform wide air 
space management, beyond the capabilities of the FACP 
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0 WOC - receives ATOs fiom the AOC, performs detailed mission 
planning, issues execution orders to subordinate commander, and 
reports the ongoing status of the mission back to the AOC 
0 ASOC - collocates with army tactical operation centers to assist 
them managing tactical air space, controlling Tactical Air Control 
Parties (TACP), and coordinating aerospace assets to support ground 
operations. 
JOINT AIR OPERATIONAL C2 
Figure 11. Joint Air Operations C2 Structure. [After Ref. 19: p. 151 
The tactical C2 architecture is designed to also support a centralized control 
and decentralized execution concept. In a joint environment, the Air Force 
component often takes the lead in air space management. It accomplishes this 
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through their lspersed operations centers fiom which they constantly coordinate 
with other services to maintain an overall Unity of effort. [Ref. 8: p. 1-4-41 
F. CAPABILITIES 
The primary attributes of the Air Force are its speed, range, flexibility, and 
lethality. It possess the capability to project combat power anywhere in the world, 
often within 24 hours of notification. Through the support of in-flight refueling, 
the range of deployed aircraft can be extended great distances fiom their 
supporting bases. Flexibility is achieved by tailoring Air Force packages 
necessary to meet specific operational and strategic objectives. These forces may 
include an assortment of long range bombers (B-52s, B-ls), fighter aircraft (F-l5s, 
F-16s, F-1 1 l's), reconnaissance aircraft (SR-7ls, UR-~S, E-3s), and Close Air 
Support (CAS) aircraft (F-4s, A-10s). [Ref. 8: pp. I-4-6,I-4-20] As demonstrated 
in Desert SheldStorm in 1991, many of these aircraft have state-of-the-art 
weapons systems that give them the capability to deliver ordinance with 
tremendous precision and lethality while simultaneously limiting collateral 
damage. The primary attributes offered by the Air Forces, provide operational 
commanders the ability to influence their 3-D battlespace so as to achieve their 
tactical, operational, or strategic missions. 
G. LIMITATIONS 
In contrast to the Air Force's many attributes, it has several inherent 
limitations such as large and costly support requirements. To sustain combat 
operations for any length of time, deployed aircraft require a large amount of 
logistical support and sizeable maintenance facilities. Examples of logistical 
support include ordinance, fuel, spare parts, and support personnel. Transporting 
this support forward to operational areas, often requires dedicating a significant 
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number of airlift assets for this purpose. Additionally, there are other 
considerations regarding forward positioning of support such as overflight rights to 
airspace, availability of locations having adequate runways, aircraft parking areas, 
and large maintenance hangers. Equipping aircraft with ''smart" or precision 
munitions is expensive, since many of these rockets and missiles cost nearly a 
million dollars each. Although the Air Force has much to offer the operational 
commander, he must to consider the amount of resources required to sustain their 
capability. [Ref. 8: pp. 1-4-17 to 1-4-18] 
H. WARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHY 
There are three types of threats that commonly challenge the aerospace 
forces: surface, air, electronic threats. Two examples of surface threats are 
surface-to-air missiles and anti-air gunfire. Air threats include those that are 
created by hostile airborne platforms such as air-to-air missiles and aircraft 
cannons. Electronic warfare, initiated from surface, air, or space, are hostile 
attempts to track and identrfy friendly aircraft or degrade and destroy friendly C41 
systems. The Air Force may attack all these threats individually or in conjunction 
with ground forces. Another, more common approach is to attack all threats 
simultaneously with combined air assets from all the services. Regardless of the 
method an operational commanders chooses, neutralization of these threats is a 
prerequisite for gaining air superiority. [Ref. 8: p. 1-4-61 
The Air Force's warfighting philosophy and doctrine are based on seven 
tenants of aerospace power that include: centralized controYdecentralized 
execution, flexibilityhersatility, priority, synergy, balance, concentration, and 
persistence. Each of the tenants are described in the following paragraphs. 
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1. Centralized ControllDecentralized Execution 
Centralized control of all air assets is essential to proper establishment of 
priorities, synchronization of combat power, and achievement of a common 
objective. For example, in a joint environment, air assets fiom all the services 
should be centrally controlled by one service component to maximize the total 
effectiveness of available air combat power. Much like the other services' 
warfighting philosophies, the execution phase of an operation should be 
decentralized and pushed down to the lowest possible command level. [Ref. 16: 
PP. 7-81 
2. FlexibilityNersatility 
The range, speed, precision, and lethality of modem aircraft provide 
operational commanders with extraordinary flexibility and versatility to strike any 
enemy target, regardless of its location. This capability, combined with a properly 
tailored Air Force package, allows combat power to be applied at the right time 
and place, causing the most damage to enemy forces. [Ref. 16: pp. 7-81 
3. Priority 
The commitment of aerospace forces necessitates prioritization of military 
goals and objectives. This is paramount to the successful integration of air combat 
power into the overall scheme of maneuver during battles, campaigns, or wars. To 
facilitate this process in a joint environment, joint and air component commanders 
must maintain a constant and open dialog. [Ref. 16: pp. 7-81 
4. Synergy 
The use of aerospace forces in conjunction with surface gunfire and air 
assets that are organic to ground maneuver forces will produce a higher combat 
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effectiveness than the sum of their individual contributions. In other words, both 
air and ground forces must concentrate their efforts toward a common military 
objective, in order to obtain the optimum combat power available to the whole 
force. [Ref. 16: pp. 7-81 
6. Concentration 
Concentration is analogous to the concept of synergy. To harness the full 
combat power of aerospace forces, they should be employed in mass and focussed 
towards a specific military objective. Again, this combat power exceeds the sum 
of their dispersed or individual contributions to the operation. This further implies 
that commanders should avoid fragmented employment of aerospace assets to 
accomplish multiple missions, because it exposes these forces unnecessarily to 




As described earlier, surface, air, and electronic threats impose special 
considerations when using air assets. Since aircraft and highly trained pilots are 
not easily replaced, operational commanders must carefully access the risk 
involved in deploying air assets into high threat areas. To achieve their assigned 
objectives, commanders must deploy the right type or mix (balance) of aircraft and 
ground forces against any threat. [Ref. 16: pp. 7-81 
7. Persistence 
Once aerospace forces achieve air superiority, they should continually and 
relentlessly strike enemy targets to fully exploit the air and space medium. This 
may include constant bombardment of the enemy's C2 facilities, logistics supply 
lines, and potential avenues of approach. In Desert ShielcUStorm, the constant 
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application of air power not only destroyed Sadaam Hussain's ability to maintain 
control of his forces, but produced overwhelming psychological degradation of his 
troops will to fight. This ultimately allowed U.S. and Coalition ground forces to 
achieve their military objectives in a matter of a few days. [Ref. 16: pp. 7-81 
The tenets of aerospace power, along with the standard nine principles of 
war, form the foundation of aerospace doctrine and warfighting philosophy. These 
seven tenets provide guidance to operational commanders when planning the 
employment and use of aerospace forces to achieve their military objectives. 
More importantly, they introduce additional considerations when achieving air 
superiority that are unique to the exploitation of the air and space medium. [Ref. 
16: p. 81 
I. SUMMARY 
The Air Force is charged with four primary missions that include aerospace 
control, force application, force enhancement, and force support. In order to 
accomplish these missions, the Air Force must rapidly gain and maintain friendly 
use of the aerospace environment while denying its use to hostile forces. During 
World War 11, this idea prompted Field Marshall Montgomery to make the 
following statement: 
"If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and lose it quickly" 
[Ref. 16: p. 91 
The primary mission of the Air Force is to defend the U.S. through the dominance 
of the aerospace medium. As a member of the joint military force, the Air Force 
must perform other collateral missions to support Marine and Naval forces such as 
sea surveillance, minelaying operations, and special operations. 
The NCA and senior military leaders base their decisions as to how and 
when to commit aerospace forces on five fundamental principles. These principles 
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include; sustain deterrence, provide versatile combat capability, supply rapid 
global mobility, control the hgh ground, and build U.S. mfluence. 
Today's Air Force is composed of highly sophisticated, techmcally 
advanced aircraft and weapon systems that give the force unique capabilities such 
as speed, range, flexibility, and lethality. Operational commanders integrate these 
capabilities, with those offered by the other services, in their military plans to 
acquire and maintain total control of the three dimensional battlespace. 
The tailored organization of the Air Force is designed to facilitate 
centralized control and decentralized execution as they contend with three 
common types of threats: surface, air, and electronic. The seven tenets of the Air 
Force's warfighting philosophy provide commanders guidelines on how they will 
neutralize these threats to gain air superiority. Total dominance of the aerospace 
medium remains a prerequisite for the U.S. military and its Allies to achieve their 
political, national, and military objectives. 
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VI. U.S. ARMY ORGANIZATION AND WARFIGHTING 
PHILOSOPHY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the past, the Arm! h played an active rol in preserving and tecting 
the nation's interests at home and abroad. The Army, along with the other 
services, have routinely supplied the country with combat-ready forces during 
numerous peace and wartime contingencies. Throughout history, constantly 
changing threats have caused the Army to routinely modifL its force structure, in 
order to, achieve their strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Today's Army 
continues to tailor its force to capture the advantages of advancing technology, 
support the increasing reliance on joint operations, and improve its overall combat 
effectiveness. The Army's ongoing modernization efforts have lead to the 
improvements of their doctrine, training, and quality of soldiers. Collectively 
these efforts have produced an Army unmatched by any potential threats arising 
out of the new world order. 
The goal of this chapter is to describe the Army's organization, capabilities, 
limitations, and warfighting philosophy. This will establish a basic operational 
fiamework for understanding the Army's specific C2 functions and their 
supporting C41 systems. These will be later addressed in Chapter X. 
B. PRIMARY ROLES AND MISSIONS 
The U.S. Army's overall mission is to provide the NCA with a land-based 
military force capable of imposing national strategy, policies, and directives, by 
gaining and maintaining land superiority. This is achieved through the conduct of 
a full range of military operations ranging from missions other than war to 
participation in large scale ground campaigns. The U.S. Army operates as a 
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member of the joint team to protect the nation's interest both in the Continental 
United States (CONUS) and overseas. Like the other military services, the Army 
must be used in conjunction with other measures such as political, economical, 
and lplomatic actions to achieve objectives directed by the NCA. To fulfill al 
its assigned responsibilities outlined in DoD Directive 5 100.1, the Army must 
perform a number of primary and collateral functions. 
of 
The primary roles of the Army involve organizing, training, equipping, and 
deploying land forces required to prosecute its assigned missions throughout the 
conflict spectrum. Some of the functions associated with executing of these roles 
and protecting the coullt~y's military forces, facilities, and homeland, include the 
following: [Ref. 5 :  pp. 13-14] 
0 Conduct decisive and prompt combat operations to seize, occupy, 
and defend areas of interest 
0 Install and maintain combat service support to sustain land-based 
operations for the Army and other military services 
0 Perform air defense operations using organic assets 
0 Participate as a member of the joint force to support other joint 
military operations with the Army's assets and capabilities 
0 Act as the lead component for conducting Marine Corps and Army 
airborne operations 
Coordinate with other services to integrate space control operations 
into the Army's concept of operations 
0 Employ electronic warfare assets to maintain dominance of the 
electromagnetic spectrum 
0 Initiate psychological operations when required 
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Install temporary military governments following the occupation of 
territories abroad 
Install, operate, and maintain land-based communications and 
network interfaces as required 
Perform and support special operations in land areas of interest 
The key drivers that determine whether the Army will perform some, if not 
all, of the functions listed above include the level of conflict, magnitude of the 
threat, and force composition. For example, in support of other than war missions, 
it would not be uncommon for the Army to perform only a few of the functions 
such as psychological operations and the use of the Army's special operations 
forces. Conversely, in a larger conflict such as the Persian Gulf, the Army will 
perform all of the listed functions in some capacity. Ultimately, the number of 
functional roles performed depends on the level of conflict, the Army's 
participation, and the composition of joint forces. 
C. COLLATERAL MISSIONS 
As a member of the joint team, the Army is charged by the DoD Directive 
5 100.1 to perform several collateral missions to support the other services. Some 
of these missions include organizing, training, and equipping land forces to 
interdict and support maritime operations. To meet these mission requirements, 
the Army uses its organic assets to conduct supporting air defense, airborne, 
airmobile, and close air support operations. [Ref. 5 :  pp. 14-15] 
D. ARMY ORGANIZATIONS 
Within the Army, there are many different levels of commands or echelons. 
These levels are based on force size, force type, and nature of the conflict. The 
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later refers to missions or objectives assigned to organizations relative to either 
tactical or operational levels of war. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-51 
1. Tactical Level 
At the tactical level of war, Army organizations are assigned specific 
tactical missions that normally contribute to higher level operational objectives for 
a specific theater of operations. Localized battles and engagements are two 
examples of tactical objectives. The type of organizations used to support the 
tactical level of war include company/battery/troop, battaliodsquadron, 
brigade/group, divisions, and corps. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-61 
a Company/Battei&roops 
Company size organizations are composed of two or more platoons 
and a headquarters section. The platoons, usually configured dike, receive limited 
administrative and logistical support from the company's headquarters section. 
Infantry and armor companies often fight as a cohesive unit. In other units, 
however, such as attack helicopters and cavalry units, platoons may operate 
independently. These units are called troops as opposed to companies. Similarly, 
company size units in field artillery units are referred to as batteries. They 
generally operate as a cohesive unit to provide fire support for other maneuver 
units such as armor, cavalry, and infantry. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-61 
6. BattaliodSquadron 
Battalion size units are composed of two or more companies and a 
headquarters company. Most Army battalions have three to five ahke (line) 
companies that receive administrative and logistical support from a headquarters 
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company. Combat battalions such as armor and infantry, typically operate as a 
cohesive unit in an assigned area of responsibility on the battlefield. 
A battalion size cavalry unit is called a squadron. Its composition 
differs from other combat units because it consists of both ground and attack 
helicopter companieshroops. It is capable of performing reconnaissance and 
security missions for a much larger organization. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-61 
c. BrigaddRegimentdGroup 
Brigade size organizations consist of two or more battalions and a 
separate headquarters company. These units can be categorized as maneuver or 
separate brigades. Maneuver brigades form the major combat elements within a 
division, however occasionally they may operate independently. Although not 
part of their organization, maneuver brigades often receive fire support, combat 
support, and combat service support through habitual relationships with smaller 
organizations. Examples of these organizations are aviation, field artillery, signal, 
chemical, and maintenance support units. Separate brigades usually reinforce 
corps or divisions with infantry, armor, engineer, and aviation. Separate brigade 
sized armored cavalry units are called regiments and brigade size field artillery 
units are called groups. Both the armored cavalry regiments and field artillery 
groups may also provide fire support and combat reinforcements to corps or 
divisions when operationally attached. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-61 
d Divisions 
The division is the largest Army organization that ordinarily trains, 
and fights as a combined arms team. Although the composition of a division will 
vary depending its type, all divisions consist of combat, combat support, and 
combat service support units. By design, divisions are self-sustaining and capable 
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of operating independently for long periods of time. They normally form the 
major maneuver elements w i h  a corps. Common types of divisions in the Army 
are infantry, armor, mechanized infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions. [Ref. 
20: p. 151 
e. Corps 
The corps forms the Army's largest tactical unit. It consists of two to 
five divisions and a full compliment of other combat, combat support, and combat 
service support units. Corps are normally tailored to achieve specific missions for 
their designated areas of operation and can sustain operations longer than a 
division. Due to the size and flexibility, corps may operate as part of a larger land 
force (field army, army group, or theater army), a component of a joint force, or 
independently. [Ref. 20: p. 31 
2. Operational Level 
Operational level missions or objectives assigned to Amy 
organizations usually contribute to accomplishment of higher national and 
strategic objectives. This generally requires the conduct of large-scale land 
campaigns in a mature theater of operations. Two examples of these campaigns 
are Desert ShieldDesert Storm and World War 11. The Army organizations used 
at the operational level are field armies, army groups, and theater armies. [Ref. 8: 
p. 1-3-71 
a FieldArmies 
A field army is an ad hoc organization formed by the theater army 
commander and typically consists of two or more corps. In a joint or combined 
operation, field armies may include units from other services or nations that 
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participate in major land campaigns. Operational missions assigned to field armies 
often contribute to the achievement of strategic objectives. If the field army is the 
largest land component in a theater, the field army commander may direct and 
orchestrate the entire land campaign. When a field army is part of an army group, 
it will form the group's major maneuver elements. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-71 
b. Army Groups 
An army group, like field armies, is an ad hoc organization formed 
by two to five field armies. They would normally be used in a mature theater of 
operations against a well-organized and well-armed adversary. The commander of 
an army group may be designated as the land component commander for the 
theater. Fortunately, army groups have not been required since World War 11. 
[Ref. 8: p. 1-3-71 
c. Theater Army 
The theater army serves as the service component in a theater of 
operations. It provides either or both operational and service support for all Army 
units in the region. As shown in Figure 12, the theater army commander is 
normally the Army Service Component in a unified command. He recommends to 
the theater CINC how to best employ and allocate Army forces. Additionally, the 
theater army commander is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and 
maintaining the force as necessary for it to achieve its assigned objectives. [Ref. 
8: p. 1-34] 
3. New Force Structure 
The Army's force organizational structure is currently undergoing major 
revisions that will tailor the force to meet future contingency requirements 
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ARMY C2 STRUCTURE 
m n i c a t i o n s  
Chaiman of JCS National Command 
Battalion CDR 
Figure 12. Army Operational Chain of Command. 
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during the post Cold War era. The new force structure will have the capability to 
respond to two major regional conflicts simultaneously. Following DoD's 1993 
Bottom-up Review, a new concept plan evolved called the Force XXI Campaign 
Plan. This approved plan establishes guidelines for the Army's restructuring 
initiatives. The Force XXI Campaign Plan will reduce the current Army force to 
10 active divisions, four corps, and three armored cavalry regiments by the end of 
FY 1996. Additionally, the plan will reduce the eight of National Guard divisions 
to five divisions and 37 brigades. Out of the 37 brigades, 15 will be designated as 
"enhanced" or readiness brigades. These units will be resourced so they can 
mobilize, train, and rapidly deploy to regional conflicts. [Ref. 21: p. 481 
The 10 active divisions remaining in the Army active force will include six 
heavy divisions, one airborne division, one air assault division, and two light 
divisions. All of these divisions, except two heavy divisions and one light 
division, will be based in CONUS. The other two heavy divisions will be 
stationed in Germany and the light division will be stationed in Korea. The four 
remaining corps will include: I Corps (Ft. Lewis, Washington), I11 Corps (Ft. 
Hood, Texas), V Corps (Germany), and XVIII Airborne Corps (Ft. Bragg, North 
Carolina). The three armored cavalry regiments remaining in the active Army 
force will include: 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (light), 3rd Armor Cavalry 
Regiment (heavy), and 1 lth Armored Cavalry Regiment (heavy). [Ref. 22: p. 461 
Under the new Force XXI Campaign Plan, each of the 10 active divisions 
will have three active brigades within their organizations. This differs from the 
"old way of doing business" where the division typically had two active brigades 
and one reserve component round-out brigade. National Guard readiness brigades 
that remain in the total Army force will no longer be part of the divisions, but 
instead be trained and equipped to deploy and operate independently of active 
forces. [Ref. 22: p. 461 
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One of the Army's key emphasis areas as it reshapes its force is strategic 
power projection. The Army's goals are to develop the capability to project its 
military power using primarily CONUS based forces in an effort to minimize the 
permanently deployed force overseas. By implementing this concept, the Army 
will continue to increase its reliance on airlift and sealift assets, normally provided 
by the other services. As the Army attempts to restructure and relocate the 
preponderance of its force to CONUS based installations, several issues of C2 
have surfaced regarding the geographical separation of some brigades from their 
parent divisions. To resolve these issues, the U.S. Army Forces Comgnd 
(FORSCOM) will provide day-to-day administrative and resource support for 
these brigades, however, the parent division must maintain operational C2 over the 
displaced units. [Ref. 22: p. 471 
_ _  
E. CATEGORIES AND CAPABILITIES OF ARMY FORCES 
Army forces can be grouped into five broad categories. These categories 
are heavy forces, light forces, fire support, aviation, and special operating forces. 
Each category represents forces having similar firepower, lethality, equipment, and 
limitations, however, W e r  in their functional roles and missions. The following 
paragraphs describe the type of forces that compose each category and their 
contributions to the Army's AirLand Battle concept. This concept will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
1. HeavyForces 
Heavy Forces give the Army the capability to defeat a well-equipped and 
well-organized adversary. Three types of heavy forces in the Army are armor, 
mechanized infantry, and armored cavalry regiments. The common weapons 
system used by these forces include Abrams tanks, Apache attack helicopters, 
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Bradley fighting vehicle, and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). [Ref. 8: 
p. 1-3-81 
Armor units employ the Abrams tank as the primary weapon to conduct 
mounted warfare. This style of warfare takes advantage of the tank's speed, armor, 
and firepower to breakthrough heavily defended areas, strike deep into enemy 
territories, and pursuit withdrawing enemy forces. Armor units are best suited for 
fighting in open terrain, like the desert, that allows tanks to be used at their 
maximum effective ranges. Conversely, heavy vegetated terrain, cities, and soft or 
wet areas will restrict the mobility and reduce the combat effectiveness of these 
forces. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-81 
Armored cavalry units are specialized and uniquely organized armor units 
designed to perform reconnaissance and security missions. Normally augmented 
with attack helicopters and tanks, armored cavalry units perform key tasks such as 
finding the enemy, establishing initial contact, and developing the tactical 
situation. 
Mechanized infantry forces use their Bradley fighting vehicles to perform 
either mounted or dismounted operations. When mounted, infantry soldiers rely 
on their armor plated fighting vehicles to provide limited firepower and protection, 
as they maneuver rapidly across the battlefield. The major contribution of 
mechanized infanq forces is their capability to dismount from their vehicles, 
upon reaching areas that would otherwise limit the mobility of annor forces. 
Although the increased mobility and versatility of mechanized infantry forces can 
compensate for limitations imposed on armor units, their fighting vehicles lack the 
firepower of the Abrams tanks. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-91 
95 
2. Light Forces 
The Army relies on light forces to rapidly respond to global regions so they 
can accomplish strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Since these highly 
versatile forces use only light armored vehicles, they are not hindered by transport 
limitations inherent to deploying heavy forces. There are two types of light forces 
in the Army: light infantry and motorized infantry. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-91 
Light infantry typically serves as a initial entry force into a theater to secure 
key areas and facilities that will support follow-on deployments of heavy forces. 
Capable of operating in any terrain or weather, light forces are particularly suited 
for missions associated with low intensity conflicts. The Army may also use its 
light forces to penetrate areas not suitable for heavy forces such as wetlands, urban 
areas, densely vegetated terrain. Other missions applicable to light forces include 
assaults on rear area facilities, exploiting the success of heavy forces, and leading 
a combined arms attack. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-91 
Motorized infantry serve as a rapid deployable light armored force to meet 
and destroy an enemy's heavy threat. Even though the motorized infantry offers 
greater firepower, lethality, and protection than light forces, it still lacks the full 
combat capabilities of conventional heavy armor or mechanized infantry units. 
Missions commonly assigned to motorized infantry units include the following: 







Attack against enemy forces in the open 
Envelop and infiltrate lightly defended areas 
Exploit the successful penetration achieved by heavy friendly forces 
Protect fi-iendly rear area operations and facilities 
Pursue and exploit retreating enemy forces 
Dismount and fight as light infantry 
96 
3. Army Aviation 
The three types of aviation units in the Army are attack helicopter, air 
cavalry, and combat support aviation units. These units are active players in 
combined arms operations, due to the operating characteristics of today's modem 
rotary-wing aircraft. Some of these characteristics are speed of movement, 
freedom of terrain, and insensitivity to weather conditions. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-10] 
Aviation units employ their attack helicopters, like the AH-64 Apache helicopter 
and the AH- 1 Cobra helicopter, to provide ground commanders with additional 
capabilities to concentrate their firepower at the right time and place on the 
battlefield. Attack helicopters are equipped with advanced weapon systems that 
are particularly suited for attacking large enemy armored formations. Air Cavalry 
units use their attack helicopters, during screening and reconnaissance missions, 
for close air support and to protect ground elements in a division cavalry 
squadrons or armored cavalry regiments. Combat support aviation units use 
support aircraft such as UH-1 Hueys, UH-60 Blackhawks, and CH-47 Chinooks, 
to perform a wide range of missions to support ground operations. These 
operations may typically include troop movementhertion, transport of critical 
logistics, and providing airmobile C2 platforms. 
4. Fire Support 
Field artillery units are the principle elements used to provide fire support 
to maneuver ground forces. The integration of fire support into the commander's 
scheme of maneuver requires the proper employment, coordination, and control of 
weapon systems organic to field artillery units. This is accomplished by 
establishing fire control measures such as No Fire Areas (NFA), Restricted Fire 
Lines (RFL), Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCL), and Coordination Fire 










forces by using their mobile weapons systems to deliver conventional, nuclear, 
I chemical, rockets, and missiles. Mission assigned to field artillery units typically 
0 Suppressing enemy direct and indirect fire support capabilities 
0 Delivering scatterable mines to impede the mobility of enemy forces 
or to protect fiiendly forces 
0 Destroy targets deep within enemy territory 
5. Special Operating Forces 
Special Operating Forces support tactical commanders with a broad range 
of military options. Special forces, rangers, special operations aircraft, 
psychological, and civil affairs units, are common types of special operating forces 
found in today's Army. 
Special forces are composed of elite forces with highly specialized skills. 
The primary mission of the special forces is to promote regional security and 
stability. They accomplish their mission by performing many different roles such 
as foreign military assistance, conventional and unconventional warfare, strategic 
reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance. Special forces 
groups, operating as subordinate organizations under the Special Operations 
Command, generally provide direct control over special forces units. [Ref. 8: p. I- 
3-1 11 
Rangers are rapidly deployable light infantry forces that conduct special 
operations to accomplish key military objectives. Their unique capabilities 
augment the forcible-entry capabilities of the Army, as it deploys into hostile 
regions. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-11] 
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The Army Special Operations Aviation's (SOA) primary mission is to 
support the special operations forces by using specially modified aircraft that are 
capable of performing covert troop insertions and extractions. The SOA supports 
not only the Army, but special operations forces provided by the other services as 
well. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-11] 
The U.S. Army psychological operations forces are often deployed into 
denied areas to create favorable perceptions of U.S. forces. If properly employed, 
these forces can shorten conflicts, reduce potential casualties (cidian and 
military), and achieve specified military objectives using only minimum- force.. 
The majority of the Army's psychological operation forces are provided by the 
Army's reserve component. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-12] 
Civil Affairs units are normally employed to interface with civilian 
governments to promote trust and approval for the occupation of U.S. forces. 
Currently there exists only one civil affairs unit on active duty (Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina), with the remaining 36 civil affairs units being provided by the Army 
reserve. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-12] 
F. LIMITATIONS 
Although Army forces are capable of projecting a sizeable and lethal land 
force world-wide, they are plagued with several inherent limitations. These 
limitations include the lack of organic lift assets, reductions in forces, and 
geographical dispersions between some CONUS based brigades and their parent 
divisions. 
The Army's modern strategy centers on the global projection of its CONUS 
based forces abroad to protect U.S. interests during international crises. This 
causes the Army to rely on the Air Force's air and the Navy's sealift assets for 
mobility to their areas of operations. In the event the situation calls for the use of 
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heavy forces such as required in Desert Shielmesert Storm, the Army requires 
tremendous lift support to deploy their forces in a timely and responsive manner. 
The time required for heavy forces to mobilize to the theater rests solely on the 
availability and often limited resources of the other services. To overcome thrs 
limitation, the Army, with assistance from the Navy, is currently establishing 
forward positioned sites of heavy equipment that are afloat near potential crisis 
regions. These initiatives, along with other ongoing modernization programs to 
improve the airlift and sealift assets in the Air Force and Navy respectively, will 
lead to improvements in the Army's capability to deploy its heavy forces. [Ref. 
23: p. 201 
The Force XXI Campaign Plan mandates the Army must reduce its force to 
10 active divisions. This new force structure will be capable of conducting two 
major regional conflicts simultaneously. The Army's force size was determined 
based on two medium, as opposed to high, intensity conflicts. To overcome this 
limitation, the Army plans to rely on continued procurement of state-of-the-art 
weapons and C41 systems, a highly trained and synchronized force, and its 
effective use of National Guard and reserve components. [Ref. 23: p. 201 
In the past, Army divisions typically used routine and local field training 
exercises on their assigned installations to maintain a highly cohesive combat 
organization. With some of the brigades geographically separated fiom parent 
their divisions, this is no longer economical or in some cases feasible. To maintain 
the combat readiness and cohesiveness in the divisions, the Army must now 
develop innovative methods to overcome this limitation. This will demand the use 
of more extensive brigade level training exercises, modem computer training 
simulators, and well orchestrated division level training exercises, whenever 
possible. Despite its limitations, the Army will continue to direct its efforts toward 
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developing highly competent leaders, modernizing the force, and capitalizing on 
tough realistic training, as they prepare for future contingencies. 
G. ARMY'S WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE 
The Army's warfighting doctrine consists of two fundamental doctrines that 
exploit the advantages offered by a multi-dimensional battlefield. These two 
warfighting doctrines are AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations. There are five 
tenets of AirLand Battle that provide today's Army commanders with a doctrinal 
guide to conduct both offensive and defensive operations against an adversary. 
The five tenets, as well as, the purpose for conducting offensive and defensive 
operations will be described later in this section. 
1. AirLand Battle Doctrine 
The Army's primary warfighting doctrine is called AirLand Battle. It 
servers as the foundation from which the Army organizes, trains, equips, and 
employs its forces. The AirLand Battle doctrine was developed based on proven 
maneuver tactics and principles learned from the Army's past involvement in 
combat. This doctrine, introduced by FM 100-5 in 1986, applies to ground and air 
operations on a linear battlefield. A linear battlefield refers to the conduct of 
battle where the force's main objective has spatial orientation such as seizing, and 
holding key terrain or areas of interests. By taking advantage of the battlefield's 
full dimensions, AirLand Battle doctrine provides a framework for planning and 
executing land campaigns, major conflicts, battles, and engagements. [Ref. 8: p. I- 
3-12 and Ref. 12: p. 141 
Proper use of AirLand Battle doctrine requires Army, joint, and multi- 
national forces to integrate close, deep, and rear battle operations on a linear 
battlefield. Close operations pertain to the operations using forces directly in 
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contact with the enemy. Deep operations are the operations drrected at enemy 
capabilities necessary to sustain, remforce, and control their forces engaged in 
close combat operations. Examples of deep operations are disrupting or 
destroying an adversary's C2 centers, reserve forces, and logistics bases (including 
industrial bases) located in their heartland. Rear battle are operations to protect 
fiiendly actions and facilities necessary to sustain close and deep operations, as 
well as, posture the force for future operations. Friendly rear operations must be 
included in planning the disposition of forces since it is often vulnerable to deep 
attacks. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-12] 
2. Tenets of AirLand Battle 
The AirLand Battle doctrine is a maneuver oriented doctrine that 
commanders use for developing their creative, innovative, and flexible operational 
plans. These plans must capitalize on advantages offered by the coordinated 
application of air, land, and naval forces in a multi-dimensional battlespace. The 
five tenets that support the AirLand Battle doctrine are initiative, agility, depth, 
versatility, and synchronization. [Ref. 24: pp. 2-6 to 2-91 
a Initiative 
~ 
Initiative refers to the spirit or momentum of the battle produced 
through successful application of offensive tactics. Gaining and maintaining the 
initiative causes the enemy to become reactive to proactive actions imposed by 
fiiendly forces. Obtaining the initiative is a prerequisite for achieving favorable 




Agility is the ability of friendly forces to quickly maneuver and 
concentrate their full combat power to exploit exposed enemy vulnerabilities. This 
requires commanders to rely on real-time intelligence sources and tactical decision 
aides that identifL enemy vulnerabilities and intercept their tactical decision 
making cycle. Agdity allows commanders to anticipate future enemy actions and 
responses, so they can adjust the movement of their forces accordingly to achleve 
a decisive advantage. [Ref. 24: p. 2-71 
c. Depth 
Depth refers to the commanders' ability to employ their combat 
resources, such as organic aircraft and supporting special operating forces, to 
attack targets deep within enemy territory. These targets might include the 
enemy's C2 centers, logistics facilities, and reserve forces that would support the 
enemy's capability to sustain current or future combat operations. [Ref. 24: p. 2-71 
d Versatility 
Versatility is the ability to tailor the organization as needed to meet a 
wide range of contingency requirements created throughout the spectrum of 
codicts. It allows the smooth transition from one mission to another to meet 
changing threats, operational environments, and assigned objectives. For example, 
an Army Engineer unit may quickly change its mission from installing obstacles on 
the battlefield to performing other that war missions such as restoring water and 
power facilities. Well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped forces are essential 
factors in developing versatility among Army forces. [Ref. 24: p. 2-91 
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e. Synchronization 
Synchronization is the arrangement of activities that bring to bear the 
full thrust of combat power at the right time and place. These activities are 
essential for the Army commander to produce desirable outcomes during a 
decisive engagement on a multi-dimensional battlefield. [Ref. 8: p. 1-3-14] 
Commanders achieve synchronization by organizing the displacement of their 
forces and designating boundaries which delineate each unit's operational areas. 
Figure 13 shows an example of how a division typically displaces during an 
offensive operation conducted on a linear battlefield. The figure also shows 
examples of control measures commonly used by the commander to plan, execute, 
and control the movement of their forces during Army land operations. Examples 
of these control measures include phase lines, unit boundaries, axis of advance, 
and lines of departureflines of contact. Whether shown on hardcopy overlays or 
computer displays, all control measures share the common goal of supporting the 
C2 over battle forces. Battle staffs achieve this goal by providing their commander 
with location, progress, and movement routes of li-iendly forces. [Ref. 24: pp. 2-8 
to 2-9 and Ref. 251 
3. AirLand Operations 
AirLand Operations doctrine is an extension of the AirLand Ba le that 
applies to the conduct of combat operations on a nonlinear battlefield. A nonlinear 
battlefield differs from a linear battlefield, because on a nonlinear battlefield the 
main objectives are not relative to spatial orientation (seizing and holding key 
terrain), but instead geared toward destroying specific enemy capabilities. 
AirLand Operations provide the basic doctrine for employing long-range weapon 
systems to strike enemy capabilities they need to continually wage war. Examples 
of these capabilities include scud launchers, critical C2 nodes, and logistic 
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facilities. Another fundamental difference between the AirLand Battle and 
AirLand Operations doctrines is that in AirLand Operations, fiiendly forces 
generally avoid using high attrition style warfare tactics to destroy the enemy's will 
to fight. Advanced weapons, precision munitions, improved intelligence 
collection, and integration of joint forces must be incorporated into the concept of 
operations to achieve desirable outcomes on a nonlinear battlefield. [Ref. 8: pp. I- 
3-16 to 1-3-17] 
It is not uncommon for Army commanders to use both AirLand Operations 
and AirLand Battle doctrines in developing their operational plans. Both provide 
Army commanders with a vehicle to successfully plan and execute offensive and 
defensive operations as they participate in land warfare. The Persian Gulf War 
provides a classic example of how the both linear and nonlinear battle doctrines 
were applied by coalition forces to defeat Iraq's Republican Guard Force and 
destroy their will to fight. 
4. Offensive Operations 
The Army warfighting philosophy and doctrine hinges on the success of 
offensive operations. It is the only decisive form of war to defeat a heavily armed 
and well-organized opposing forces during medium to high intensity conflicts. 
Successful offensive operations demand tempo, surprise, concentration, and 
audacity. The Army's FM 100-5, Operations, describes the four sequential phases 
of an offensive operation as movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. 
Although the primary objective of any offensive operation is to defeat the enemy's 
will to fight, other reasons for undertaking offensive operations may include the 
following: [Ref. 24: pp. 7-0 to 7-31 
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0 Securing decisive terrain 
0 Depriving the enemy resources 
0 Gaining information to deceive or divert the enemy 
Holding the enemy in place 
0 Establishmg conditions favorable for future operations 
The Army uses six forms of maneuver to conduct offensive operations 
including envelopment, infiltration, turning movement, penetration, and frontal 
attack. In offensive operations the acronym METT-T is commonly used by Army 
commander's to access the tactical situation and determine which form of offensive 
maneuver to use. This acronym represents the assigned mission, enemy actions, 
fiiendly troops available, terrain, and weather. A commander's selected form of 
maneuver is normally stated and relayed to subordinates as the commander's intent 
or concept of operations within an operation order. [Ref. 24: p. 8-11 
5. Defensive Operations 
Defensive operations are normally conducted as part of major campaigns, 
battles, or engagements and often used in combination with offensive operations. 
The Army's purposes for conducting defensive operations are to halt or delay 
enemy attacks, exercise economy of force, retain ground, and gain time. Since a 
defensive operation is a less decisive form of war, it is normally used temporarily 
until fiiendly forces have the capability to transition to the offense. This is 
typically accomplished by conducting a counterattack at the point when enemy 
forces loose their offensive initiative (sometimes referred to as the culminating 
point). The two common types of defensive operations are mobile and area 
defense. During mobile defense operations, Army commanders allow an attacking 
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enemy force to advance into a position that exposes it to a counterattack or 
envelopment by a mobile reserve forces. Area defense operations are static in 
nature. During these operations, the Army establishes stationary defensive 
positions to secure its key terrain while using its reserve forces to halt enemy 
efforts attempting to penetrate between them. A situation where the Army would 
uses a defense operation is during its initial deployment into a theater of operation 
while they are being attacked by an aggressive force. During this phase of the 
operation, initial Army forces would conduct a defensive posture to wait for 
additional reinforcements. Eventually some form of offensive operation will be 
necessary for the Army to achieve its military objectives. [Ref. 8: pp. 1-3-23 to I- 
3-24 and Ref. 24: p. 9-01 
H. SUMMARY 
Modem Army organizations combine state-of-the-art weapon systems with 
the world's highest trained soldiers. This combination produces deployable land- 
based forces that are capable of protecting national interests around the world. 
The NCA uses the Army's military power, in conjunction with other options, such 
as economical, political, and diplomatic measures, to accomplish specific strategic, 
operational, and tactical objectives. Although the Army's primary mission is to 
organize, train, equip, and employ its land forces to wage war against hostile 
forces, it has several collateral missions as well. These collateral missions include 
integrating and employing the Army's land forces, their capabilities, and their 
organic assets to support joint and combined operations. 
Versatility is a salient characteristic of today's Army Forces. It is created 
by the diverse units that compose its organizational structure both at the tactical 
and operational levels. Army's units at either level (tactical or operational) may 
consist of various types of unit that fall under five broad categories. These 
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use the AirLand Battle doctrine as a basic foundation for developing their concept 
of operations and exercising C2 over their forces fighting on a linear battlefield. 
In addition, commanders may elect to use the AirLand Operations doctrine, 
separately or in combination with the AirLand Battle, to employ and fight their 
forces on a nonlinear battlefield. Both doctrines favor offensive watfare as 
primary means for producing decisive outcomes during combat. 
Modernization efforts continue to be one of the Army's highest priorities. 
The Force XXI Campaign Plan is the approved roadmap for modernizing the 
Army's organizational structure. This plan is based on the anticipated success of 
other ongoing Army and joint programs that will capture and integrate advancing 
technologies of new weapon and C41 systems into the force. These systems will in 
turn, provide tomorrow's Army commanders with the capability to fight effectively 




VII. NAVY COMMUNICATIONS 
b The previous four chapters have outlined each of the services' organization, 
missions, roles, and wdighting philosophies. The goal of these chapters was to 
provide an operational overview in how each of the services deploy, function, and 
contribute to the DoD's overall functions presented in Chapter 11. This knowledge 
will provide the framework for understanding how the each of the services apply 
their unique C41 systems and supporting communications systems to meet the C2 
requirements of theater and tactical commanders. 
This chapter, along with Chapters VIII through X will begin by introducing 
the each of the service's primary C41 systems. This will be followed by an 
explanation on how subcomponents of these systems or other service unique C41 
systems support five common C2 functional areas. These five functional areas are 
intelligence, fire support, air operations (air defense), maneuver, and logistics. To 
provide a well-rounded discussion on the Navy's C41 systems, requires a 
presentation on the various types of C41 communication support systems they use 
in their unique operating environment. 
A. NAVY'S PRIMARY C41 SYSTEMS 
The primary C41 systems used in today's Navy is the Joint Maritime 
Command Wormation System (JMCIS). The need for JMCIS surfaced as the 
Navy attempted to upgrade many of their separate afloat and ashore C41 systems 
such as the Joint Operations Tactical System (JOTS) and its derivative systems. 
During this attempt, they found that many of these separate systems had 
duplication in both system functions and software components. This duplication 
drove up development, maintenance, and training costs. In addition, many earlier 
Navy systems were not only incompatible with other Navy command information 
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systems, but more importantly, different systems did not provide the user with 
consistant information. JMCIS, however, offered both a feasible and economical 
alternative to resolving these issues. [Ref. 261 
JMCIS was developed using a common software set called Unified Build. 
This software consolidated key features and software programs from earlier 
systems (prior to 1993), thereby eliminating duplication. The Unified Build is not 
a deliverable system to the end user, but rather a set of development tools, 
documentation, and modules for building a command information system. This 
allowed system developers to merge the operational functions of existing C41 
systems, [Ref. 26: p. 1-15] 
JMCIS is based on an open client-server architecture that consists of UNIX 
workstations connected to a Local Area Network (LAN). The workstations, 
normally located in command information centers (CICs) onboard ships or in 
shore based command centers, allow users to query a centralized database for 
specific information. [Ref. 26: pp. 2-5 and 2-14] 
A key feature of JMCIS is that it uses a common operating environment 
which includes commercial off-the-shelf software (COTS) and core software 
utilities. Two examples of COTS software are the system's basic operating system 
and a windows environment. The core utilities used in JMCIS include receiving 
and processing messages, message correlation, updating the track database, and 
software for generating cartographic displays. COTS, core software utilities, and 
the client-server architecture allow the system to receive messages and track 
information, even when the operator is not logged into a workstation. Since 
JMCIS is developed using a common operating environment, it offers full 
interoperability with other JMCIS users in the Marine Corps and U.S. Coast 
Guard. In addition, its modular design will also facilitate future system upgrades 
and integration into the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) to support 
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its users changing C2 requirements. GCCS will be discussed in futher detail in 
Chapter XI. [Ref. 26: p. 2-31 
Two prominent Navy C41 systems that contributed functions to JMCIS are 
the Naval Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A) and the Operations 
Support System (0%) or Naval Command and Control System-Ashore (NCCS- 
A). Their merger established a single, consolidated C41 system (JMCIS) that 
meets the needs of both communities. [Ref. 26: p. 1-11 
1. Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A) 
The NTCS-A was originally formed by consolidating several earlier 
generation information management systems used at sea to include: Joint 
Operations Tactical System (JOTS), for battle track management; Naval 
Intelligence Processing System (NIPS), for intelligence database management; 
Tactical Information Management System (TIMS), for status board displays; 
Navy Imagery Electronic Warfare System (NIEWS), for imagery acquisition; and 
assorted Tactical Decision Aides (TDAs), for supporting the tactical decision 
maker. This consolidation led to a set of common software called the Government 
off-the-shelf software (GOTS) version 1.1. The NTCS-A assisted both flag and 
unit level commanders (onboard Navy ships) in performing mission and data 
analysis requirements. This was accomplished by supplying them with a fused 
tactical picture of their battlespace, integrated intelligence processing services, and 
imagery exploitation capabilities. Additionally, the NTCS-A exchanged tactical 
information with other C41 systems such as the Combat Direction System (CDS) 
and the Tactical Air Planning System (TAMPS). [Ref. 26: p. 1-11 
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2. Operations Support System (OSS) 
The OSS, snyonomous with NTCS-A, was a command and control system 
used in Naval shore based intelligence and command centers. It was a composite 
of software functions that evolved from other C41 systems such as JOTS, the 
Navy's WWMCCS standard software, and the Fleet Command Battle Management 
Program. It served as the shore based version of the NTCS-A. The Navy merged 
the OSS with the NTCS-A to form a common software set called Unified Build 
version 2.0 or GOTS 2.0. This software incorporates key C2 functions that 
support both afloat and ashore operations. Furthermore, this software 
consolidation now forms the basic Unified Build software that will facilitate the 
integration of other C41 systems being developed by the U.S. Coast Guard and the 
Marine Corps. [Ref. 27: p. 241 
B. NAVY C2 FUNCTIONAL AREAS 
There are five C2 functional areas that support naval commanders ability to 
maintain proper C2 over their forces. Each functional area maybe supported by 
one or more C41 systems that provide commanders with the information they need 
to assess the situation, make operational decisions, and disseminate guidance to 
subordinates. The five functional areas are intelligence, air operations, Eire 
support, maneuver, and logistics. Described below are the system(s) the support 
each functional area. [Ref. 28: p.. 721 
1. Intelligence 
The intelligence functional area is supported by the Naval Intelligence 
Processing System (NIPS). This is a subsystem of JMCIS that acts as a 
comprehensive military intelligence database server to assist flag and unit level 
commanders execute their assigned duties. NIPS consolidates, updates, and fuses 
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intelligence data collected from various sensors at the national, theater, and tactical 
levels. The system allows its users to query, Isplay, update a wide variety of 
information from performance data for weapon systems and changes to the tactical t 
situation. NIPS receives and disseminates information among its users by 
exchanging informaton over supporting communications systems like the Naval 
Automated Communication System (NAVMACS) and the Tactical Intelligence 
System (TACINTEL). NIPS' maintains several databases that contain collected, 
processed, and analyzed intelligence. Some of these databases are: [Ref. 29: p. 
3001 
0 Integrated Database (IDB) 
0 Naval Intelligence Database (NID) 
0 
0 Emitter Paramenter Listing (EPL) 
0 Message Database (MSGDB) 
Naval Emitter Reference File (NEW) 
0 Imagery Management Database (IMDB) 
0 Air Tasking Order Database (ATODB) 
2. Air Operations 
CVBG Air operations are supported by two primary systems: Tactical Air 
Mission Planning System (TAMPS) and Advanced Tactical EAdB Mission 
Support System (ATEAMS). TAMPS facilitates mission planning and route 
analysis in support of power projection. It includes such capabilities as weapons 
loadout monitoring and radar prediction. ATEAMS supports air operations by 
providing users mission planning information for airborne electronic 
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countermeasures. In addition, it accepts postmission mformation for correlation 
and display on the user's workstation consoles. This system interfaces fully with 
TAMPS that retrieves the tactical picture and other related information from a 
centralized database in JMCIS. Ths capability provides complete support for the 
air operations C2 functional area. [Ref. 28: p. 891 
3. Fire Support 
The C2 of naval fire support is performed by the Tomahawk Weapons 
Control System (TWCS) and the Combat Direction System (CDS). Both systems 
assist tactical commanders in assessing the situation, determining hostile targets, 
and designatinglselecting weapon systems. [Ref. 28: p. 721 
TWCS provides the processingkontrol of targeting, engagement planning, 
and launch control for Tomahawk cruise missiles. This system also keeps a 
theater level ocean surveillance database and correlates contact reports from other 
systems, such as the Command and Decision (C&D) onboard Aegis Cruisers and 
other combat direction systems within JMCIS. Important to note is that TWCS 
provides a near real-time tactical picture of a large geographical area collected 
from offboard sensors. This capability allows the employment of ASUW missiles 
beyond the normal detection range of the ships onboard sensors. [Ref. 28: p. 57 
and Ref. 30: p. 1-31 
CDS performs other fire support related functions such as: integrating 
ownership sensor data and tactical digital data link (TADIL) information; 
providing real-time situation monitoring; performing threat evaluations; and 
determining weapons assignments. It establishes a common database through 
information exchanges between the Combat Information Centers (CICs) onboard 
selected ships and other similar facilities used by air and ground forces. The 
connectivity for these communications links is provided by High Frequency (HF) 
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radios, Ultra High Frequecy (UHF) Line-of-Site (LOS) radios, satellite 
communications, all of which use JCS approved TADIL formatting. There are 
various configurations of CDS such as Aegis Command and Decision (onboard 
cruisers and destroyers), the Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS, onboard 
carriers), and the older Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS, still onboard certain 
ships). The Navy will eventually replace the aging NTDS with the newer ACDS. 
[Ref. 6: p. 7-73 and Ref. 28: p. 781 
4. Maneuver 
The maneuver C2 functional area is supported by two systems: CDS and 
the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS). As stated earlier, 
JMCIS is an evolutionary C41 system that incorporates key functions of the Naval 
Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A). These functions included tactical 
decision aides and intelligence management, to name only a few. Collectively all 
the functions in JMCIS (particularly those provided by NTCS-A) support the 
commanders afloat with a k e d  near-real time picture of their battlespace, so they 
can accurately assess the tactical situation. Similarly, the CDS affords 
commanders the ability to perform real-time situational monitoring, so they can 
make appropriate weapon assignments. Commanders may use information 
provided by both systems to determine where he should position his ships and 
weapon platforms to achieve a decisive advantage. [Ref. 28: p. 721 
5. Logistics 
The logistics h c t i o n  is performed by the Naval Tactical Command 
Support System (NTCSS). This system was created from the merger of the 
logistical functions provided by many of the Navy's earlier stovepipe and legacy 
logistics information systems such as the Shipboard Nontactical ADP Program 
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(SNAP), the Maintenance Resource Management System (MRMS), and the Navy 
Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System (NALCOMIS). 
Currently the NTCSS is merging its functions into the JMCIS architecture. [Ref. 
27: p. 281 
C. C41 COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
In describing the various C41 communications support systems currently 
used by the Navy, this thesis categorizes them into either theater or tactical 
communications. Theater communications refer to systems that support ship-to- 
shore, ship to nonorganic activities, and connectivity to strategic networks like the 
Defense Communication System (DCS). Tactical communications refer to those 
systems which support ship-to-ship and ship-to-air communications. The primary 
characteristic used to categorize Navy C41 support systems into either theater or 
tactical communication system is the span of C2 provided by each system, relative 
to the theater of operations. As a reminder these systems are categorized 
subjectively for the purpose of standardizing their presentation across each of the 
military services and does not imply the categories have discrete boundaries. 
1. Theater Communications Systems 
The Navy's theater communications is provided by the Navy 
Telecommunications System (NTS). Its shore-based facilities form the Navy's 
terrestrial backbone communications architecture. This architecture allows users, 
onboard deployed ships, remote access to strategic communications networks 
using various onboard ship-to-shore communications systems. Other NTS ship-to- 
shore (theater communication) used in the Navy include the following: [Ref. 3 1: 
pp. 82- 1 111 
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0 Fleet broadcast system 
0 ORESTES 
0 Satellite communications 
0 Secure voice communications 
0 Officer-In-Tactical-Command Information Exchange System 
(OTCIXS) 
0 Tactical Information Exchange System (TADIXS) 
The main purpose of NTS is to facilitate the C2 process from the NCA 
down to commanders of deployed CVBGs and task forces. This is accomplished 
by providing users with secure and reliable telecommunication services during 
contingency operations or wartime scenarios. 
a NTS Shore Facilities 
The three major types of shore-based communication facilities that 
support Naval shore commands and ship/shore communications requirements are 
Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Stations (NCTAMS), 
Naval Computer and Transmission Stations (NCTS), and Naval 
Telecommunications Centers (NTCC). These facilities allow the exchange of 
various types of information such as automated message traffic, secure and 
nonsecure voice, C2, and intelligence. [Ref. 6: p. 6-19] 
The NCTAMS is normally the largest and most well equipped shore-based 
communication facility that is located in one of four geographical regions. These 
geographical regions are Eastern Pacific, Western Pacific, Atlantic, and 
Mediterranean. Although the main function of the NCTAMS is to control and 
track the status of other NTS facilities within their region, they are capable of 
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performing other support functions as shown below: [Ref. 6: p. 6-19 and Ref. 3 1: 
P. 801 
Support full period ship/shore terminations 
0 Perform re-keying of fleet broadcasts 
0 Facilitate HF communications 
0 Provide user interconnectivity to services offered by the Defense 
Communications System (AUTODIN, DSN, DDN, etc.) 
The Naval Communications and Transmission Stations (NCTS) are smaller 
facilities compared to the NCTAMS, but still provide the basic support functions 
listed above. These interconnected facilities make up the preponderance of the 
NTS network. Both the NCTAMS and NCTS have transmission and receive 
communications equipment that connect Naval shore commands and deployed 
fleets with long-haul DCS services. [Ref. 6: p. 6-19] 
The Naval Telecommunications Centers (NTCC) are similar to the NCTS, 
but lack the communications capability to transmit and receive ship-to-shore 
message traffic. Their main function is to provides its customers with over-the- 
counter message services. 
b. Fleet Broadcast System 
The Navy's fleet broadcasting system disseminates (one-way) record 
traflic between shore commands, shore facilities and deployed fleets, and among 
ships at sea. Broadcast transmissions are controlled by the Broadcast Control 
Authority located at the regional NCTAMS. Two types of software programs that 
provide interfacing with Defense Idormation System Agency's (DISA) 
communications networks and automated switching centers are the Naval 
Communications Processing and Routing System (NAVCOMPARS) and the Local 
Digital Message Exchange (LDMX). The NAVCOMPARS, located at NCTAMS, 
interfaces with the fleet broadcasting system to maintain message reliability, 
accuracy, and control for messages transmitted to and received fiom the fleet. For 
example, the NAVCOMPARS translates messages received fiom the fleet by using 
a Common User Digital Exchange System (CUDIXS) that converts the message 
into a format compatible with the AUTODIN network. The LDMX, located in the 
NTCC, is similar to the NAVCOMPARS, but does not interface with the fleet 
broadcasting system. This system is commonly used to manage and control high 
volume message traffic only between the Naval shore commands. The type of 
fleet broadcasts and their means of communication are driven by users' specific 
needs and requirements. Table 8 summarizes some of the common types of fleet 
broadcasts and methods of communications. [Ref. 7: pp. 24-25 and Ref. 32: p 5- 
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c. ORESTES (High Frequency) 
The ORESTES is the Navy's teletype system that supports the 
transmission of message traffic over HF radios. Due to the long range capabilities 
offered by HF communications, this system is often used to add redundancy to 
high priority Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communication (UHF SATCOM) 
links. The two ship/shore channels this system uses are the Primary Ship-to-Shore 
(PSS) channel and the Secondary Ship-to-Shore ( S S S )  channel. The main 
difference between PSS and S S S  is that PSS communicates with Radioteletype 
Systems (RATT) using HF skywave propagation, where as the SSS communicates 
with RATT using continuous wave. The ORESTES is normally used an alternate 
system, due to both the large electronic signature emitted from its high powered 



















- Support simultaneous transmission of the fleet broadcast 
- Primary means of delivering the fleet broadcasts 
- Types of information: OPINTEL, weather, GENSER 
over HF and UHF SATCOM to users at sea. 
Record traffic. 
- Transmits the fleet broadcasts to ships with simpler 
communications systems. 
- Transmission of weather pictures 
- Continuous wave transmission of government messages to 
Material Sealift Command and Merchant vessels. 
- Fleet broadcast transmission over HF to ASW Patrol 
Aircraft and their operation centers. 
- Relay emergency action messages to submerged 
submarines using LF communications. 
- Transmit message traffic to patrol gunboats over primary 
- Transmitting messages using the VERDIN (operating in 
ship-to-shore circuits using HF communications. 
the VLF fiequency range) to deployed submarines. 
Table 8. Common Types of Fleet Broadcasts. [Ref. 7: pp. 22-24] 
d Satellite Communications 
Satellite communications are the Navy's primary means of 
supporting its high priority communications between shore commands and the 
deployed naval forces. Today's naval satellite communications use four types of 
satellites which are GAPFILLER satellites, leased satellites (LEASAT), fleet 
satellites (FLTSAT), and Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) 
satellites. The DSCS satellites were discussed in Chapter 11. 
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(1) GAPFILLER Satellites. The UHF GAPFILLER 
satellites, launched in 1976, acquired their name by filling in coverage gaps that 
previously existed among naval communication systems. Although the Navy 
originally launched three GAPFILLER satellites, currently only one remains in use 
today. [Ref. 31: pp. 100-1011 
(2) Leased Satellites (LEASAT). LEASAT are commercial 
satellites leased by the government for a period of five years to replace the aging 
GAPFILLER satellites. The primary purpose of these UHF satellites are to 
maintain user connectivity between mobile and shore-based facilities. [Ref. 3 1: p. 
1023 
(3) Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT). The FLTSAT consists of five 
government owned satellites. They have either Super High Frequency (SHF) or 
Extremely High Frequency (EHF) capabilities and provide communications 
support for both the Air Force and the Navy. The use and channel allocations for 
FLTSATs are determined by the CINC Fleets (CINCFLTs), NCTAMS, and the 
Commander of Naval Computer and Telecommunications Command (NCTC). 
Some of the services supported by FLTSAT include the following: [Ref. 3 1 : pp. 
101- 1021 
0 Fleet broadcasting system 
0 Common User Digital Information Exchange System 
(CUDD(s)/Naval Modulated Automated Communications System 
(NAVMACS) 
0 Secure voice 
0 Submarine Satellite Information Exchange Subsystem (SSIXS) 
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The Common User Digital Information Exchange System 
(CUDIXS) and the Naval Automated Communications System (NAVMACS) are 
two systems supported by FLTSAT that automate two-way, high volume messages 
between ships and shore. The CUDIX is located in the NCTAMS or NCTS. This 
system receives messages sent from sea and forwards them to the Naval 
Communications Processing and Routing System (NAVCOMPARS) where they 
are translated and injected into the AUTODIN network. The CUDIXS has the 
capability to handle 60 received messages simultaneously by using time division 
multiplexing. The NAVMACS is the ships' onboard counterpart of CUDIXS. The 
goal of both systems is to minimize the amount of information passed over the PSS 
channels of HF communication system. [Ref. 3 1: pp. 88-89 and Ref. 32: p. 5-15] 
The Tactical Intelligence Computer System (TACINTEL) is 
another subsystem to the UHF FLTSAT communications. It is similar to 
NAVMACS, but is normally used only to process and distribute intelligence 
related messages. The system operates along with the CUDIXS system for 
transmitting messages up to the Special Intelligence Information (SCI) security 
level. [Ref. 6: p. 5-20] 
c Secure Voice 
The Navy's satellite communication systems (GAPFILLER, 
LEASAT, and FLTSAT) provide the transmission media needed to extend secure 
voice communications to highly dispersed common users and dedicated 
subscribers. The satellite links will connect the users afloat to shore-based 
facilities (NCTAMS and NCTS), thus acting as communication gateways into the 
Defense Switching Network (DSN). The DSN is one of several long distance 
services provided by the DCS. To support its high volume requirements over 
limited satellite links, Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) techniques are 
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often employed. This technique performs time division multiplexing of both voice 
and data circuits to allow users simultaneous access over the same 
communications Imk. For example, to support situations that call for additional 
voice circuits, DAMA will multiplex these voice circuits with dedicated tactical 
intelligence (TACINTEL) circuits to meet the communication requirements. [Ref. 
7: pp. 31-33] 
f: Officer In Tactical Command In formation Exchange 
System (OTCIW) 
OTCIXS is a two-way communication system designed to pass 
targeting, fire support, and intelligence record trflic over UHF satellite links 
between battle group elements and key shore sites. These key shore sites include: 
Fleet Ocean Surveillance Centers (FOSIC), Fleet Ocean Surveillance Facilities 
(FOSIF), and Shore Targeting Terminals (STT). The system supports over-the- 
horizon tactical targeting efforts, especially for precision guided munitions like the 
Tomahawk cruise missile. OTCIXS is commonly found on most combatant ships 
and some designated submarines. In the future, the new Advanced Combat 
Direction System (ACDS) will replace OTCIXS and similar systems. [Ref. 32: p. 
6-66] 
g. 
TADIXS, similar to the OTCIXS, is a dedicated broadcast channel 
Tactical Data Information Exchange System ( T m I W )  
used for communicating between shore sites and ships equipped with cruise 
missiles. This system is normally located in the NCTAMS and provides deployed 
ships with targeting information. One should not confuse this TADIXS with the 
Coprenkan TADIXS. The Coprenican TADIXS is a series of tactical Virtual nets 
that form one of four pillars of the Coprenicas architecture. The others included in 
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this architecture, but exceed the scope of h s  thesis, are the Global Lnformation 
Exchange System (GLOBIXS), the Commander in Chief (CINC) Command 
Complex (CCC), and the Tactical Command Center (TCC). [Ref. 3 1: pp. 36- 1401 
2. Tactical Communications Systems 
Tactical communication systems are systems that are generally used 
for localized C2, relative to the theater of operations, to support immediate combat 
operations. This category may consist of ship-to-ship, submarine-to-submarine, 
ship-to-submarine, and ship-to-aircraft communications. As a caveat, many of the 
systems previously categorized as theater communication systems may also 
support tactical user requirements. Other systems such as tactical voice systems, 
Submarine Satellite Idonnation Exchange Subsystems (SSKS), and Tactical 
Information Digital Data Links (TADIL) may be used in lieu of, or in conjunction 
with, theater communications systems. Tactical communication systems support 
the real-time exchange of voice and data, essential to maintaining C2 over highly 
mobile forces in a rapidly changing environment. 
a Tactical Voice Systems 
Tactical voice communications among deployed forces primarily use 
both HF and LOS UHFNHF communication equipment. HF radios are often used 
to communicate with stations located over-the-horizon when UHF/SHF satellite 
systems are unavailable. Conversely, UHFNHF radios are used to maintain 
secure voice communications with deployed aircraft and other shipshbmarines 
that remain in LOS. As mentioned earlier, one limitation associated with HF 
communications is that HF radios transmit a much larger electronic signature than 
UHFNHF communications, thereby assisting hostile efforts for direction finding. 





























~ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~  
Coordination and information 
transfer between the OTC and hs 
warfare commanders 
Tactical C2 of surface action 
groups (SAG) 
Tactical C2 for maneuvering of 
the battle group and screening 
operations 
AAWC and AAWIAEW units for 
reporting and control 
A means to report AAW contacts 
ASWIASUW units coordinate and 
report all surface and subsurface 
contacts within LOS range. 
ASW ships and Air Information 
Center uses net to control and 
manage air space 
EWC controls and tasks EW 
assets and reports their operational 
Status. 
AWC and the air strike leader 
uses to control other strike 
aircraft. 
ASWIASUW units coordinate and 
report all surface and subsurface 
contacts beyond LOS range. 
METHODS OF 
COMMUNICATIONS 
UHF Satellite, HF 
(back-up) 
UHF LOS Radio, HF 
(back-up) 
UHF LOS only 
HF only 
Table 9. Common VoiceData Communications Nets. [Ref. 3 1: pp. 108-1091 
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These nets are typically used by naval fleet, carrier battle group, and task force 
commanders to maintain C2 over their assigned forces. [Ref. 3 1: pp. 107-1091 
b. 
TADIL is a group of JCS approved standardized communication 
Tactical Data Information Links (TADIL) 
links that support the exchange of real-time digital information between a number 
of major U.S. and NATO C2 systems. The type of specific TADIL used to 
support air defense and combat operations depends on their use and the type of 
communication system (HF, UHF, SATCOM, etc.) over which TADIL is passed. 
The type of TADILs currently available are summarized in Table 10. 
c. Submarine Satellite In formation Exchange Subsystem 
(SSIM) 
The primary means of communicating with deployed submarines is 
by very low frequency (VLF) and low frequency communications. The 
wavelengths in this frequency range facilitate communications with SSN and 
SSBN class submarines while submerged at great depths. Additionally, the low 
frequency ranges require submarines to use long trailing antennas, often greater 
than ten kilometers, to propagate the large wavelengths. Due to the inefficiency of 
its very low data rates, this system is normally used as a "bell ringer". The bell 
ringer method directs submarines to place antennas above the surface of the water, 
so they are able to receive message traffic, over HF or SATCOM, using the 
Submarine Satellite Mormation Exchange Subsystem (SSIXS). The SSlXS 
supplements existing VLFMedium Frequency (MF)/HF communication links to 
submarines by allowing deployed submarines to passively receive regularly 












- One-way data link that controls interceptor 
aircraft through surface-to-air, air-to-air 
and air-to-surface computer interface 
- Intra-task force tactical voice and teletype 
circuits for C2 related functions 
- Two-way data link with F-14 Tomcat 
aircraft that enables the fighter to transfer 
track and ownership status data to the air 
controller 
- Intra-task force tactical voice and teletype 
circuits for C2 related functions 
- Intra-task force tactical voice and teletype 
circuits for 
C2 related functions 
- One-way link that enables NTDS- 
equipped ships to communicate surface 
Combat Direction System (CDS) 




C2 related fuactions 
- Intra-task force tactical voice and teletype 
TRANSMISSION 
METHOD 
UHF LOS radio 
UHF LOS radio 
HF, UHF LOS 
~ 
HF, UHF LOS 
radio 
this system supports message and voice transmissions over FLTSATCOM and 
LEASAT during periods between regularly scheduled broadcasts. By decreasing 
the submarines' transmission times, they can quickly return to a submerged state, 
thus significantly decreasing their chances for detection. [Ref. 7: pp. 37-39] 
Table 10. Examples of TADILs. [Ref. 6:p. 7-72] 
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D. SUMMARY 
The Navy's primary C41 system is JMCIS. T h s  system supports the 
objectives of the Navy's strategy to develop a seamless and global C2 
architecture called GCCS. The Navy is currently expanding the system's 
functions, applications, and capabilities to meet rapidly changing C2 requirements 
of the modern warfighter. To support the five generic C2 functional areas, the 
Navy applies its key C41 systems such as: NIPS for intelligence, ATEAMS and 
TAMPS for air operations, TWCS and CDS for fire support, JMCIS (NTCS-A) 
and CDS for maneuver, and NTCSS for logistics. These C41 systems rely on 
theater or tactical level communication support systems to exchange information 
among its users and databases. Theater level communications systems provide 
communications between deployed ships and non-organic activities. Some of 
these systems discussed in this chapter were the Fleet broadcast system, 
ORESTES, satellite communications, secure voice, OTCIXS, and TADIXS. 
Tactical level communication systems provide communications among the 
elements of a deployed naval force. Examples of tactical communications 
discussed included tactical voice, TADIL and SSIXS. The main focus of this 
chapter was how the Navy applies its C41 system to satis@ the user's C2 functional 
requirements and how various types of Naval communication systems support its 
C41 systems in its operational environment. 
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VIII. MARINE CORPS COMMUNICATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV identified the MAGTF as the Marine Corps' primary 
organization that is often tailored to support specific naval/amphibious operations. 
It also stated that all MAGTF organizations generally deploy as Amphibious Task 
Forces (ATF) and consists of four primary elements. These elements are a 
Command Element (CE), an Air Component Element (ACE), a Ground 
Component Element (WE),  and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). To 
support the MAGTF's tactical and theater level C2 requirements, it must rely on 
the C41 systems that fall under the MAGTF C41 program. This program is a 
collective group of automated C41 systems that replaced the older Marine Corps 
Tactical Command and Control System (MCTCCS) [Ref. 6: p. 7-62]. Some of the 
key C41 systems that compose the MAGTF C41 program and will be described 










Intelligence Analysis System (US) 
Advanced Tactical Air Command Central (ATACC) 
Improved Direct Air Support Central (IDASC) 
Marine Air Traffic Control and Landing System (MATCALS) 
Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM) 
Marine Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (MAFATDS) 
Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) 
Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) 
Marine Combat Service Support Control System (MCSSCS) 
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B. MARINE CORPS PRIMARY C41 SYSTEMS 
The MAGTF C41 systems presented in t h i s  chapter were designed to 
support the information "pull" concept similar to the Navy's JMCIS. This concept 
allows Marine commanders to access only information they need from a common 
database that receives periodic updates from many different input sources. 
lnteroperability between MAGTF C41 systems and JMCIS databases make it 
possible for users in either the Navy and Marine Corps to access, exchange, and 
update information between these systems. 
As with JMCIS, the Marine Corps migration toward a single consolidated 
system is driven by Assistant Secretary of Defense C31 mandate directing all of the 
services to eliminate their stovepipe and legacy systems to support the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) data standardization initiative. To fulfill this 
objective, the Marine Corps plans to migrate their MAGTF C41 systems first into 
JMCIS and then later into GCCS. This required the Marine Corps to adopt 
common core software modules provided by the Unified Build of the GCCS. One 
of the key objectives for adopting the Unified Build, other than reducing 
development and maintenance costs, is that it provides full integration and 
interoperability of C2 functions between the Commander, JTF (CJTF), the Naval 
Expeditionary Force (NEF), and the MAGTF. The core software provides an 
automated Command, Control, and Communications Decision and Display System 
(C3DDS) capable of interfacing across multiple communication circuits, 
processing standardized formatted messages, and correlating contact reports to 
produce a consistent surface/& track database. Track data is plotted on situation 
displays to create real-time tactical decision aides for both Marine and Navy 
commanders. This capability will facilitate commanders' ability to quickly acquire 
real-time information, determine feasible courses of action, and make timely 
decisions. [Ref. 33: pp. 5-61 
C. MARINE CORPS C2 FUNCTIONS 
As stated earlier, the MAGTF C41 program encompasses a broad range of 
automated information systems to support the expanding C2 and tactical decision 
making needs of today's Marine commanders. Collectively these systems support 
five key C2 functional areas. The functional areas form a basis to determining the 
operational value and contribution of each MAGTF C41 system. Recalling from 
the previous chapter, the five functional areas intelligence, air operations, fne 
support, maneuver, and logistics. 
1. Intelligence 
The Marine Corps uses the Intelligence Analysis System (IAS) to support 
the intelligence functional areas. The LAS provides a tool for intelligence staff 
officers (G2, S2) at all MAGTF levels, to collect, process, produce and 
disseminate the commander's critical information requirements. The system fuses 
into its consolidated database, automated intelligence information received from 
other systemskenters such as Technical Control and Analysis Center (TCAC), 
Secondary Imagery Distribution System (SIDS), Joint Services Imagery Processing 
System (JSIPS), Position Locating Reporting System (PLRS), and Tactical Combat 
Operations (TCO). Intelligence information is exchanged between the IAS and 
external sources using HF, VHF, UHF satellite, and terrestrial communications. 
As an a l l  source reference, IAS offers tactical commanders f i s h e d  intelligence 
that is usefid in accesshg a constantly changing tactical situation. [Ref. 19: p. 27- 
29 and Ref. 33: p. 181 
2. Air Operations 
The four Marine Corps C2 systems that support the air operations 
functional area are the Advanced Tactical Air Command Central (ATACC), the 
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Jinproved Direct Air Support Central (IDASC), the Marine h Traffic Control and 
Landing System (MATCALS), and Tactical h Operations Module (TAOM). 
Both ATACC and IDASC systems will eventually replace the Tactical Air 
Command Center (TACC) and its components that the Marine Corps currently 
uses for their overall airspace management. [Ref. 19: pp. 24-29 and Ref. 33: p. 
201 
The ATACC serves as tactical facilities to support Air Component Element 
(ACE) commanders and their battlestaffs. It provides them with tactical decision 
aides they need to supervise, coordinate, and execute both current and future 
tactical air operations over the MAGTF airspace. These decision aides include 
communications, system processing, data correlation, air tasking generation, and 
information (graphics and text) displays. Additionally, the system receives and 
forwards air management information using TADIL A, TADIL B, and NATO Link 
11 sent over HF, UHF, VHF (AM and FM), SHF satellite, and terrestrial 
microwave communications. This capability allows ACE commanders to develop 
situation awareness and automate the generation, manipulation, and dissemination 
of Air Tasking Orders (ATO). [Ref. 33: p. 201 
The IDASC is another facility used to plan and control direct air support for 
the MAGTF ground component. By automating all direct air support requests, this 
system facilitates the coordination process for air support, deconflicts aircraft with 
other supporting arms, and controls all aircraft operating in designated airspaces. 
This facility replaced the older Direct Air Support Center (DASC). [Ref. 33: p. 
201 
Marine air Wings use the MATCALS to support air operations while in 
forward deployed areas. This rugged, transportable, self-sufllcient system controls 
all arriving and departing aircraft within a 60 mile radius. These functions are 
accomplished by the system's surveillance and approach radars connected to a 
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central control facility. Air traffic control operators interface with MATCALS 
through their workstations that contain multi-mode displays, communications 
equipment (UHF, VHF, HF) and cryptographic equipment (for securing TADIL-B 
and TADIL-C data links). [Ref. 29: pp. 105-1061 
The TAOM is a facilityhhelter that supports the Marine Corps air defense 
C2 requirements. It receives input from external sensors, search radars, and 
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, then performs the following operations: 
[Ref. 29: pp. 103-1041 
0 Performs automatic track correlation, acquisition, identification, 
classification, tracking 
0 Evaluates threat and determines weapon selectiodassignment 
0 Receives and processes track information, orders, and statuses 
acquired fiom other C2 systems 
0 Displays on four internal operator consoles real-time air picture of 
the situation. 
3. Fire Support 
The primary system for supporting the fire support function is the Marine 
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (MAFATDS). This system is 
basically a Marine Corp version of the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data 
System (AFATDS) that the Army used to replace its older TACFIRE system. 
Interoperability between the two systems (MAFATDS and AFATDS) allow the 
MAGTF ground component to fully integrate into the Army's fire control nets 
using HF, UHF, VHF, and terrestrial microwave communications. The 
MAFATDS provides Marine fire control elements with fully automated support 
for planning, coordinating, and controlling fire support assets. These assets 
normally include mortars, field artillery cannons, rockets, close air support, naval 
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gunfire, and guided missiles. All echelons from corps to platoon benefit from the 
MAFATDS capabilities, especially during various operations such as close air 
support, counterfire, interdiction, suppression of enemy air defense systems, and 
deep ground operations. [Ref. 19: pp. 28,31 and Ref. 33: p. 191 
4. Maneuver 
Two primary systems the Marine Corps uses to maintain C2 over the 
MAGTF elements are the Position Location Reporting System (PLRS), and the 
Tactical Combat Operations (TCO). PLRS supports the MAGTF during ground 
operations by providing its users with accurate locations necessary to plan and 
deliver artillery fue, naval gunfire, and air support. In addition, this system offers 
maneuver forces other useful functions such as enhanced navigation positioning 
and unit identification. The system operates using UHF radios that link its user 
terminals into local area master stations. The PLRS master stations are arranged to 
form a complete autonomous radio network. [Ref 29: pp 13 1-1321 
The TCO is the focal point of the MAGTF C41 network. It provides the 
commanders, staff, and subordinates the capability to receive, fuse, display, and 
disseminate C2 information, for both planning and executing phases of an 
operation. The TCOs located in Combat Service Support Operations Centers 
(CSSOC), Operations Control and Analysis Center (OCAC), Combat Operations 
Centers (COC), Tactical Air Command Centers (TACC), and Fire Direction 
Centers (FDC). The TCO allows data exchange among its terminals by using HF 




The Marine Corps main system for managing logistical support is the 
Marine Combat Service Support Control System (MCSSCS). This system 
provides an automated means to collect, analyze, and distribute personnel and 
logistical information between the components of the MAGTF (CE, CSSE, ACE, 
GCE) and the Army's Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS). 
Communication between these components is typically over HF, VHF, and 
terrestrial microwave communication systems. The MCSSCS contains logistical 
databases regarding the statuses of the MAGTF's personnel, configuration, and 
equipment. [Ref. 19: pp. 28-31] 
The MAGTF C41 systems introduced in this section can be tailored to meet 
the Marine Commander's unique C2 requirements. The number and specific C41 
system configurations are driven by the MAGTF's assigned mission, organization, 
and asset availability. Although there are other C41 systems and subsystems that 
currently exist in the Marine Corps, this thesis mainly presents the candidate 
systems most likely to be selected for retention as legacy or migratory systems. 
These C41 systems will eventually merge into the Navy's JMCIS, as part of their 
ongoing effort create a Global C2 System (GCCS). 
D. MARINE CORPS COMMUNICATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
MAGTF C41 systems exchange critical information using various types of 
communications systems such as HF, UHF, VHF, UHF and SHF satellite, and 
terrestrial communication networks. Asset availability, communication distances, 
type of MAGTF C41 system, and phases of the amphibious operation are primary 
factors that determine the type of communication support systems requied. 
The amphibious operations described in Chapter IV, are generally 
conducted in three basic phases. These are the preparation phase (Marine forces 
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embarked onboard their ships, prior to an amphibious assault), the movement to 
shore phase, and the sustainment phase. 
Like the earlier discussion on Naval communication support systems, the 
Marine Corps communications are categorized into two broad categories: theater 
and tactical communication systems. Theater communication systems are those 
systems, often used in the communications zone, that bridge tactical networks with 
strategic communications systems (DCS). These systems extend C2 from the 
NCA down to the deployed MAGTF. Tactical communication systems are 
localized communication systems, commonly used in the combat zone, to provide 
"close in" communications among the MAGTF's internal components. For 
example, tactical communications systems include those systems between the 
CATF and the landing force (while afloat and during movement ashore), between 
the CATF and tactical multichannel networks (established ashore to support 
follow-on land operations), and between deployed aircraft and their air control 
elements. 
1. Theater Communications Systems 
Theater communication support systems may provide connectivity between 
the Commander of an Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Commander of the 
JTF (CJTF), Marine Corps Component headquarters, and Naval shore commands, 
during the preparation and movement to shore phases of an amphibious operation. 
Due to the geographical dispersion of these elements, over-the-horizon 
communications systems are often required. This is accomplished by using 
transportable UHF/SHF/EHF satellite, HF radio, the fleet broadcast system, and 
other existing naval communication systems. In addition, Common User Digital 
Information Exchange (CUDIX) UHF satellite equipment and HF radios provide 
the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) connectivity to shore-based NCTAMS and 
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NCTS. This gives the ATF seamless access to strategic DCS communications 
services, ldce DSN, DDN, and DMS. Once the amphibious landing force 
completes its transition to shore, Ground Mobile Force Tactical Satellite 
Communications (GMF TACSAT) equipment, such as the AN/TSC-85 and 
AN/TSC-93 GMF TACSAT terminals, provide the MAGTF command element 
with long-haul communication capabilities. The GMF TACSAT terminals connect 
the terrestrial communication network (tactical) established ashore to theater DCS 
gateways and other Army, Air Force, and Allied communication networks. [Ref. 
6: p. 6-26] 
2. Tactical Communications Systems 
Tactical communication support systems generally include both tactical 
radio and forward established terrestrial networks ashore. During the preparation 
phase of an amphibious operation, tactical radio communication systems, such as 
LOS VHF single channel and HF radio communications (as a back-up), give the 
CATF a means to exercise C2 over other elements of the ATF. These systems 
support the exchange of secure voice and data essential for coordinating and 
executing the preparation phase of the operations. Similarly during the movement 
to shore phase, the CATF who is often loitering offshore, continues to rely on 
tactical radio communications to maintain C2 over the landing force transitioning 
to shore. [Ref. 32: pp. 5-20 to 5-22] 
After the majority of units of the landing force have arrived on shore, the 
Marine communication support units begin installing a tactical multichannel 
network with their organic TRI-TAC communications equipment. The TRI-TAC 
network interconnects the primary force components (CE, W E ,  ACE, and CSSE) 
with their subordinate headquarters. By using a combination of UHF multichannel 
microwave radios, troposcatter radios, or Ground Mobile Forces Tactical Satellite 
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(GMF TACSAT), the network interconnects Unit Level Circuit Switches (ULCS). 
The ULCS provide local subscribers with secure voice, facsimile, data and 
message communication support. [Ref. 6: pp. 6-25 to 6-26] 
At lower levels of command, the primary means of communications is the 
Single Channel Ground Air Radio System (SINCGARS). SINCGARS is a VHF 
single channel fiequency hopping FM radio, with sipficant anti-jam features, 
capable of transmitting and receiving both secure voice and data. [Ref. 6: p. 7-62] 
The SINCGARS ability to operate in a jamming environment was tested 
during the Persian Gulf War, when the Iraqi Army launched a surprise attack on 
Marine Task Force Shepherd near the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border. During this 
attack the Iraq Army attempted unsuccessfully to jam the Marines SINCGARS 
radios. As a result the Marine were able to maintain C2 over their unit and 
concentrate their firepower to block the advancing Iraqi force. [Ref. 34: p. 91 
E. SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps main C41 modernization initiative contributing to the 
implementation of the C4IFTW concept and the development of GCCS is called 
the MAGTF C41 program. This program capitalizes on the common core software 
modules contained in block I of GCCS and its common operating environment 
(COE) to leverage the Marine Corps' migration of the MAGTF C41 systems. Also 
presented in thrs chapter were key C41 systems in the MAGTF C41 program and 
how they support the five C2 functional areas. These systems and their associated 
C2 functional areas were outlined in the following manner: LAS supported 
intelligence; ATACC, IDASC, MATCALS, and TAOM supported air operations; 
MAFATDS supported fire support; PLRS and TCO supported maneuver; and 
MCSSCS supported the logistics functional area. The Marine Corps' theater and 
tactical communication support systems provide CATF, CJTF, Naval shore 
140 
commands, and MAGTF components with connectivity necessary to exchange 
critical information among their C41 systems. Theater level communications 
systems allow the deployed MAGTF to gain access to long-haul communication 
systems such as DCS. Tactical communication systems, such as the TRI-TAC 
network, interconnect the components of the MAGTF and provide Marine 
commanders localized C2 over their maneuver forces. The combination of modern I 
C41 systems and their communications support systems give the MAGTF the C2 
~ 
flexibility needed to win on tomorrow's fluid and dynamic battlefield. 
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IX. AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS 
The Air Force's overall C41 architecture is called the Theater A.u Control 
System (TACS). It is composed of a number of C41 systems the Air Force uses to 
employ, manage, and control its aircraft and ground facilities within an assigned 
theater of operations. This chapter describes the principal C41 systems that 
support TACS and other major C41 systems that support, not only the Air Force, 
but other services and Allied Forces. To complete the discussion on the Air 
Force's C41 systems, requires a presentation on their application to the five C2 
functional areas and their communication support systems. 
A. AIR FORCE'S PRIMARY C41 SYSTEMS 
The two principal C41 systems that automate the C2 functions and 
processes within TACS are the Contingency TACS Air Planning System (CTAPS) 
and the Wing Command and Control System (WCCS). CTAPS is used at 
theatedforce level, where as WCCS is used at wing/unit level. In addition to these 
systems, the Air Force is responsible for four other major C41 systems whch 
include Rivet Joint, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and 
Contingency Airborne Reconnaissance SystedJoint Service Imagery Processing 
System (CARS/JSIPS), and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Set (JSTARS). 
Due to their significant contributions to the theater level C2 process, they will also 
be treated and discussed as primary Air Force C41 systems. [Ref. 28: p. 32, 361 
1. 
In April 1992, the Joint Chiefs of Staff(J6) identified the CTAPS as the 
Contingency TACS Air Planning System (CTAPS) 
objective system for supporting the JFACC. The approval by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff approval for the JFACC concept has encouraged all of the military services 
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to adopt CTAPS as their primary air control system. The concept states that the 
military service having the preponderance of air assets in a theater, will be 
designated as the JFACC. The JFACC will need CTAPS to fulfill €usher roles in 
planning, coordmating, allocating air resources, and tasking subordinate 
organizations, based on guidance received from the JTF commander. [Ref. 33: p. 
21 
CTAPS supports the Air Force's centralized control and decentralized 
execution warfighting philosophy introduced in Chapter IV. The assigned JFACC 
will use CTAPS to centralize detail planning, tasking, and control of air assets in 
hisher area of operations. Once the JTF commander approves the JFACC's 
recommended Master Attack Plan (MAP), he/she will decentralize the execution 
by issuing Air Tasking Orders (ATO) to subordinate commanders. These ATOs 
will be more specific in content than the MAP to include details on targets, 
specific aircrew assignments, available reconnaissance support, and AWACS 
coverage areas. [Ref 33: pp. 4-71 
Two other factors that lead to joint implementation of CTAPS as a favored 
air control system was its capability to resolve interoperability problems that 
plagued U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf and its evolutionary modular composition. 
During the initial phase of the Gulf War, the JFACC (Air Force) experienced 
limited flexibility to change or m o w  ATOs sent to Navy units, especially after 
receiving updated intelligence information. These delays were caused by 
incompatible communications hardware and software that could not receive 
CTAPS generated ATOs transmitted fiom the JFACC in Riyadh to the Red Sea 
battle force. This situation forced the Navy to pick up and deliver ATOs on 
diskette using messengers fiom its deployed carriers. The impact of these delays 
hindered the effective application and control of naval airpower during the early 
phases of the operation. To minimize future interoperability problems, CTAPS 
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has been designated as the objective joint system that all JFACCs will use to 
dweminate air control and tasking orders. Since CTAPS is based on an open 
system architecture, consisting of high-speed computer workstations connected by 
a Large Area Network (LAN), it eliminates many of the earlier interoperability 
problems that previously existed among the services. For example, CTAPS 
supports the AT0 generation and dissemination process among the military 
services by interfacing with the Army Maneuver Control System (MCS), the Naval 
Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A, now part of JMCIS), and the Marine 
Corps Advanced Tactical Air Command and Control System (ATACC). [Ref. 33: 
pp. 3-5 and Ref. 341 
Its modular design provide users with core capabilities required to support 
the air control C2 functional area that will be explained later in this chapter. The 
modular design further allows the system to be easily tailored to support the users' 
changing C2 requirements. [Ref. 341 
At the center of CTAPS lies a common set of core software functions that 
provide a mechanism for integrating "mission oriented" applications used at 
different Air Force command levels, other military services, and Allied Forces. 
Th~s  et of common core functions is called the Theater Battle Management 
(TBM) core. Some examples of the services they generally provide include the 
following: [Ref. 34 and Ref. 35: pp. 2-31 
0 Communications 
0 Message preparation and parsing 
0 Man-machine interface 
0 Email 
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0 Systems administration and management 
0 User utilities (data distribution and diagnosis, help, system 
configuration, etc.) 
2. 
The WCCS is the Air Force's C41 system used at the Tactical Air Force 
Wing Command and Control System (WCCS) 
(TAF) wing/unit level. It is an automated system that shares the same TBM core 
functions and common operating environment as CTAPS, thereby allowing full 
interoperability between its tailored software applications and those used by 
CTAPS. A few examples of software applications (systems) used in WCCS and 
interface with CTAPS are the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS), 
Combat Intelligence System (CIS), Manpower Personnel Module (MANPER), 
Combat Ammunition System-Base (CAS-B), and Logistics Module (LOGMOD). 
[Ref. 28: p. 36 and Ref. 36: pp. 2-31 
The overall objective of WCCS is to provide TAF commanders with an 
accurate composite picture of the wing's resources for planning and executing air 
operations. To achieve this objective, WCCS must perform a wide variety of data 
processing tasks to support: aircraft scheduling, executiodimplementation of air 
plans, maintenance statuses, alerts, personnel management, weather assessments, 
vehicle statuses, and munitions availability statuses. [Ref. 19: p. 221 
Collectively. CTAPS and WCCS automate the C2 processes and functions 
performed by the theater operational chain of command when employing air 
assets. The benefit of automating these processes allow the JFACC and TAF 
commanders to accurately view the tactical situation and asset availability, make 
timely decisions, and quickly disseminate ATOs to subordinate units. 
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3. Rivet Joint C41 System 
The &vet Joint C41 system is a E-135 reconnaissance aircraft equipped 
with onboard communication systems the Air Force uses to receive and process 
long-range early warning Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Intelligence 
(ELINT). After detecting hostile communication and electronic signatures, the 
system aides in the analysis of h s  information to determine the enemy's electronic 
order of battle, force identification, and unit locations. This system communicates 
with command posts over TADIL J communications links by using UHFNHFIHF 
radios. [Ref. 19: p. 161 
4. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
The AWACS is a wide-area surveillance system that aides primarily in the 
control of air defense weapons and airspace management functions. It is 
composed of nine multi-purpose operator consoles, secure communications 
systems, and an IFF/SSR multimode radar mounted onboard a modified Boeing 
707 (E-3) aircraft. The AWACS scans its coverage area using its IFF/SSR radar, 
mounted in a mushroom shaped housing above the fuselage. Several key features 
of the AWACS include its capability to transmit a comprehensive air picture to 
ground facilities and perform target cuing for other targeting and tracking systems. 
This system provides critical surveillance information into C41 systems owned by 
the Air Force, other services, and selected Allied Forces. [Ref. 29: pp. 257-2581 
5. Contingency Airborne Reconnaissance SystedJoint Service 
Imagery Processing System (CARSNSIPS) 
CARS is an airborne platform that forwards SIGINT, imagery, and target 
data to ground-based JSIPS terminals for futher processing and dissemination by 
C41 systems. JSIPS terminals may also receive imagery and target data over 
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tactical data links from other surveillance systems such as U2-R aircraft, 
unmanned aircraft, and other national systems. Inside shelters housing the JSIPS 
terminals, military personnel collect, correlate, analyze, and prioritize received 
intelligence data, prior to reformatting it for further dissemination over electronic 
media. [Ref. 37: pp. 1-31 
6. 
JSTARS is a long-range airborne surveillance system, onboard an E-8 
aircraft, that is capable of detecting, identifying, locating, and tracking both ground 
and airborne enemy activities in deep operational areas (beyond the Forward Line 
of Troops). Its advanced electronics allow the system to perform these functions 
during any type of weather and while operating in a jamming environment. 
Collected surveillance information is forwarded down to Army operated ground 
stations and C41 systems over TADU, J communications links. This provides 
Army commanders a means to optimize targeting for long-range fire support. Au 
Force command posts maintain operational C2 over JSTARS assets by using 
UHFNHF/HF radio communications from its ground control stations and centers. 
[Ref. 38: pp. 266-2671 
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 
B. AIR FORCE FUNCTIONAL AREAS 
The Air Force, like the Army and Marine Corps, relies on TRI-TAC 
networks and tactical radio communications to link their key C41 
informatiodmanagement systems. These systems must collectively work together 
to support tactical decision makers with the five C2 functional areas. The 
following paragraphs describe these C41 systems and their related C2 functional 
areas. I 
'The astrict (*) denotes systems that support multiple C2 hnctional areas. 
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1. Intelligence 
The primary CTAPS software component for collecting, managing, and 
exchanging intelligence information is the Combat Intelligence System (CIS) 
located in the AOC, ASOCs, and WOCs. CIS consolidates the software functions 
from Rapid Application of h Power (RAAP), Intelligence Correlation Module 
(ICM), Sentinel Byte, and Constant Source (CS) to support air operations at the 
theater (force) and tactical (unit) levels. The system automates the correlation of 
near-real time data fiom message traffic to continually update its threat database. 
CIS, in conjunction with the other systems listed below, provide the JFACC with a 
common (fused) picture of their battlespace that can be shared with the other 
services and Allied Forces. This information is displayed on a Tactical 
Information Situation Display (TISD). The other systems that contribute and 









Automated Weather Dissemination System (AWDS - application of 
WCCS used at the windunit level) 
Combat Air Forces Weather Support Program (CAFWSP-used in the 
ASOC and AOC) 
Improved Many-on Many (IMOM - for electronic combat analysis in 
the AOC) 
Contingency Airborne Reconnaissance S ystedJoint Services 
Imagery Processing System(CARS/JSIPS) 
Rivet Joint System 
U2-R Reconnaissance Aircraft (collects signal and imagery 
intelligence) 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)* 
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)* 
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2. Air Operations 
The key systems that support the air operations C2 functional area are the 
Automated Planning System (APS), the Computer Assisted Force Management 
System (CAFMS), the Airspace Deconfliction System (ADS) and the Air Force 
Mission Support System (AFMSS). These systems are software applications in 
CTAPS for planning future air operations, airspace management, creating airspace 
control orders, and producing air tasking orders (ATOs). [Ref. 28: pp. 72-73 and 
Ref. 341 
At the Air Component (force) level, the APS assists the Combat Plans 
Division in the Air Operations Center (AOC) build force packages by performing 
the following functions: [Ref. 341 
0 Comparing desired force levels with available resources 
Requesting, receiving, maintaining, and analyzing intelligence data 
0 Conducting risk assessments 
0 Assessing logistical and weapon statuses 
Estimating expected flight times of the mission 
The A P S  produces an air coordination order (draft air tasking order) that 
the Combat Plans Division uses with other information provided by the ADS to 
plan future air operations. During the execution phase of the mission, the APS 
produces the actual AT0 then relies on CAFMS to manage and disseminate it to 
the appropriate unit or services. This system provides pilots with a 
comprehensive, well-coordinated, and deconflicted air plan. The AFMSS 
performs similar functions as the APS, but at the wingbi t  level. [Ref. 28: p. 37 
and Ref. 341 
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3. Fire Support 
The Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) and the CIS (RAAP 
t 
functions) are the primary frre support applications in CTAPS. Air Force 
operational planners rely on the JMEM to assist them in determining which type of 
weapon they should employ. Targeteers use this information, along with target 
data correlated and managed by RAAP, to determine actual target nominations. 
Fire support information is then forwarded to combat planners, so they can 
construct the ATOs. Other systems that contribute to the fire support functional 
area include: [Ref. 28: pp. 37, 731 
I 
I 
0 Target Plotting and Verification Module (TPVM - used in the 
ASOC) 
0 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System ( J S T M ) *  
0 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)* 
4. Maneuver 
The primary component of the CTAPS the Air Force uses for maneuver is 
the Route Evaluation Module ( E M ) .  This software application performs a route 
analysis that assist combat planners in determining optimal avenues of approach to 
selected targets. Other systems that support the maneuver C2 functional area 
include: [Ref. 28: p. 721 
0 Advanced Planning System (APS - used at the Air Component 
level)* 
0 Modular Control Equipment (MCE - automated system for 
controlling and coordinating the employment of aircraft and air 
defense systems) 
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0 Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS - used at wing/unit 
level)* 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)* 
5. Logistics 
The Logistics Module (LOGMOD) is an automated system the Au- Force 
uses to track, record, and manage logistical support requirements. The system also 
keeps track of the status of all available resources. LOGMOD is a subsystem of 
CTAPS, as well as, part of the WCCS. Other WCCS subsystems that collectively 
support the logistics C2 functional area include: [Ref. 28: pp. 37,731 
0 Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance System (CAMS) 
Combat Ammunition System-Base (CAS-B) 
0 Manpower and Personnel Module (MANPER) 
Air Force Operational Resource Management System (AFORMS) 
The five C2 functional areas, just presented, require full integration and 
interoperability among a variety of CTAPS software applications. These CTAPS 
subsystems, in conjunction with other independent C41 systems such as AWACS, 
JSTARS, Rivet Joint, and CARS/JSIPS, must continually share a common tactical 
picture to JFACC and Air Force commanders at all levels. This provides them 
with reliable, consistent, and timely information necessary to enhance their 
decision making process. 
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C. AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
In order to maintain consistency and standardization, t h ~ s  thesis describes 
the various Air Force C41 systems by again categorizing them into two broad 
categories: theater and tactical communication systems. 
1. Theater Communication Systems 
Theater level communication systems are systems that connect the Air 
Force's key C2 facilities which are often geographically dispersed throughout the 
theater of operations. These facilities include the JTF headquarters, the Joint 
Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), the Air Operations Center (AOC), 
the Mobile Air Operations Centers (MAOC), Forward Air Control Posts (FACP), 
Control and Reporting Centers (CRC), Control and Reporting Posts (CRP), and 
Air Support Operations Centers (ASOC). Two examples of theater 
communications systems include the Air Force's TRI-TAC network and long-haul 
satellite links into strategic DCS communications network. [Ref. 28: pp. 34-35] 
Air Force units deployed into a theater of operations are supported by 
Combat Communications Groups (CCG) and Combat Communications Squadrons 
(CCS). These organizations collectively have the responsibility of installing a 
reliable, robust, and secure terrestrial communications network consisting of an 
assortment of TRI-TAC communication assemblages. The system's circuit and 
message switches, such as the ANITTC-39 and AN/TYC-39 respectively, are often 
collocated at key operations centerdposts to provide local subscribers with 
common user voice, message, and data communications. The TRI-TAC switches 
may also interface with other terrestrial networks installed by the Army, Marine 
Corps, and Allied forces. Connectivity between the TRI-TAC switches is 
normally accomplished by using troposcatter and UHF LOS microwave 
transmission systems. In some cases, such as in Desert ShielcUDesert Storm, 
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operation centersheadquarters may be dispersed at great distances, thereby 
creating a need for single and multichannel Ground Mobile Forces Tactical 
Satellite Systems (GMF SATCOM). The AN/TSC-94 and AN/TSC-100 are two 
types of GMF SATCOM terminals commonly employed by the Air Force. They 
provide users connectivity to TRI-TAC switches allowing them to communicate 
through the tactical multichannel network. The Air Force's operation centers/posts 
may use either GMF SATCOM or troposcatter communications equipment for 
connectivity to other TRI-TAC message and circuit switches positioned near DCS 
entry stations. These entry stations give users access to strategic DCS s g v k g s  
such as DMS, DDN, and DSN. Regardless as to whether the Joint Force Air 
Component Commander (JFACC) operates fiom a fixed AOC or mobile AOC 
(MAOC), the DCS network can provide them with extended or "reach back" 
capabilities to CONUS based commands. This is achieved by using DSCS, 
commercial, or leased satellites. An example of a CONUS based command is the 
Air Combat Command (ACC) at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. [Ref. 6: pp. 5- 
17 to 5-19] 
2. Tactical Communication Systems 
The Air Force's tactical communication systems include the service's 
VHF/UHF LOS single channel or HF radio communication systems that support 
C2 between all deployed aircraft (including theater level airborne systems) and 
their ground control elements such as the AOC, TACPs, CRCs, FACPs, CRPs, and 
WOCs. For example, the radio communications between an attack aircraft 
providing close air support (CAS), air interdiction, and other related missions in 
support of Army ground forces, are categorized in this thesis as tactical 
communication systems. 
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The Ar Force supports Army ground operations by collocating Tactical Air 
Control Parties (TACPs) that consist of Air Force liaison personnel assigned to the 
Army's Tactical Operation Centers (TOCs) at division, brigade, and battalion 
levels. Although these personnel generally use tactical VHFAJHF radios to 
communicate directly with supporting aircraft, they must also rely on the Army's 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) network to coordinate with their parent 
ASOC collocated with the corps TOC. To add further redundancy to these 
communication links, as well as, support other long-range, over-the-horizon 
communication requirements, the Air Force uses its organic HF radios. [Ref. 6:  p. 
5-19] 
D. SUMMARY 
The two principal Air Force C41 systems described in this chapter were 
CTAPS and WCCS. They automate many of the C2 functions and processes 
within TACS to support commanders at the forceheater and windunit levels. 
The CTAPS is a migratory system that has an open architecture and a common 
operating environment, similar to the C41 systems (JMCIS and MAGTF C4I) 
described in previous chapters. The system's key function is to support the JFACC 
with an automated mechanism for developing and disseminating ATOs to 
subordinate units, the other services, and Allied Force. At the wing/unit level, the 
WCCS shares the same TBM core functions as CTAPS, in order to, promote 
interoperability among the two systems. Also described in this chapter were four 
C41 systems to include the Rivet Joint, AWACS, CARS/JSIPS and JSTARS. 
These systems are capable of managing and disseminating real-time tactical 
pictures of the commanders' battlespace during joint warfare operations. 
Air Force's C41 systems presented in this chapter support one or more C2 
functional areas. The primary C41 systems that supports each functional area were 
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identified as: CIS for intelligence; A P S ,  CAFMS, ADS, and AFMSS for air 
operations; JMEM and RAAP for fire support; REM for maneuver; and 
LOGMOD for logistics functional area. 
Similar to the other services, communications systems that support the An 
Force's C41 systems were categorized as either theater or tactical communications. 
The Air Force relies on its organic TRI-TAC communication network and GMF 
SATCOM terminals to support theater level commands, as well as, provide long- 
haul connectivity into strategic communications networks, like DCS. At the 
tactical level, the Air Force generally uses its VHF, UHF, and HF radios to 
communicate voice and data between controlling ground stations and deployed 
aircraft. 
Although not specifically addressed, the Air Force's ongoing C41 initiatives 
are outlined in their service's strategy called the Horizon. This strategy outlines 
how the Air Force will migrate and consolidate many of its stovepipe C41 
information systems into the CTAPS to support the Department of Defense's 
ultimate goal of creating a joint C41 architecture (GCCS). Eventually CTAPS, 
AFMSS, and other C41 systems will merge into a single C41 system called the Air 
Force Global Command and Control System (AFGCCS). This will form the Air 
Force's contributing system to a joint C41 architecture that supports a seamless 
exchange of tactical information to the warfighter. 
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X. ARMY COMMUNICATIONS 
Th~s chapter will present the Army's primary C41 systems used to support 
the theater and tactical level C2 requirements. Following an executive overview of 
these systems, this chapter will identi& and explain the Army's key C41 systems 
that directly support the five C2 functional areas. This will be presented in the 
same manner used previously to describe the C41 systems for the other military 
services. To complete the presentation on the Army's theater and tactical C41 
systems, the various types of communications support systems needed to 
interconnect these C41 systems will also be discussed. 
A. ARMY'S PRIMARY C41 SYSTEMS 
The Army's C2 architecture is called the Army Command and Control 
System (ACCS). It extends C2 from the NCA to the foxhole, by interfacing 
theater level networks with strategic and national communications systems. The 
ACCS encompasses all of the C2 systems, communications, hardware 
components, and software applications, required to implement the Army's AirLand 
Battle doctrine and support its portion of the Joint Operations Planning and 
Execution System (JOPES). The three principle C41 systems that compose the 
ACCS are the Army WWMCCS Information System (AWIS), Standard Theater 
Army Command and Control System (STACCS), and the Army Tactical 
Command and Control System (ATCCS). AWIS is the Army's component of 
WWMCCS (discussed briefly in Chapter 11) that supports strategic level C2. In 
addition, AWIS serves as a brigde between WWMCCS and C41 systems 
supporting theater and tactical C2, such as STACCS and ATCCS respectively. 
Both STACCS and ATCCS are treated in this thesis as C41 systems because their 
composition includes C2, communications, and intelligence processes and 
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systems. Since the main focus of this thesis is on theater and tactical C41 systems, 
only STACCS and ATCCS will be discussed in further detail. [Ref. 401 
1. Standard Theater Army Command and Control System 
(STACCS) 
STACCS is a theater level or Echelons Above Corps (EAC) C41 system that 
provides its users with timely and accurate information, on friendly and hostile 
force activities throughout the contingency spectrum.' Examples of contingencies 
typically supported by STACCS are peace operations, crisis planning, transition- 
to-war, and wartime C2 functions. Users of the STACCS are normally theater 
army commanders and staffs, Army component headquarters, and major command 
levels. STACCS connects its users' Local Area Networks (LANs) to form a single 
Wide Area Network (WAN). The WAN gives commanders the capability to 
rapidly access and exchange critical information needed to support tactical 
decision making and order dissemination. This information generally includes, 
theater level communications statuses, staging area activities, force movement, and 
resource availability status. [Ref. 41: pp. 3 1-36 and 44-45] 
During the Persian Gulf War, STACCS formed a single WAN that 
connected the LANs supporting the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) 
Headquarters, the forward logistics center at King Kahlid Military City (KKMC), 
the Support Command (SUPCOM), the Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), 
the Material Management Command (MMC), the Area Support Group (ASG), and 
the supporting signal brigade. This WAN was externdy connected to the Defense 
Integrated Secure Network (DISNET) to provide users with secure 
'Echelons Above Corps include all command levels at the Army corps level and higher in a 
theater of operations. EAC typically includes Army major theater commands, theater Army 
component headquarters, and theater Army support commands. 
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communications to other headquarters outside the theater, such as U.S. Army 
Europe (USAREUR), Forces Command (FORSCOM), and ARCENT rear 
headquarters in the continental U.S.(CONUS). [Ref. 41: p. 341 
STACCS uses common hardware components and a common software 
operating system that support an open system architecture which can be easily 
tailored to support specific C2 functional requirements. Some of these functions 










Message processing and control 
Common network management 
Gateway connectivity to other networks 
The system is completely interoperable with the Maneuver Control System 
used at Echelons Corps and Below (ECB). This connectivity allows high level 
commanders to acquire timely tactical information needed to remain abreast of the 
tactical situation and exercise effective C2 over widely dispersed theater assets. 
To meet the near-term objectives of the approved C4IFTW concept, the Army 
plans to standardize the STACCS basic system architecture (excluding the 




The ATCCS is the tactical or Echelons Corps and Below (ECB) portion of 
Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) 
ACCS. It serves as an aggregate means by whch commanders employ and sustain 
tactical forces. The architecture of ATCCS consists of five battlefield functional 
areas (BFA) directly corresponding to the C2 functional areas used throughout this 
thesis, and three types of communication support systems. The three type of 
communications support system are Area Common User System (ACUS), Combat 
Net Radio (CNR), and Automated Digital Data System (ADDS). These systems 
will be discussed later in this chapter. [Ref. 401 
The BFAs are common at each level of command from corps to brigade. 
They have been identified by senior military planners as essential for tactical 
A m y  commander's to implement the AirLand battle and AirLand Operation 
doctrines. The ATCCS integrates all of the BFAs to provide a commander the 
capability to assess the tactical situation, make decisions, disseminate orders, and 
evaluate the results. [Ref. 401 
The BFAs are supported by C41 systems that manage, exchange, 
coordinate, synchronize, and process information to support the tactical decision 
making process. The five Army C41 systems that support ATCCS are the All 
Source Analysis System (ASAS), the Forward Area Air Defense Command, 
Control and Intelligence System (FAADC21), the Advanced Field Artillery 
Tactical Data System (AFATDS), the Maneuver Control System (MCS), and the 
Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS). These systems will be 
described later in this chapter. [Ref. 401 
Since all  of the C41 systems in both ATCCS and STACCS use common 
hardware and software (ie. Common ATCCS Software System, CASS), they are 
capable of exchanging data information both vertically and horizontally using 
force level and functional control systems. Force level control systems provide the 
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automation to support the horizontal synchronization of the BFAs at each level of 
command. The horizontal exchange of information extends beyond the immediate 
organization to include adjacent Army units or other miliary services. Functional 
control systems integrate similar BFAs vertically between the levels of command. 
This full integration and interoperability allows information to be fused and 
rapidly disseminated to expedite a commander's tactical decision cycle. [Ref. 42: 
pp. 4-8 to 4-93 
The Army strategy to capture advancing technology in communications and 
support the development of a global C41 system is called the "Enterprise Strategy". 
Under this strategy, a new system will evolve in the future called the Army Global 
Command and Control System (AGCCS). It will merge components of STACCS 
and AWIS into a consolidated C41 system. AGCCS will improve the Army's 
capability to report, mobilizeldemobilize, deploylredeploy, and sustain its forces 
during a wide range of contingencies. The system is currently being developed 
using a modular design, a common operating system, and "tailorable" software 
applications. Eventually AGCCS, ATCCS and the Brigade and Below Command 
and Control System (B2C2, a modified extension of ATCCS used at the lower 
levels) will merge to form the Army's contributing C41 system to GCCS. This 
system will be called Army Battle Command System (ABCS). The ABCS will 
permit the warfighter to "pull" from consolidated sources only information needed 
to support timely tactical decision making. [Ref. 6: p. 6-18] 
B. FIVE BATTLEFIELD FUNCTIONAL AREAS (BFAs) 
Like those presented for the other services, the Army's five C2 BFA's are 
intelligence, air operations (air defense), fire support, maneuver, and logistics. 
Collectively the BFAs form the complete spectrum of a commander's C2 
requirements. Each C2 BFA requires one or more specialized C41 system(s) to 
161 
perform unique functions. Described below are the Army's basic C41 systems used 
to satis@ each C2 BFA. 
1. Intelligence 
The intelligence C2 functional area is supported by the All Source Analysis 
System (ASAS). This system uses an automated tactical intelligence network to 
fuse intelligence information into a common picture. It supports commanders 
from battalion to EAC with a complete view of their battlespace. Intelligence 
information acquired by ASAS often includes enemy deployments, capabilities, 
vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action. ASAS is compatible with other 
intelligence/surveillance systems such as the Marine Corps IAS, as well as, the Air 
Force's Rivet Joint and JSTARS. In the future, ASAS will form the intelligence 
module for ABCS. [Ref. 19: p. 12 and Ref. 401 
2. Air Operations (Air Defense) 
The Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence System 
(FAADC21) is the primary C41 system that supports the air defense functional 
area. By interfacing with other joint or Allied air defense C2 systems and other 
ground sensors, it collects, processes, and disseminates aerial target recognition, 
identification and location. The system uses Joint Tactical Information 
Distribution System (JTIDS) radios to receive long-range air pictures from the Air 
Force's AWACS. The FAADC21 automatically disseminates this information to 
Army commanders and Forward Air Area Defense (FAAD) battalions by using 
SINCGARS or the MSE network. [Ref. 28: p. 27 and Ref. 401 
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3. Fire Support 
The fire support functional area is supported by the Advanced Field 
Artdlery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). This system automates, processes, and 
manages fire support data received or transmitted to and from fire direction 
centers, fire control centers, and other operation'facilities from corps to platoon 
levels. This is performed by using a common suite of hardware components and 
software applications. Some examples of information passed over AFATDS 
include up-to-date battlefield information, target analysis, unit status, and 
coordinate target damage assessment. The AFATDS also provides Army 
commanders a tool to assist them in determining the right mix of firing platforms 
and munitions required to defeat high priority enemy targets. [Ref. 28: p. 27 and 
Ref. 401 
I tactical idormation such as enemy/fiiendly force locations, warning orders, 
operation orders, fire support requests, intelligence requests, supply status reports, 
and air operation requests. The system's graphical displays provide commanders 
with an up-to-date picture of the battlefield enabling them to optimize, 
synchronize, and concentrate their combat power. [Ref. 28: p. 27 and Ref. 401 
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5. Logistics 
The logistics C2 functional area is supported by the Combat Service 
Support Control System (CSSCS). This system provides automated control of all 
combat service support activities, by providing commanders the capability to 
assess the unit's state-of-readiness &d model potential courses of action upon 
receiving updated logistical information. This system interfaces with other C41 
systems for in both ATCCS and STACCS. [Ref. 28: p. 27 and Ref. 4011 
C. ARMY COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
The Army's communications support systems provide interconnectivity 
among the C41 systems supporting users at EAC and ECB. Similar to C41 
systems, these communications support systems are also categorized as either 
theater or tactical systems. The method for categorizing these system was 
introduced earlier in Chapter 11. 
1. Theater Communication Support Systems 
Theater communications support systems are those systems used at 
Echelons Above Corps (EAC) to support high level users who normally operate in 
a theater's communication zone. The Tri-Service Tactical Communication System 
(TRI-TAC) is the Anny's digital secure theater communications support system. It 
provides connectivity and communications support to the corps Tactical Operation 
Centers (TOC), major commands, Army component headquarters, and 
occasionally the JTF headquarters. Collocated at these locations are ANRTC-39 
and ANRYC-39 circuit and message switches respectively, that allow users direct 
interface with the TRI-TAC communications network. The network architecture is 
composed of a series of circuit and message switches arranged in a grid-like 
pattern. Interconnectivity is achieved by using GMF SATCOM, troposcatter, or 
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LOS UHF/SHF multichannel microwave systems. Critical network gateways, C2 
headquarterdcenters, and signal area communications nodes, are often connected 
with multiple communications llnks or "dual-homed", as a measure to increase the 
system's redundancy, reliability, and survivability. The TRI-TAC system services 
both dedicated subscribers and common users with secure message (up to top 
secret), data, voice, and facsimile communications. In addition, the system 
provides seamless interconnectivity to other national, theater, and tactical 
communication networks such as TRI-TAC networks established by sister military 
services, MSE networks used at ECB, and other foreign communication networks 
installed by our NATO allies. Another important attribute of the TRI-TAC system 
is the capability of its switches to access long-haul DCS communications services 
such as DMS, DSN, and DDN. This access is achieved through network gateways 
connected directly to strategically located DCS entry stations. Since TRI-TAC 
communication equipment is organic to the Army's supporting signal units, they 
normally have the responsibility for installing, controlling, and maintaining the 
network. To ensure users are provided with continuous communication service, 
system mangers closely monitor and control the TRI-TAC network/components by 
using Communications System Control Elements (CSCE) and Communications 
Nodal Control Elements (CNCE). While the systems managers use the CSCE for 
managing and controlling the overall network, they use the CNCE for managing 
individual local signal node centers. [Ref. 6: p. 7-100 and Ref. 32: p. 6-88] 
The ultimate goal of TRI-TAC systems is to support higher level theater 
commanders with secure, continuous, and reliable communications that not only 
interfaces with strategic "reach back" systems to the NCA, but also interfaces with 
tactical systems used by ECB elements. This goal is a prerequisite for the Army to 
maintain total force control within the theater of operations. 
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2. Tactical Communication Systems 
As stated earlier, the Army Tactical Command and Control System 
(ATCCS) is the main tactical communication system used by units at Echelons 
Corps and Below (ECB) typically operating in a theater's combat zone. 
Communication support within ATCCS consists of Area Common User System 
(ACUS), Army Digital Data Systems (ADDS), and Combat Net Radios (CNR). 
a. 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) is the Army's prominent ACUS 
Area Common User System (ACUS) 
of choice for supporting tactical units at ECB. Users of the system can 
communicate throughout the length and width of the battlefield in either a mobile 
or static situation. This relatively new system replaced earlier generations of 
equipment that could no longer meet the Army's needs. The system covers the 
entire corps area, fiom its rear boundary all the way forward to the maneuver 
battalion rear area. A typical corps sized area network will cover 37,000 square 
kilometers and provide secure digital service for 8500 wireline subscribers and 
1900 mobile subscribers. MSE is a nodal switched system extended by 
radiotelephone. Its backbone architecture, shown in Figure 14, is formed by 
Line-of-Site (LOS) microwave links connecting Node Centers (NC) together in a 
grid-like pattern. Other key elements of the system are Large Extension Nodes 
(LEN), Small Extension Nodes (SEN), Signal Control Centers (SCC), Radio 
Access Units (RAU), Mobile Subscriber Radio Terminals (MSRT), and Digital 
Non-Secure Voice Terminals (DNVT). [Ref. 431 
The architecture supports area common user communications 
requirements on the fluid and integrated battlefield described in the Army's 
doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Operations. These requirements include 
survivability when damaged or overloaded and self-controlling features that allow 
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the network to compensate for rapidly shfting subscriber locations and densities. 
The system enhances Command Post (CP) movement by providing selected users 
with telephone service even during movement. MSE further supports CP 
dispersion by combining wire and mobile access in the same general area of 
interest. The system incorporates a number of modern features to include high 
strategic and tactical mobility, without sacrificing its capabilities or survivability. 
The system is fully compatible with the majority of existing Army 
communications systems to include Tri-Service Tactical Communications 
NODE CENTERS 




COMMANDERS AN0 STAFF 
Figure 14. MSE Backbone Archtecture. [After Ref. 361 
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(TRI-TAC) switches and the AN/TSC-85 or AN/TSC-93 series GMF tactical 
satellite terminals. These tactical satellite terminals give the commander an 
essential "long-haul" communications capability whlch is an absolute "must have" 
in today's CONUS-centric force projection Army. Figure 14 also shows that 
mobile subscribers, down to and including maneuver battalions, receive their 
access into the MSE network through their MSRTs, whch are serviced by the 
RaQao Access Units ( M U ) .  The RAU integrates up to eight separate telephone 
calls into a Digital Trunk Group (DTG) which is then sent to a switchboard by 
LOS raQaos. [Ref. 431 
In the hture, MSE will undergo two major modifications. The first 
will be to modify MSE CNR interfaces that will increase the data rate throughput 
between its packet switch network and SINCGARS. The second involves 
modifying existing MSE LO§ llnks to extend their range capabilities using the new 
MILSTAR satellite system. [Ref. 401 
Despite its few limitations, MSE is still considered a combat force 
multiplier because of its many capabilities. It gives the modern Army force 
commander a robust and dependable communications system that will enable hun 
to effectively command and control h s  forces so that he can fight and win on any 
battlefield. 
b. co Net Radio 
Combat Net Radio (CNR) provides today's Army commanders with 
a means to exercise their C2 over highly mobile forces. The three primary 
components that constitute the CNR communications are Very High Frequency 
(VHF) Frequency Modulated (FM) radios, single channel Ultra High Frequency 
(UHF) satellite terminals, and High Frequency (HF) ralos .  
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The SINCGARS is a VHF FM radio that provides users, particularly 
at lower echelons, real-time C2 over maneuver forces during the execution phase 
of combat operations. T h s  radio is the center piece for the Army's C2 radio 
networks for frontline units such as artillery, armor, and mfantry. The SINCGARS 
single most important contribution to tactical ra&o communications is its 
Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCM) capabilities. By using direct 
sequence spread spectrum and frequency hopping techques,  the radio can 
provide users secure voice and data communications in a jamming environment. 
SINCGARS gives the Army and Marine Corps a common, reliable, and adaptive 
r a l o  system that can be used in vehlcles, aircraft, or manpack configurations. 
Additionally, these radios can interface with the MSE tactical network through 
CNR interface devices located inside some of the MSE switching shelters. [Ref. 
6 :  p. 7-13] 
One of the current limitations with SINCGARS is its low 
transmission and throughput data rates. To overcome h s  limitation and other 
shortfalls, SINCGARS System Improvement Plan (SINCGARS SIP) will upgrade 
the radio's communication protocols and add a new Global Positioning System 
(GPS) feature. Protocol modifications will increase the radio's existing capability 
for SINCGARS to SINCGARS data transmissions when used through the MSE 
packet switchmg network. Furthermore, the transmission and throughput data 
rates will be increased four times that of the current radio. [Ref. 441 
The single channel UHF Satellite Communications (SATCOM) 
terminals are small, compact, portable ra&os that extend the range of conventional 
LOS VHF FM radio communications. These rahos are used extensively by light 
airborne &visions, air assault divisions, special operations forces, and contingency 
support units to communicate secure voice and data traffic over hlgh priority radio 
nets. Typical missions that require the use of UHF SATCOM terminals are deep 
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reconnaissance missions, special Operations, and initial phases of force 
deployment to the theater. [Ref. 6: p. 6-17] 
The Army is currently performing operational testing on a new tri- 
band satellite terminal, that will replace its current UHF SATCOM terminals. The 
tri-band satellite terminal would operate in the C-, Ku-, and X-band (military) 
frequency ranges to support T 1 ( 1.544 Mbps) data rate transmissions. With h s  
capability, operators could transmit and receive secure voice, data, and video 
images. [Ref. 6: p. 6-17] 
To fuifill the tactical commander's Army's long range HF radio 
communication needs, the Army uses the Improved f igh Frequency Radio 
(IHFR). T h s  radio is capable of transmitting secure voice and data when used 
with KY-99 or MD-1230 secure equipment. The IHFR can be configured for use 
in either a manpack or vehcle application. Lke  the UHF SATCOM terminal, the 
radio is particularly effective during deep reconnaissance operations, due to its 
operating range capabilities of 2500 miles (depending on the specific model). 
IHFR, however, is more often used as a reliable and redundant back up system for 
other TRI-TAC, MSE, or UHF racho communications lmks. Thls is primarily due 
to its hgh power omni-directional transmission signatures that increases chances 
for detection, thus decreases its survivability. [Ref. 32: p. 5-9 and Ref. 45: pp. 2- 
29 to 2-33] 
Data Dibibsation System (ADDS) 
The ADDS is a collection of several automated data distribution 
systems that give commanders a secure means to collect, manage, and disseminate 
near real-time mformation regarding the tactical situation. Th~s mformation often 
includes unit locations (enemy and friendly), reconnaissance/sensory mformation, 
and targeting data. The two systems that make up ADDS are the Joint Tactical 
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Information System (JTIDS) and the Enhanced Position Location Reporting 
System (EPLRS). 
JTIDS is a secure UHF radio system used primarily at ECB to 
transmit and receive hgh-volume, hgh-speed digital data traffk, such as weapon 
system alerts, warnings, targehng, and ranging mformation. T h s  autonomous 
system is composed of a network of secure UHF radlos that transmit message 
traffic to other terminals by using omni-duectional broadcasts. The rahos are 
capable of operating in a hostile jamming environment by using frequency hopping 
and time-sequence transmission schemes. JTIDS is interoperable with the other 
services' derivative JTIDS systems, NATO's Multifunction Information 
Distribution System (MIDS), and other surveillance systems. To extend the 
system's range, JTIDS is capable of transmitting air defense data received from the 
Air Force's AWACS or the FAADC2I (common to Army air defense artillery 
units). JTIDS contributes to the C2 process by improving the tactical commander's 
situation awareness that is essential to detexmining proper employment of weapon 
systems, prioritizing targets, and selecting types of munitions. [Ref. 32: p. 6-50] 
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) is a secure, 
contention-free, data communications system that tactical commanders and staffs 
use to report a unit's identification, location, and navigation mformation. This 
capability significantly reduces the chances of unfortunate fiatricide incidents 
from occurring on a highly congested battlefield. EPLRS supports the exchange of 
real-time C2 information by using a geographlcally dispersed network of secure 
UHF radio relay links between net control stations and user terminals. Although 
EPLRS was designed as an autonomous system, it can interface with the Marine 
Corps' Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) and the Army's Battalion and 
Below Command and Control System (B2C2) System. Despite a low data rate 
throughput of 1.2 Kbps, the system enhances maneuver flexibility, fire power 
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effectiveness, and manpower efficiency of combat forces. It performs &us 
function by assisting commanders determining optimal maneuver passages, 
corridors, and zones to avoid hostile battlefield obstacles and enemy forces. The 
24th Mechanized Infantry Division proved the system's utility and capabilities 
through its successful use of EPLRS during Desert SheldDesert Storm. [Ref. 461 
D. SUM 
Two principle Army C41 systems that support theater and tactical 
commanders are STACCS and ATCCS, respectively. The Army's portion of 
WWMCCS is called AWS. It provides STACCS with the necessary interface to 
wwh/lCCS for implementing JOPES and other joint service systems supporting 
regonal CINCs and the JCS. At the theater level, STACCS offers users at EAC 
with the capability to perform force t r achg ,  rear operations, and force 
sustainment throughout the contingency spectrum. Since STACCS uses a standard 
set of hardware/sokware components and common operating systems, it can fully 
interface with ATCCS. The ATCCS architecture is composed of five BFA's, 
matchmg the five C2 functional areas used throughout this thesis, and three types 
of comunications support systems. The C41 systems that support each furmctional 
area include: ASAS for intelligence, FAADC2I for air operations (air defense), 
AFATDS for fire support, MCS for maneuver, and CSSCS for logistics. The three 
types of commuraications support systems are ACUS, CNR, and ADDS. Common 
to each type of c o m ~ c a t i o n s  ystems is they provide the physical 
interconnectivity among the Army's C41 systems. 
As the size of the Army continues to shn& due to ongoing force 
reductions, it is imperative that commanders have the capability to obtain timely 
and accurate dormation necessary to fight smarter and more efficiently. To 
achleve t l v s  goal, the Army developed its Enterprise Strategy that guides C41 
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system consolidations and other ongoing modernization initiatives. This strategy 
outlines both an economical and practical approach to capturing the advancing 
technology being developed by commercial vendors. C41 systems emerging from 
h s  strategy such as the ABCS support the long-term goals of the C4IFTW 
concept and the development of GCCS. Ultimately, ABCS or its derivative 
systems must support joint interoperability concepts and C2 requirements that are 
becoming essential to fighting and winning tomorrow's h L a n d  Battle. 
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XI. C41 FOR THE WARRIOR CONCEPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous four chapters introduced the C41 systems for each of the 
military services and how they will contribute to the evolving global C41 
archtecture. T h s  idea of a C41 archtecture erupted fiom studying lessons learned 
during the U.S. military's involvement in Grenada, Panama, Persian Gulf, Somalia, 
and Haiti. Common to each of these conflicts was the increasing reliance and use 
of joint forces to fulfill national, strategic, and military objectives. Lessons 
learned have clearly pointed out the importance and need for joint C41 
interoperability among the services. T h s  need in combination with a shnnlung 
military force, dwindling system procurement budgets, and growing uncertainty of 
future contingencies have encouraged senior military staffs to pursuit a "new way 
of doing business". The Command, Control, Communications, and Computers 
Intelligence For The Warrior (C4IFTW) concept, initially approved by the 
Secretary of Defense in 1992, encompasses the strategy to accomplish h s  goal. 
[Ref. 47: p .2] 
The C41 Architecture and Integration Division of the Joint Staff (J6I) 
introduced the' C4IFTW concept, due to numerous problems discovered whle the 
services were attempting to modernize their existing "stovepipe" or service unique 
C41 systems. Some of the problems encountered were the duplication of C2 
functions, incompatibility between systems, increased maintenance costs, 
increased procurement costs, and limited flexibility. Upgrading stovepipe systems 
can no longer be viewed as either economically or operationally feasible to 
compete for constrained budget resources or to support the warfighter's growing 
C2 requirements. These shortfalls have lead to the development and approval of 
the C4IFTW concept. There are several key documents and directives that guide 
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the implementation of the C4IFTW concept such as; the National Military 
Strategy Document that defmes C41 overall program objectives for joint and 
combined arms across the spectrum of conflicts, DoD Policies 4630.5 and 4630.8 
that outline policies for establishmg a global C41 mfrastructure, and Joint 
Publications 6-0 and 6-02 that describe requirements for C41 systems to support 
future joint operations. [Ref. 47: pp. 18-19] 
The primary goal ofthe C4IFTW concept is to support the CINCs and JTF 
Commanders (wdighters) with fused real-time information that provides them a 
true representation of their battlespace. This mformation not only provides--- 
wdighters with timely decision aides, but also enhances their ability to coordmate 
horizontally and vertically with other organizations during the prosecution of their 
assigned missions. The C4IFTW concept acts as a roadmap for integrating the 
warfighter's critical functions into a common C4I system by improving 
interoperability between the services, taking advantage of commercial-off-the-shelf 
technology, and providmg maximum flexibility in joint force composition. Upon 
completion, the C4IFTW will provide warfighters the mformation necessay to 
fight smarter and more efficiently with a smaller joint force. 
The thee  main components ofthe C4IFTW concept are the warrior's 
terminal, the warrior's battlespace, and the infosphere. The warrior's terminal is 
the composition of hardware and software that gves the warrior multimecha 
connectivity and access to fused battlespace mformation. These terminals perform 
a variety of functions to support the warfighters specific C 2  requirements 
including: [Ref. 47 and Ref. 48: p. 81 
(b Information storage and sharing 
@ Artificial intelligence and decision m h g  tools 
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@ Simulation 
@ Multi-level security 
Tactical picture displays 
0 Lnteroperability and communication support 
The warrior's battlespace refers to the area where the warrior exercises 
control or possesses a military interest. Warriors, operating withm their 
battlespace, require a fused tactical picture that represents the integration of air, 
sea, and land forces. Thts lctates that dormation to be fused into a common 
operating environment that can be exchanged with other C41 systems. By using 
approved standards, protocols, and interfaces, interoperability between existing 
systems is now possible. An example of a CINC'S battlespace is hdher  assigned 
theater of operations. [Ref. 47: p. 91 
The mfosphere is a global C41 network that forms a seamless 
communication archtecture. It wdl provide the warfighter with immelate access 
to a central repository or "warehouses" of information at anytme and from 
anywhere. By having access to this information, the warriors can extract only the 
mformation needed to make timely decisions. Dependmg of the commander's 
desires, the infosphere may automatically update the warrior's local database as the 
centralized database is changed or altered by other sensors and input systems. 
[Ref. 47: p. 101 
B. PHASES OF C4IFTW 
The C4LFTW concept is an implementation strategy that or ipal ly  
consisted of three phases that included quick fix, midterm, and objective phases. 
This strategy quickly gained favoritism and support, because it satisfied both the 
military's near-term and long-range goals for joint C41 interoperability. 
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1. Quick Fix Phase 
The goal of the quick fix phase was to launch the C4IFTW concept into 
motion by providing immediate and temporary solutions to the warrior. T h s  
phase entailed the development and use of system interpreters that translates data 
from key C41 systems withm the military services. The Joint Universal Data 
Interpreter (JUDI) is an example of a interpreter used to improve interoperability 
of canddate systems selected for future migration in the midterm and objective 
phases. JUBI is a software system that fuses tactical &splays, interprets various 
data formats, and formulates messages for output. Additionally, JUDI offered an 
innovative and economical way to use existing stovepipe systems to achleve short- 
term interoperability goals. Victory was declared for thls phase of the C4IFTW in 
1993. [Ref. 47: pp. 15 and 231 
2. Midterm Phase 
The primary goal during the midtenn phase is to create a global C41 system, 
commonly referred to as the "system of systems", which continues to prosecute 
improved interoperabllity initiatives set forth during the quick fix phase. T h s  
global C41 system is called the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). 
The GCCS is currently being created by migrating the "best of breed" or selected 
systems supporting the CNCs desirable C2 functions. Some of the candidate 
systems selected by the services as the best of breed for fiKther migration into 
GCCS include core subsystems from the Army's STACCS, the Au Force's CTAPS, 
and the Navy's MCIS. The criterion used for selecting the best of breed systems 
were based OR how well they support the CINCs desired core functions. A few of 
these core functions are crisis planning, force deployment, force employment, 
force status, air operations, f i e  support, intelligence, personnel, position, and 
narrative mformation. Collectively these core functions will support the 
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warfighter’s effort to plan, execute, and manage military operations, in order to, 
maximize their use of limited defense resources. [Ref. 48: p. 71 
The GCCS supports the general goals of the C4IFTW concept through its 
capability to generate and deliver fused real-time mformation to the warfighter 
during joint and combined operations. Besides the warfighter, GCCS also meets 
the C2 needs of other users such as the National Command Authority, the Joint 
StafY, Service Component Headquarters, supporting DOD agencies, and Allied 
Force Commanders. Since the Defense Lnformation Switchmg Network (DISN) 
infrastructure supports GCCS connectivity, all users should be able to exchange 
valuable mformation at anytune and fiom anywhere. [Ref. 491 
GCCS has become the focal point for developing future strategy, policy, 
doctrine, and system acquisition programs, as the military modernizes its C41 
systems. Its construction is based on a C41 modular design and client-server 
architecture that can be tailored to meet the warfighter’s unique C2 requirements. 
GCCS is basically a hybrid system that consists of a group of customer 
applications (ie. functional modules), extracted from earlier systems. By having a 
single consolidated system like GCCS, functional duplication and database 
inconsistencies will be eliminated. Furthermore, the single system approach 
supports ongoing efforts toward achieving full interoperability between military 
service comprising a joint force. After completing the construction of GCCS and 
successful proof-of-concept for its functions, victory of the midterm phase can be 
declared. [Ref. 47: pp. 17-23] 
3. Objective Phase 
The objective phase is the final step required for implementing the C4IFTW 
concept. During this phase advancing technologes and experience gained from 
previous phases will be used to continuously optimize evolving C41 systems. The 
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main goals of the objective phase are to: field a multifunctional, multimedia 
terminal to the warrior, ensure seamless exchange of lnformation throughout the 
warrior's battlespace, and provide a global mfosphere from whch the warrior can 
pull desired mformation. Success during the objective phase will greatly depend 
on imagination, innovation, creativity, and ingenuity by system developers, 
warfighters, and supporting DoD agencies. [Ref. 47: p. 171 
OOF-OF-CONCEPT 
To measure success and progress in implementing the C4IFTW cQncept, 
C41 systems such as GCCS must be demonstrated, tested, and evaluated in a joint 
operational environment. %s requires the users to integrate various canchdate 
systems (functions) into their operations SO that functional values can be measured. 
In the past, joint training exercises and real-world deployments have provided 
excellent opportunities for demonstrating, determining, and identifying the 
progress and related issues of C41 systems supporting the C4IFTW concept. 
The strategy for evaluating functional applications and modules used in 
GCCS consists of the following three objectives: [Ref. 48: p. 121 
@ Selection of candldate systems for future migration into GCCS 
e Conducting a proof-of-concept for new functions integrated into 
GCCS 
8 Determining user satisfaction by soliciting feedback 
Candihte systems are chosen based on how well their contributing 
functions support the C 2  needs of the warfighter during the planning and execution 
of joint and multinational operations. Once selected as candldate systems, they are 
integrated into GCCS core functions as modular components. %s requires a 
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series of tests or proof-of-concept to evaluate their attributes such as 
interoperability with other supportmg systems, usefulness of their contributions to 
the wdighter, and performance reliability in an operational environment. To 
accomplish this objective, a series of demonstrations are conducted to validate the 
added components or resolve past issues of concern. Demonstrations normally 
occur during or immediately following scheduled joint training exercises. 
Examples of past joint training exercises and demonstrations include the series of 
Secure Tactical Data Network Tests (1-4), TANDOM THRUST, AGILE 
PROVIDER, and JWID 94. Specific evaluation goals during these exercises and 
demonstrations included measuring system interface capabilities with supporting 
communication networks, testing of GCCS core functions and integrated software 
packages, and evaluating interoperability between GCCS and other C2 systems 
used at lower echelons. Other demonstrations have been incorporated, whenever 
possible, to support real-world missions such as planning and controlling the U.S. 
force deployment to Haiti. Planned demonstrations, much llke the past, will 
continue to be designed to maximize user participation and solicit feedback. User 
assessments and input must drive ongoing changes in the development of GCCS to 
fully support the C2 needs of the modem warfighter. [Ref. 47: p. 2 1 and Ref. 50: 
P. 11 
D. SUMMARY 
The C4IFTW concept charts the course for modernizing the military's C41 
systems. Since its approval in 1992, C4IFTW has gained overwhelrmng support 
and momentum by the NCA, joint staffs, CINCs, and other government agencies. 
It is a modem concept that sigmficantly d u e n c e s  the development of joint 
strategy, doctrine, training, policies, and acquisition programs. The C4IFTW 
concept allows the rapid integration of advancing off-the-shelf technologies to 
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support the modern warfighter during joint and multmational operations. GCCS, 
being developed as a baseline C41 system, will provide the joint warfighter with 
the capability to fight smarter with a much smaller force. 
The C4IFTW concept originally consisted of three phases whlch were the 
quick fix, midtenn, and the objective phases. Victory was declared for the quick 
fix phase after the successful integration of the JUDI. T h s  interface gave the 
warfighter a limited, but immediate solution to resolve interoperability problems 
among the service's existing C41 systems. Currently the military services are 
heavily engaged in meeting the challenge outlined for the midterm phase that 
r e q ~ e s  the development of a global C41 architecture using GCCS. To meet h s  
common objective, each service has developed their own strategy which include 
the Air Force's Horizon, the Army's Enterprise, the Marine Corps' MAGTF C41, 
and the Navy's Copernicas strategies. Collectively, these modernization strateges 
are paving the way toward reachmg the fmal objective phase for implementing the 
C4IFTW concept. In the objective phase, the warfighter will be provided the 
capability to "pull" information, as needed, from a global mfosphere and "pushed" 
or automatically receive selected mfomation updates from consolidated databases. 
Since the primary goal ofthe C4IFTW concept is to support the 
wxfighters, it is imperative they remain actively involved in the development and 
proof-of-concept demonstrations. Their input and feedback will mfluence the type 
of functional design and customer s o h a r e  applications offered by the next 
generation (2.41 systems. Although h s  process is currently underway, it will 
continue during future joint training exercises and demonstrations such as 
UNIFIED ENDEAVOR and JWID 95, scheduled later h s  year. 
Current trends indicate that fbture contingencies will require the application 
of fully joint forces that have the capability to synchronize their combat power at 
the right time and place. This will fwther compel the need for commanders at all 
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XII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The scope of tlus thesis was limited primarily to C2, C3, and C41 used at 
the operational and tactical levels of the services. However, tlus subject area 
extends to all levels of command to include national, strategic, joint and combined 
operations, not specifically addressed in h s  thesis. To provide introductory 
students in the Joint C41 Curriculum with a comprehensive primer in C2 and other 
related topics that covers these areas, further research is recommended. 
Specifically, h s  research should address national, strategic, joint and combined 
level C2 organizations, deployment planning systems, roles, decision malung 
processes, and modem C41 technology. Other areas that establish fertile ground 










Special operations forces' roles, organizations, C41 systems, and 
communications support systems 
U.S. Coast Guard roles, organizations, C41 systems, and 
communications support systems 
National, stratep,  and joint contingency planning and C41 systems 
Strategic nuclear C2, organizations, and C41 systems (NORAD) 
Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) 
Joint Deployment System (JDS) 
Unique joint contingency C41 and communication support systems 
Administrative requirements, organizations, and functions at the 
national and operational levels 
Defense level planning systems (JOPES, JSPS, PPBS) 
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0 Functional CINCs' roles, organizations, and C41 systems 
0 National and strategic level sensors and intelligence processing 
Advancing technology conhnues to have a profound effect on today's C41 
archtectures. Since this thesis is used to educate tomorrow's leaders, system 
developers, and analyst, it is paramount for thls document to remain updated. 
Further research in C41 and the other areas recommended above will be the means 
to accomplish thls task. Ultimately, thls additional research will provide Joint C41 
students with the educational tools and technical skdls they need to meet their 
commanders' C2 warfighting requirements. 
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